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Abstract
This thesis contains a critical discussion of two metaethical theories: expressivism, as 
developed in the works of Simon Blackburn,-and Cornell realism, as presented by Richard 
Boyd and David Brink. In the introduction, a distinction is made between external and 
internal accommodation projects for moral discourse and it is ai'gued that the external 
accommodation project should be guided by acceptance of methodological naturalism. 
Expressivism and Cornell realism are then subjected to an extended comparative evaluation, 
and an answer is sought to the question of which of the two should be favoured. The main 
conclusion of the thesis is that Cornell realism is rationally preferable to expressivism. This 
conclusion is arrived at by looking at how well the two theories, respectively, explain various 
deeply embedded features of moral discourse. Explaining such features is what the internal 
accommodation project for moral discourse consists in.
The assertoric surface-form of moral discourse and the supervenience of moral 
predicates on natural predicates receive special attention in the study. It is argued that 
expressivism and Cornell realism do equally well on the issue of moral supervenience. But 
whereas expressivism is still vulnerable to a paiticular argument from the philosophy of 
language (the Frege-Geach point), Cornell realism can fend off the criticism that most 
persistently has been directed at it from this area of philosophy. In a comparative evaluation 
involving the selected issues, Cornell realism therefore fares better than expressivism.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
1. Setting the Stage
This thesis concerns metaethics. It raises and discusses theoretical issues concerning 
the nature of moral discourse, and does not offer any guidance in relation to issues in 
moral theory or applied ethics. The conclusions of the thesis are therefore of little, if 
any, direct relevance to our eveiyday, practical life as moral agents. First-order 
reflections about what to do, or about how to live, do not, however, stand alone, or 
even particularly prominent, in relation to the question of what is interesting and 
important from a philosophical point of view. There is a distinct philosophical task 
that consists in taking a step back from our first-order reflections, and ask 
second-order questions about the nature of these reflections. Such second-order 
questions include, but are not restricted to, ones like these: can moral utterances be 
evaluated in terms of tmth and falsity, and if so, what notion of truth is appropriate to 
moral discoui'se? Does a notion of moral truth require for its intelligibility, the 
existence of (perhaps, distinctively moral) states of affairs such that moral claims are 
time just in case they give a correct depiction of these states of affairs? What is the 
relation between moral language and reality? Do moral utterances describe states of 
affairs, or are they used to express emotions or something else with 
non-propositional content? Can we refer to the classical notions of inconsistency and 
entailment when we are to explain the validity of certain patterns of inference used in
moral reasoning, or do we have to say that a non-classical system of logic applies to 
inferences in tliis area of discomse?
What distinguishes one metaethical theory from another is the nature of the 
answers it offers to questions like these. In the following, I shall be concerned with 
assessing vaiious answers to some of these questions, and I shall suggest that some 
answers are better than others. A major assumption of the thesis is that a view I call 
'methodological naturalism' should be accepted. Acceptance of methodological 
naturalism sets constraints on what views one can hold in areas of thought such as 
philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of religion, aesthetics and metaethics. If we 
focus on metaethics, it seems to me that an adequate metaethical theory must meet 
two desiderata. First of all, it must be able to accommodate features of ordinary 
moral discourse and practice that are commonly taken to be characteristic of the 
discourse. Such features include the assertoric suiface-foim of moral discourse, the 
existence of the truth-predicate in moral discourse, and the phenomenon that it is 
impossible that two objects should differ in tenus of moral properties without 
differing in terms of natural properties. A metaethical theory that is unable to explain 
features such as these, yields a distorted picture of moral discourse and practice. This 
first desideratum can be summed up in the following way:
"A plausible metaethical view should comport with deeply embedded 
presumptions of ordinary moral discourse and practice. This guides the 
project of internal accommodation" (Timmons 1999:12).
The second desideratum that an adequate metaethical theory must meet is that it must 
not conflict with well-supported non-moral theories and assumptions. The idea is that 
a metaethical theory that is based on implausible epistemological and ontological
assumptions, cannot be satisfactoiy. This second desideratum might be foimulated |
like this: !
"A plausible metaethical view should comport with plausible general views 
and assumptions from other relevant areas of inquiry. This guides the project |
Iof external accommodation" (ibid. : 12). |
If methodological naturalism is accepted, as I ai'gue that it should be, then it is the |
truth of methodological naturalism that should guide the project of external 
accommodation. That methodological naturalism guides the project of external 
accommodation means in paificulai* that it is a requirement on an acceptable 
metaethical theoiy that it only involves methods of acquiring Icnowledge that are ones 
employed by the best contemporaiy empirical science, and that it only posits the 
existence of entities that are referred to in the explanatoiy theories of the best 
contemporaiy empirical science. *
Working within the consti aints of methodological naturalism constitutes a 
land of'play safe' strategy. It is to say: 'certain methods of acquiring knowledge are 
well tested and have proven veiy reliable. We also know that things such as atoms, 
acids, desires, beliefs, biological needs, behavioural patterns and societies exist. Let 
us see how many of the chai acteristic features of ordinary moral discoui se we can 
explain and make sense of if we only make use of these tested methods of acquiring 
Icnowledge, and if we only posit the existence of entities that we Icnow ai e there'. It 
might of course be the case that in the end it proves impossible to explain and make 
sense of the characteristic features of ordinary moral discourse, if  we work within the 
boundaries of methodological naturalism. If this turns out to be the case, then we are 
faced with the choice of either abandoning methodological naturalism or abandoning
 ^ Tliis view is spelled out mid defended in the next chapter.
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moral discourse. This choice only becomes pressing, however, when the failure has 
been established of eveiy attempt to caiTy out the project of internal accommodation, 
constrained by the core claims of methodological natui alism.
2. The Problem
Historically, many attempts have been made to carry out the external accommodation 
project within a natmalistic framework. On the contemporary metaethical scene, 
Simon Blackburn and the philosophers associated with the school of thought that has 
come to be known as 'Cornell realism', ai e examples of theorists who ai e engaged in 
this project.^ For a number of yeais, Blackburn has defended a theoiy labelled 
'quasi-realism'. The Cornell realists defend a version of what is called 'synthetic 
naturalism'. Blackburn and the Cornell realists offer their own characterisations of 
what naturalism is, but it is safe to say that neither Blackburn's theoiy nor Cornell 
realism transgress the boundaries of an external accommodation project which is 
guided by acceptance of methodological naturalism. Put s li^ tly  differently: both 
Blackburn's theory and Cornell realism can be seen as attempts to caiTy out the 
external accommodation project when this project is guided by the truth of 
methodological naturalism. Consequently both meet one of the desiderata that any 
minimally acceptable metaethical theory should meet.
The main question of the thesis can now be foimulated: given that one is 
attracted to methodological naturalism, and has a choice in metaethics between 
Blackburn's quasi-realism and Cornell realism, which of these two theories should be 
favoured? This question is to be decided by looldng at how well the two theories,
respectively, cariy out the internal accommodation project. Given that both theories
 ^ Cornell realism is commonly associated with the work of David Brink, Richar d Boyd, Nicholas 
Sturgeon and Richard Millar.
meet the desideratum of being compatible with methodological naturalism, the 
question of which theoiy to favoui* must be answered by comparing how well the two 
theories, respectively, explain and account for deeply embedded presumptions of 
ordinary moral discourse and practice.
Perhaps some justification is needed for this fiamework. There are, after all, 
other metaethical theories on the contemporary scene that meet the desideratum of 
being compatible with methodological naturalism/ Why not discuss these? My 
reasons for focusing on quasi-realism and Cornell realism are these: 
non-descriptivism, which is a core component of Blackburn's quasi-realism, has been 
a prominent line of thought in the history of philosophy. Blackburn can be seen to 
caiiy the flag, previously carried by Hume, Ayer, Stevenson and Hare. Blackburn's 
writings have, moreover, been veiy influential over the past two decades and 
Blackburn continues to be an important figure. When it comes to Cornell realism, it 
can also be said that this is a version of a general line of thought that has been 
prominent in the history of philosophy. Realism and descriptivism in ethics have 
been ar ound since, at least, Plato, and it is proper and interesting to contrast a 
contemporaiy anti-realist and non-descriptivist position with a contemporaiy realist 
and descriptivist position. Brink and Boyd, who aie the two theorists I shall focus on 
in my discussion of Cornell realism, continue, moreover, to be influential writers in 
the field.'* There is therefore good reason to choose Cornell realism as one of the 
positions to be discussed.
 ^ See, for example, (Railton 1986; 1989), (Gibbard 1990), (Jackson 1998), (Smith 1994), (Skorupski 
1999), (Timmons 1999) and (Wright 1996).
4 See (Brink 2001) and (Boyd 2003).
3. Thesis Outline
Having made clear" what the main question of the thesis is, and having offered some 
justification for the criteria by which expressivism and Coi-nell realism have been 
chosen for examination and comparison, it is now possible to turn to an outline of 
how the thesis is structured in terms of individual chapters. The next chapter contains 
a discussion of what naturalism is as a general ontological and methodological view. 
The key features of methodological naturalism, as I shall understand the position, ar e 
specified, and the position is defended. In chapter three, I start focusing on the 
project of internal accommodation. There are a number of deeply embedded 
presumptions of ordinary moral discourse and practice that a plausible metaethical 
theory should compoi"t with. One such presumption revolves around the concept of 
supervenience. A general introduction to this concept is the topic of this chapter. A 
par*ticulai" definition of moral supervenience is suggested, and it is argued that any 
minimally adequate metaethical theory must be able to explain why this relation 
holds. Chapter four contains a discussion of Simon Blackburn's influential 
supervenience argument against moral realism. It also contains an account of what 
expressivism is as a semantic theory, and a discussion of the expressivist explanation 
of moral supervenience. I argue that Blackburn's argument is powerful, and that 
expressivism does not have an independent problem on the issue of moral 
supervenience.
In chapters five, six and seven, attention is directed at the commonly termed 
'Frege-Geach point'. I give an account of what this point is, and why it constitutes a 
challenge to expressivism. I consider thereafter, in some technical detail, the various 
argumentative strategies that Blackburn, over the years, has employed in order to
overcome the challenge. In chapter seven, I discuss Blackburn's most recent strategy.
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The conclusion of that discussion is that this sti'ategy does not enable the expressivist 
to overcome the Frege-Geach point. This is one of the main conclusions of the thesis. 
At present there simply is no credible solution on the table as to how the expressivist 
can meet the Frege-Geach point. Expressivism should therefore not be embraced.
In chapter eight, I begin my exploration of the second alternative for the 
methodological naturalist. I discuss the 'open-question argument', and conclude that 
this much heralded challenge poses no threat to either analytic ethical naturalism, or 
to Cornell realism. In chapter nine, I outline and discuss a very influential argument 
against the plausibility of the semantic views associated with Cornell realism. I ai'gue 
that this ai'gument, at best, poses an explanatory challenge to Cornell realism, and 
that this challenge can be met. In addition to an account of some of the key 
metaphysical commitments of Cornell realism, chapter ten involves a discussion of 
David Brink's explanation of moral supervenience. The conclusion of this chapter is 
that the special modal force with which moral supeivenience holds, does not amount 
to a problem for Cornell realism. This position faies well on the issue of moral 
supervenience. Chapter eleven contains a short summary of the thesis and its main 
conclusions. The main conclusion of the thesis is that Cornell realism is to be 
prefened to expressivism as developed by Blackburn. In a compaiative evaluation of 
the two theories, involving the issues I have chosen for discussion, Cornell realism 
comes out the strongest.
CHAPTER 2 
Naturalism
1. Introductory
In this chapter, I present and defend a certain view about what non-moral 
assumptions should guide the external accommodation project for moral discourse. 
The main claim of the chapter is that this project should be guided by an acceptance 
of naturalism. This claim needs, however, to be qualified in a number of ways, and 
the rest of the chapter can be seen as an attempt to provide such a qualification. In 
section two, an important distinction is drawn between two types of naturalism. In 
sections three, four and five, various popular chai acterisations of ontological 
naturalism are discussed. I argue that these characterisations are either uninstructive, 
internally inconsistent, or vague. In section six, I turn to methodological naturalism. I 
present and reject a particulai' characterisation of this type of natui alism. After that, I 
make cleai* what I mean by ’methodological natui alism', and I then ai gue that this 
position should be accepted.
2. Two Types o f Naturalism
Naturalism is a significant stance in contemporary philosophy. In areas such as 
philosophy of mind, philosophy of mathematics and metaethics, it is popular to 
pledge allegiance to natuialism.^ But what is naturalism as a general philosophical 
outlook? Since so many people call themselves 'naturalist' it would be helpful to 
Icnow what this label entails in terms of substantial commitments. According to The 
^ See, for example, (Papineau 1993), (Brink 2001), (Jackson 1998) and (Blackburn 1998).
Cambridge Dictionary o f Philosophy ^ which aims to captuie contemporaiy analytical 
usage, naturalism is a twofold view that has a methodological/epistemological 
component and an ontological component/ The methodological/epistemological 
component of naturalism is the claim that;
"acceptable methods of justification and explanation are commensurable, in 
some sense, with those in natural science".
The ontological component of naturalism is the claim that:
"everything is composed of natural entities - those studied in the sciences (on 
some versions, the natural sciences) - whose properties determine all the 
properties of things, persons included, absti acta (abstract entities) like 
possibilia (possibilities) and mathematical objects, if they exist, being 
constmcted of such abstracta as the sciences allow;".
What is the conceptual relationship between methodological and ontological 
naturalism if the two components are given this characterisation? It is conceptually 
possible, and indeed veiy common for the two views to be combined. For example, if 
one adheres to the methodological component of natui alism, then this is likely to set 
constraints on what ontological theses one is willing to accept. A methodological 
naturalist might reject the existence of abstiact objects because the only methods of 
justification and explanation he allows, do not register the existence of abstiact 
objects. In a case like this, a methodological commitment informs ontological 
commitments. The reverse relation can also hold. One can staif with the assumption 
that everything is composed of the entities that ai e studied in the natural sciences, 
and then go on to form the methodological view that the only acceptable methods of
® Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995.
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justification and explanation are ones that are commensurable, in some sense, with 
those in natural science.
However, it is conceptually possible that methodological and ontological 
naturalism should come apart. Consider the, be it unlikely, case of an agent who 
endorses ontological, but not methodological natuialism. Such an agent tliinks that 
there aie other, and acceptable, ways of justification and explanation of the subject 
matter of natural science, than the ones that are commensurable with those in natural 
science itself. As an example of such an agent, consider a materialist who, for some 
reason, thinks that claims about the material world, put foiward on the basis of the 
laying of tarot cards, are methodologically acceptable. Such an agent might be 
thought to hold an odd combination of views, but that combination of views is not 
excluded by the characterisations of methodological and ontological naturalism.
As an example of the coherence of being a methodological, but not an 
ontological naturalist, consider an agent who accepts the existence of a Deity outside 
space and time. It is conceptually coherent for such an agent to endorse the view that 
respectable methods of justification and explanation aie commensurable, in some 
sense, with those in natural science. Methodological naturalism, in the above 
characterisation, does not say that eveiy aspect of reality can, even in principle, be 
explained by methods commensurable, in some sense, with those in natural science. 
Accordingly, the truth of methodological naturalism is conceptually compatible with 
there being aspects of reality that cannot be justified and explained by methods 
commensurable, in some sense, with those in natural science.
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3. A Characterisation o f Ontological Naturalism
To shed further light on the distinction between methodological and ontological
naturalism, consider this characterisation of what it is to be a naturalist:
"To be a naturalist is to see human beings as frail complexes of
perishable tissue, and so part of the natural order. It is therefore to refuse
unexplained appeals to mind or spirit, and unexplained appeals to Icnowledge
of a Platonic order of F oItus or Norms; it is above all to refuse any appeal to a
supernatural order" (Blackburn 1998:49).
Blackburn’s comments serve to make clear what the ontological commitments of a
naturalist aie, and can therefore be seen to shed light on the ontological component of
naturalism. The passage does not, however, touch upon issues relating to
methodological naturalism, and acceptance of ontological natui alism, in Blackburn’s
characterisation, is compatible both with acceptance and with rejection of
methodological naturalism, as chaiacterised above.
Interestingly, Blackburn’s characterisation is mainly negative. He explicates
what it is to be an ontological naturalist by giving a list of things that such a
naturalist does not believe in. This negative definition is not without merits. It tells
us, for example, that Platonism and theism aie rejected by the ontological naturalist,.
and it therefore gives us some understanding of what ontological natui alism is. More
needs to be said, however, if  we are to have a satisfying chai acterisation of what
ontological natui alism is, and I do not think that such a chai acterisation can be of a
mainly negative nature. One reason why such a characterisation is insufficient is that
it leaves unexplained the rejection of vaiious entities. If ontological naturalism is
chaiacterised negatively as the view that entities x, y and z do not exist, then there is
nothing in the characterisation alone that unifies the rejection of these entities. And if
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there is nothing that unifies the rejection of these entities, then it is difficult to see 
how ontological naturalism can be a systematic view. If x, y and z are rejected on the 
gi'ound that they all possess a certain property, and if this is made clear in the 
characterisation of ontological naturalism, then such a position would go some way 
towards being a systematic view. A characterisation of ontological naturalism that 
contains a clause that yields a general criteria for what it takes to be a natural entity is 
therefore preferable to a characterisation that has infoimative content primaiily in 
viiiue of stipulating that certain entities ai e not tolerated by ontological naturalism.
Another dissatisfying featui e of Blackburn’s characterisation is that it is rather 
uninformative in virtue of referring to the notions of the 'natural order’ and a 
’supematui'al order’. Saying that a natui'alist sees human beings as pai*t of the natural 
order, and that he refuses appeal to a supernatural order is only informative on the 
assumption that it is clear what ’natural’ means in these contexts. It is, however, not 
clear what ’natural’ means in these contexts. To use ’natural’ in a characterisation of 
what it is to be a naturalist, without making explicit what this term means, has no 
explanatoiy power. Such a manoeuvre just shifts the question from what it is to be a 
naturalist to what it is to be natural.
A third problem is this; what new infoimation about what it is to be a
naturalist, new information in the sense of not already being inherent in the notion of
being a naturalist, is actually conveyed by saying that a naturalist refuses any appeal
to a supernatural order? Saying this, only yields new information about what it is to
be a natui'alist on the assumption that one could be naturalist and appeal to something
supernatural. Such an assumption is, however, conceptually incoherent. Whatever it
exactly is to be naturalist, it is a conceptual ti*uth about what it is to be a naturalist
that a naturalist does not appeal to anything supematui'al. The moment a natui'alist
12
appeals to something supernatural in his explanations, he simply stops being a 
natui'alist. So, Blackburn's emphasis that a naturalist, "above all" refuses any appeal 
to a supernatural order, does not cast any new light on what it is to be a naturalist.
4. The Discipline Criterion
If Blackburn's characterisation of the ontological component of natui alism is 
dissatisfying, are there any other, more satisfying ones? One way of explaining what 
naturalism is, consists in making use of what has been called the 'discipline criterion' 
(Crisp 1996:115). According to this criterion, naturalism is the view that the only 
entities that exist are natural entities. Natuial entities are then characterised as those 
entities that are studied and described by natural science. Mark Timmons is an 
example of a philosopher who uses the discipline criterion to characterise what 
naturalism is:
"The vague, pre-theoretic idea that the philosophical naturalist tries to
articulate and defend is that everything - including any paificulars, events,
facts, properties, and so on - is part of the natui al, physical world that science
investigates" (Timmons 1999:12).
Timmons gives a fuifher elucidation of what he takes philosophical naturalism to be:
"The naturalist begins with an ontological presumption about what sorts of
particulars, entities, and so forth are fundamental, which can be roughly
captured in the following thesis of ontic primacy: The ontologically primary
or fundamental entities (properties, facts, etc.) in the world are all part of the
subject matter of science" (ibid.: 13).
One thing to note about Timmons' initial characterisation of the philosophical
naturalist is that it contains reference to the notion of the 'natural' world. The natural
13
world is seen to be equivalent to the physical world. Timmons' chaiacterisation is 
therefore informative. Naturalism is equivalent to physicalism. A philosophical 
naturalist defends the idea that everything is par t of the physical world, and as a 
result of this, a naturalist cannot accept the existence of non-physical entities such as, 
say, a Cartesian ego. A naturalist must, simply in virtue of being a natui'alist, reject 
the existence of such an entity.
This does not, however, square well with the subsequent thesis of ontic 
primacy. Since this thesis only says that the primary or fundamental entities in the 
world ai e the subject matter of natural science, the thesis allows the existence of 
entities that are not the subject matter of the natural sciences. Non-physical entities 
are examples of entities that are not the subject matter of natural science. The thesis 
of ontic primacy therefore allows the existence of non-physical entities. This means 
that if what it is to a natui'alist is characterised in terms of subscription to the thesis of 
ontic primacy, as Timmons suggests it should be, then a naturalist may be able to 
accept the existence of a non-physical entity such as a Cartesian ego, assuming that it 
is not a primary or fundamental entity. It is of couise possible for such a naturalist to 
reject the existence of non-physical entities, but if the naturalist does this, then this is 
not something that can be justified by reference to his naturalist position. When 
characterised in terms of the thesis of ontic primacy, naturalism does not entail 
physicalism, though physicalism is compatible with naturalism.
The upshot of this is that whereas Timmons’ two characterisations, when
considered individually, cast some light on the question of what it is to be a
naturalist, they do not, when seen in conjunction, present naturalism as a consistent
position. One remedy to this problem is to go for just one of the chai acterisations,
and leave the other out of the pictm e. Each of the two characterisations suffer,
14
however, from a flaw that is common to many attempts to chaiacterise what 
naturalism is. Both of Timmons' characterisations of what it is to be a naturalist 
involve reference to a notion of the natural sciences. This notion is, moreover, clearly 
supposed to do a lot of explanatoiy work in the characterisations. In relation to this, it 
is important to be awaie that an attempt to chai acterise natural entities in tenns of 
what is the subject matter of the natui al sciences can only be infoimative if it is clear 
what sciences ai e natuial sciences. But this is not at all clear. The concept of a 
natural science is vague. To give any of the following, distinct definitions of a natural 
science is to demonstrate competence in the use of the concept.
Firstly, a natural science can be defined as a science that gets its results from 
conducting empirical research and cariying out empirical experiments. This 
definition has as a consequence that sciences such as physics, chemistiy, biology and 
geology ai e within the boundaries of natui al science. But it also has the consequence 
that sciences such as social psychology and anthropology are natural sciences.
Secondly, a natural science can be defined as a science that studies physical 
objects. It is a consequence of this definition that social psychology and anthropology 
cannot be natuial sciences. After all, it does seem to be stietching things to say that 
the emotional and behavioural characteristics of a group, and the social norms of a 
culture, aie physical objects.
Thirdly, a natural science can be defined as a science that studies natural
phenomena where natural phenomena are defined as phenomena that lie within the
spatio-temporal world. The important contrast is here between the natural and the
supematui'al where the latter is some, or all, of the phenomena that lie outside the
spatio-temporal world. On this definition of a natural science, the class of natural
sciences is gi eatly expanded compared to the previous definitions. All of the social
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sciences study phenomena that lie within the spatio-temporal world and are therefore 
to be seen as natural sciences. The same is tiue of medical science and many of the 
disciplines within the humanities. History, literature, cultuial studies and art-history 
are all areas of inquiry that study phenomena that are natural in the sense that they lie 
within the spatio-temporal world.^
An uncontroversial conclusion to draw from these considerations is that 
reference to an unqualified notion of the natural sciences does relatively little to 
make it cleai' what entities are natural, and as a result of this, it does not cast much 
light on the question of what naturalism is. Timmons just uses an unqualified notion 
of die natui al sciences, and his characterisations of what it is to be a naturalist are 
therefore vague.^ This can be illustrated by taking yet another look at the thesis of 
ontic primacy. Acceptance of this thesis leads to two veiy different world views 
depending upon which definition of natural science is accepted. If the first definition 
is accepted, then naturalism is a position that allows the view that non-physical 
entities such as the emotional and behavioural characteristics of a group and the 
social norms of a culture aie ontologically primary or fundamental entities. If the 
second definition is accepted, then naturalism is a position that does not allow this 
view. This means that a chai acterisation of what it is to be a naturalist, through use of 
the thesis of ontic primacy, only has real informative content if it is put forward in 
conjunction with a qualification of what a natui al science is.
’ This definition of what a natural science is leaves it unclear whether philosophy is a natural science. 
After all, many philosophers think that philosophy's subject matter is not spatio-temporal entities, but 
rather general, abstract structures.
® To see that Tinunons is not alone in making use of an unqualified notion of natural science in an 
attempt to characterise what entities are natural, see (Moore 1993:92), and consider tliis passage from 
Brink: "First, we must distinguish within the class of nomnoral facts and properties between natural 
and supernatural properties (see Moore 1993 :chapters: 1,2,4). This distinction is supposed to be one o f  
which we have an intuitive grasp. Natural facts and properties aie presumably sometiiing like those 
facts and properties as picked out by the natural and social sciences (broadly conceived);" (Brink 
1989:22).
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If naturalism is characterised thi'ough use of the discipline criterion, then 
naturalism actually comes in at least three different versions. The fu’st version says 
that what is natural is what is the actual, historical subject matter of the natural 
sciences. One might reject this view because one feels that it places unwarranted 
weight on the contingent fact of what, as it happens, has been of interest to natural 
scientist (Crisp1996:116). The worry can perhaps be spelled out in more detail like 
this: if the set of natural entities is the set of entities that actually has been studied by 
natural science, then it is the case that if  natural scientists had chosen to study other 
tilings than the things that they actually chose to study, then we would now have a 
different set of natural entities fi'om the set that we actually have, and this is 
unsatisfactory.
It seems to me that this line of thought rests on the assumption that the notion
of natural entities is only useful if the set of natural entities is a set whose boundaries
can be determined once and for all, and by a method that is completely independent
of contingent human interests. This assumption is, in my opinion, mistalcen. A
defender of this first version of the discipline criterion should say that the natural
sciences, whatever the natural sciences exactly are, are engaged in the process of
acquiring knowledge of reality. This is an ongoing process and progi essively, more
and more aspects and layers of reality, are laid bare. The set of type of particles and
type of forces, governing the behaviour of these particles, that tlie natural sciences, at
any given point in time, have been able to detect and characterise, is the set that
constitutes the set of natural entities. This view entails that the set of natural entities
changes along with changes in the investigatory powers of the natural sciences. This
does not mean, however, that the notion of natur al entities is not a useful notion. The
set of natural entities is a set of entities that we, at some given point in time have
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str ong reason think is there, and independently of the fact that the set of natural 
entities might be revised in light of future discoveries, the set of entities, as it looks 
like at that time, should be taken into account when views about the nature of reality 
ar e then being formulated.
A second version of naturalism emerges if what is natural is what is 
potentially the subject matter of natural science. Perhaps this way of characterising 
naturalism should be rejected because "it begs the very question to which we are 
seeking an answer" (Crisp 1996:116). I think that this is the right response. Consider 
the question of what is the potential subject matter of natural science. If something 
'non-natural', whatever exactly that is, is a potential subject matter of natural science, 
whatever exactly that is, then natural science can, at least potentially, study and 
describe something non-natural. But if natur al science can do this, then it is difficult 
to understand why this kind of science should be called 'natural' science. On any 
plausible view about what natural science is, it must be stipulated that natural science 
only studies and describes 'nature' or 'the natural'. Whatever 'nature' or 'the natural' 
exactly is, it is, per definition, something different fiom 'the non-natural'. So, it is not 
a plausible suggestion that somethirig non-natural is the potential subject matter of 
natural science. It is only the natural that is the potential subject matter of natural 
science. This means that saying that what is natural, is what is the potential subject 
matter of natural science, is like saying that what is natur al is what is natural. This 
does not cast any light on the question of what it is to be natural, and it therefore 
casts no light on what natur alism entails in terms of ontological commitments.
What is involved in the third version of natur alism can be illuminated by 
considering a recent characterisation of naturalism:
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"Ontological natmalism takes various forms. We will understand such
naturalism in terms of this core view: every real entity either consists of or is
somehow ontologically grounded in the objects countenanced by the
hypothetically completed empirical sciences" (Moser & Yandell 2000:4).
Naturalism is here characterised through use of the discipline criterion. It is,
however, not a notion of the natur al sciences that is supposed to do a lot of
explanatory work in this definition. It is a notion of the empirical sciences in a certain
state that is supposed to do this work.
At least three objections can be raised against this characterisation. Firstly, it
needs to be specified what it means to say that an entity 'is somehow ontologically
gr ounded in' certain objects. Secondly, invoking the notion of the empirical sciences
raises the problem of specifying exactly when something is an empirical science. The
wony is that the notion of the empirical sciences is just as vague as the notion of the
natural sciences. And if the latter notion cannot be used to characterise naturalism
because it is too vague, then the same must be true of the former notion. Thirdly, the
notion of the hypothetically completed empirical sciences is problematic because it
seems doubtful that the empirical sciences, even hypothetically, can be complete.
What can be said in response to these objectioiis?
As a specification of what they mean, Moser and Yandell say that it is either
by reduction or supervenience that one entity can be ontologically grounded in
another entity (ibid.:8). It should be noted here tliat if an entity only needs to stand in
a supervenience relation with the objects countenanced by the hypothetically
completed empirical sciences in order to be ontologically grounded in these objects
(and therefore real), then naturalism becomes very inclusive. In philosophy of mind,
the only position that is incompatible with the supervenience requirement, and which
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therefore is not a version of naturalism, is Cartesian dualism that allows the mental to 
float free of the physical domain. A version of substance dualism that only differs 
fr om its Cartesian sibling, in that it insists that the mental cannot float fr ee of the 
physical, is, however, a version of naturalism. In Moser and Yandell's 
characterisation, ontological naturalism is a world view that can accommodate the 
existence of entities outside space that are able to cause change in the physical world. 
'Ontological natur alism' is of course just a name, and one can apply this name to 
whatever kind of world view one likes. If one, however, characterises ontological 
naturalism in such a way that it is expansive enough to allow for the existence of 
entities outside space that can causally interact with entities in space, then a very 
large number of theories qualify as a version of ontological naturalism, and not much 
is conveyed in terms of substantial information by saying that a certain theory is a 
version of ontological natur alism.
Regarding the second objection, it does not seem to me that the notion of the
empirical sciences is just as vague as the notion of the natural sciences. What is
distinctive of empirical science is that it formulates hypotheses that can be falsified
or supported by observation of controlled experiments. Social sciences such as
psychology, social psychology and anthropology formulate such hypotheses and
therefore they belong to the class of empirical sciences. What about such a science as
particle physics? One might argue that this is not an empirical science, but a highly
theoretical science that puts forward abstract models for the nature and behaviour of
various particles. If this is true, then the entities countenanced by this science
(particles such as protons and neutrons) are not real. As a response to this, it can be
ar gued that par ticle physics is an empirical science since many of its hypotheses can
be tested against observation. Many of its hypotheses can be subjected to empirical
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testing in the sense that they can be falsified or supported by observation of 
controlled experiments.
The third objection is quite powerful. The idea that the empirical sciences can 
be complete, rests, as far as I can see, on the following assumptions: i) the world 
contains a finite number of types of particles and a finite number of types of forces 
governing the behaviour of these types of particles, ii) the empirical sciences 
gradually become able to detect more and more of these types of particles and types 
of forces, iii) the empirical sciences will eventually detect all types of particles and 
all types of forces. When the empirical sciences have done this, they can be said to be 
complete. The history of the empirical sciences, however, does not lend much 
support to the idea that they will one day be complete.
The history of the empirical sciences is a one of continuous new discovery. 
What has very often happened is that what was taken to be the final truth about some 
matter has been revised in the light of further empirical investigation. The fact that 
the history of the empirical sciences is a history of continuos new discovery does not, 
of cour se, prove that the empirical sciences will continue to progress in this way and 
therefore this fact does not prove that the empirical sciences cannot be complete.
This is not, however, a problem for the person who is sceptical about the idea
that the empirical sciences can be complete. I do not think that it is he who has to
prove that the empirical sciences will continue to yield new information about the
world. The defender of the notion of the hypothetically completed empirical sciences
puts forward an idea that seems implausible in light of the history of the empirical
sciences. I therefore think that it is reasonable to say that he must bear the burden of
proving that the empirical sciences can be complete in the sense that one day they
will have yielded all the inforuiation about the world that there is to yield. I find it
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hard to see what a posteriori arguments can be used to support this claim, and I find it 
just as hard to see what a priori arguments can be used to support it.
There is another problem with the strategy of using the notion of the 
hypothetically completed empirical sciences in a characterisation of naturalism. 
Consider this dialectic:
Q1 : What is naturalism?
A1 : Natur alism is the view that every real entity either consists of or is 
somehow ontologically grounded in the objects countenanced by the 
hypothetically completed empirical sciences.
Q2: What are the hypothetically completed empirical sciences?
A2: The hypothetically completed empirical sciences are tlie empirical 
sciences in such a state that they have countenanced every real object.
Q3: What is a real object?
A3: A real object is an object that is countenanced by the hypothetically 
completed empirical sciences.
We are trying to find out what naturalism is. We are then presented with a 
characterisation of naturalism that involves reference to the notion of the 
hypothetically completed empirical sciences. In order to get clear about what 
naturalism is, we therefore look for an elucidation of the notion of the hypothetically 
completed empirical sciences. We are then told that the hypothetically completed 
empirical sciences are the empirical sciences in such a state that they have 
countenanced every real object. When we then ask what a real object is, the answer 
we get involves reference to the notion of the hypothetically completed empirical 
sciences.
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This is, however, a non-infonnative way of ai'guing. It was the notion of the 
hypothetically completed empirical sciences that we in the first place needed an 
elucidation of, in order to get clear about what naturalism is. The notion of the 
hypothetically completed empirical sciences is, however, now being explained in 
terms of itself. The definiendum is the notion of the hypothetically completed 
empirical sciences. The definiens must not contain the definiendum. However, this is 
what happens, somewhat disguised, in the above dialectic. To see this, consider the 
fact that the full answer to the question of what the hypothetically completed 
empirical sciences are, is the conjunction of A2 and A3. The full answer to Q2 is: 'the 
hypothetically completed empirical sciences are the empirical sciences in such a state 
that they have countenanced every real object, and a real object is an object that is 
countenanced by the hypothetically completed empirical sciences'.
The problem of ar guing in a non-informative way is avoided if another
answer than A3 is given. A3 is, however, the natural answer to give for one who has
invoked the notion of the hypothetically completed empirical sciences in his
characterisation of naturalism. If one does not give A3 as an answer, or does not give
an answer that entails A3, then one allows for the possibility that an object should be
real without it being the case that it is countenanced by the hypothetically completed
empirical sciences. But if  it is possible Üiat an object should be real without it being
the case that it is countenanced by the hypothetically completed empirical sciences,
then there would not be much sense in saying that the empirical sciences ar e
complete. For the sake of the argument, it can be agreed that the empirical sciences
can be said to be complete without it being the case that they countenance everything
real. There might be supervening entities, for example non-physical mental entities,
that are real without it being the case that they are countenanced by the hypothetically
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completed empirical sciences. If the empirical sciences are complete, they must, 
however, be able to countenance all the objects (atoms, molecules or other physical 
structures) that these supervening entities supervene upon. So, on pain of watering 
down the notion of the hypothetically completed empirical sciences, one is forced to 
give A3 as a reply to Q3. But then the problem of arguing in a non-infoimative way 
arises.
5. The Causal Criterion
Another way of explaining what natm alism is, as an ontological view, consists in 
making use of what can be called the 'causal criterion for a property's being natural' 
(Crisp 1996:115). If this criterion is adopted, then naturalism is the view that only 
natural properties aie real, and that natmal properties are those properties that pass 
the causal explanatoiy test. What is it for a property to pass this test? If a property is 
to pass this test, then it must be the case that it plays a role in the best causal 
explanation of phenomena that ai e in need of explanation. Om* causal explanations of 
why events occurred contain reference to various entities and properties, and a given 
property passes the causal explanatory test if and only if the best causal explanation 
of at least one event, contains reference to this property. Properties that we never 
need to refer to in order to give the best causal explanation of events do not pass the 
causal explanatoiy test. Such properties aie causally superfluous and therefore they 
cannot be said to be natural properties.
I do not think that the causal criterion for a property's being natural gives us
any cleai* picture of what kind of general world view is entailed by natm alism. The
causal criterion is silent on the important question of what the best causal explanation
of an event is, and if it is silent on this question, then it does not make cleai* what
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properties aie natural. To characterise natural properties as the ones that are referred 
to in the best causal explanations is explanatoiy ineffective. Such a characterisation 
immediately raises the question of what the best causal explanations are. It is, 
moreover, controversial what properties have causal power. Consider, for example, 
the question of what the best causal explanation is of an agent foiming a moral 
conviction in a given situation. On this question, one might side with Gilbert Hannan 
and say that the best causal explanation of this phenomenon, or any other 
phenomenon for that matter, does not involve reference to distinct moral properties 
that supposedly are properties of the act, policy or institution with which the agent is 
confronted. The best causal explanation only involves reference to an external world 
that is fully describable in non-moral terms and to the agent's psychological make 
up.^
Alternatively, one might side with G.E. Moore and say that at least 
sometimes, the best causal explanation as to why an agent forms the moral 
conviction that a given act is intrinsically good, is an explanation that involves 
reference to an ontologically distinct property of goodness.^® For present puiposes, no 
stand needs to be taken on the debate between Hannan and Moore. In relation to a 
discussion of ontological naturalism and a discussion of various ways of 
char acterising this position, it is, however, noteworthy that if  naturalism is 
chai'acteiised through use of the causal criterion, then 'naturalism' or 'natur alist' ar e 
not predicates that cut much ice in terms of distinguishing one class of philosophical 
positions from a different class of philosophical positions. Any philosophical 
position will count as a version of natur alism, as long as it is an integr al part of the
® (Harman 1977:7).
‘«(Moore 1993:111; 130).
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position that the kind of entities that it postulates the existence of, feature in the best 
causal explanation of a phenomenon that demand causal explanation.
This is, of course, not to suggest that all causal explanations are equally 
well-founded. It is a central part of philosophical inquiry to asses the plausibility of 
the types of causal explanation that a given philosophical position offers of various 
phenomena, and a given philosophical position might be rejected on the ground that 
it offers an implausible type of causal explanation of a given phenomenon. The 
important project of assessing the plausibility of a type of causal explanation offered 
by a given philosophical position is, however, something, that comes after, and is 
independent of, the question of whether or not the philosophical position counts as a 
version of naturalism.
6. Methodological Naturalism
Where does all of this leave us? What I have tried to show in the previous sections, is 
that a number of popular characterisations of naturalism, as an ontological view, are 
uninformative, internally inconsistent or vague. This is not to say that a 
char acterisation of ontological naturalism cannot be found that avoids these flaws. I 
shall not spend time trying to come up with a satisfying characterisation of 
natur alism as an ontological view. My reason for this is that I am not interested in 
defending naturalism as an ontological view, whatever exactly naturalism is as an 
ontological view. I do, however, thinlc that methodological naturalism should be 
endorsed. What is methodological naturalism? One characterisation of this 
component of naturalism has already been presented. Here is another, and slightly 
more detailed, characterisation:
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Core methodological natm alism: "every legitimate method of acquiring
Imowledge consists of or is grounded in the hypothetically completed
mediods of the empirical sciences (that is, in natural methods)" (Moser
& Yandell 2000:10).
One problem here is the notion of the 'hypothetically completed methods of the
empirical sciences'. The problem is of a structural kind similar to the one outlined in
the discussion of the notion of'the hypothetically completed empirical science'. To
see that the structural problem is the same, consider this dialectic which has obvious
similarities with the dialectic already considered:
Q1 : What methods of acquiring Imowledge belong to the set of methods that
constitutes the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical sciences?
A1 : A method of acquiring knowledge belongs to the set of methods that
constitutes the hypothetically completed methods o f the empirical sciences, if
and only if the method of acquiring knowledge belongs to the set of methods
that is employed by the empirical sciences when they are developed to such a
level that they employ eveiy legitimate method of acquiring knowledge.
Q2: What is a legitimate method of acquiring knowledge?
A2: A method of acquiring knowledge is a legitimate metliod of acquiring
knowledge if and only if it is a method that belongs to the set of methods that
constitutes the hypothetically completed methods o f the empirical sciences.
The characterisation of methodological naturalism involves reference to the notion of
the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical sciences, but this notion is
explained, at least partly, in terms of itself. The full answer to the question of what
methods of acquiring knowledge belong to the set of methods that constitutes the
hypothetically completed methods of the empirical sciences, is this: 'a method of
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acquiring knowledge belongs to the set of methods that constitutes the hypothetically 
completed methods of the empirical sciences, if and only if the method of acquiring 
knowledge belongs to the set of methods that is employed by the empirical sciences 
when they are developed to such a level that tliey employ eveiy legitimate method of 
acquiring knowledge, and a method of acquiring knowledge is a legitimate method of 
acquiring knowledge if  and only if it is a method that belongs to the set of methods 
that constitutes the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical sciences'.
The stiuctuial problem is avoided by giving a different answer to Q2 than A2. 
But if one does not give A2 as an answer here, or an answer that entails A2, then one 
allows for the possibility that there should be a legitimate method of acquiring 
knowledge that do not belong to the set of methods that constitutes the hypothetically 
completed methods of the empirical sciences. But if the set of methods that 
constitutes the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical sciences lack, or 
are without, a legitimate method of acquiring knowledge, then this set of methods 
cannot correctly be said to constitute the hypothetically completed methods of the 
empirical sciences. A set of methods can only correctly be said to be the set of 
methods that constitutes the hypothetically completed methods of the empiiical 
sciences if it contains every legitimate method of acquiring knowledge. So, on pain 
of watering down the notion of the hypothetically completed methods of the 
empirical sciences, one is forced to give A2 as an answer to Q2. But then the 
problem arises that the notion of the hypothetically completed methods of the 
empirical sciences is, at least partly, explained in teiins of itself. I take this argument 
to show that a notion of'the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical 
sciences' should not occur in a characterisation of methodological naturalism.
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Another problem with the above characterisation of methodological 
naturalism is the notion of a method being 'grounded in' a set of other methods.
Moser and Yandell do not make clear what they mean by 'giounded in' and lacldng 
any such clarification, the presence of the notion in a chai acterisation of 
methodological naturalism, makes it the case that methodological naturalism is a 
view that can encompass just about every conceivable method of inquiiy. To take a 
familiar example, consider the laying of tarot cards as a method of acquiring 
knowledge. In some sense of'grounded in', this is a method of inquiry that is 
giounded in the methods of the empirical sciences. The laying of tarot cai ds is a 
method of inquiiy that presupposes theoretical assumptions. The deck of cards can be 
seen as experimental equipment and the process of laying the cards can be seen as the 
process of conducting an experiment. Furthermore, just as use of our perceptual 
faculties plays a vital role in the methodology of empirical science, use of our 
perceptual faculties plays a vital role in the method of acquiring knowledge that is 
constituted by the laying of tarot cards. One has to look at the cards in order to be 
able to form a view about what has happened, or what will happen.
If methodological naturalism is characterised in such a way that it 
encompasses a method of inquiry such as the laying of tarot cards, then 
methodological naturalism becomes a view that is too accommodating to be of much 
theoretical interest. The element in the characterisation of methodological naturalism 
that is responsible for methodological naturalism being so accommodating should 
therefore be removed. In short, a chai acterisation of methodological naturalism 
should not involve an unqualified notion of one method of inquiry being 'grounded 
in' the methods of other methods of inquiiy.
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These considerations suggest that Moser and Yandell's chaiacterisation of
methodological naturalism should be amended such as to yield the following
characterisation of methodological naturalism:
Methodological naturalism: a method of acquiring Imowledge is a legitimate
method of acquiring knowledge if and only if it is a method employed by the
best contemporary empirical science.
This is what I take methodological naturalism to be, and this is the methodological
view that I think should be endorsed. My characterisation of methodological
natm alism is not without problems. It is vague what empirical science is. I have,
however, said something about what characterises empirical science and what
sciences should count as empirical. It is also vague what the best contemporary
empirical science is. There are many issues in the empirical sciences on which there
is no agreement, and conflicting theories and explanations compete for allegiance.
This does not, however, mean that the notion of the best contemporaiy empirical
science is completely empty. It should be accepted that one emphical scientific
theoiy is better than a competing theoiy if it accords better with the observational
data, and if it enables a more coherent and systematic explanation of its subject
matter than the competing theory. Newtonian physics does not, for example,
constitute the best contemporary empirical science since there are other theories that
yield a more coherent and systematic account of the subject matter of Newtonian
physics. The fact that my characterisation of methodological naturalism contains
vague notions means that it is itself vague. It yields, however, an approximate
position whose plausibility can be the subject of debate.
Why should methodological natuialism be endorsed? I do not have any
original arguments or insights to offer on this question. Methodological naturalism
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should be endorsed because the empirical sciences have proved very successful in 
yielding coherent and systematic causal explanations of phenomena that we ai e 
interested in being able to causally explain. The empirical sciences have, moreover, 
proved able to deliver exti emely accurate predictions of many types of futui e events 
in both micro- and macro-cosmos. It is, in short, the great explanatoiy and predictive 
success that the empirical sciences have enjoyed that wanants the endorsement of 
methodological natm alism. No other method of inquiry has been able to produce a 
catalogue of explanatoiy and predictive successes that is anywhere close to matching 
the catalogue of successes that the empirical sciences can put forward for inspection.
It should be stressed that methodological naturalism does not conceptually 
entail any paiticular view about what sort of entities constitute reality as a whole. The 
best contemporary empirical science malces reference to a wide variety of entities in 
its explanatory theories. The existence of some of these entities can be verified 
thr ough use of om* perceptual faculties. We have strong reason to believe in the 
existence of yet other entities because the assumption that these entities exist, enables 
a coherent and systematic explanation of a number of different phenomena that we 
aie interested in being able to explain. The claim that reality contains nothing but 
these entities is, however, a claim that is distinct from the claim made by 
methodological naturalism, and it is not a claim that is conceptually entailed by 
methodological natmalism.
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Chapter 3 
Supervenience
1. Introductory
The general topic of this chapter is tlie concept of supeivenience. In sections two to 
four, I outline and discuss a number of common types of supervenience. In section 
five, I argue that a particular definition of weak supeivenience, put forward by Kim, 
should be refined in a certain way. I also ai'gue that a particular definition of weak 
supervenience, put forward by Blackburn, should be rejected, and that the relation of 
supervenience should be taken to be no more than a relation of necessary 
co-variation. In section six, I try to make clear why supervenience, understood merely 
as a relation of necessary co-variation, is still an interesting concept in ethics. I also 
suggest a particular definition of moral supervenience, and argue that anyone who 
accepts moral supervenience in this definition, incurs an explanatory debt that must 
be discharged.
2. An Initial Characterisation
The verb 'supervene' is part of everyday language. It derives fiom the Latin 'super' 
which means 'on', 'above' or 'additional', and from the Latin verb 'venire' which 
means 'to come'. The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary defines 'to supervene' as 
'to occur as an interiuption or change' as in 'she worked well until illness 
supervened'.” The philosophical use of'supervene' is, however, different from the 
way the term is used in everyday language. 'Supervene' and its derivatives
“ Fourth edition, Fourtli Impression. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990.
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'supervenient' and 'supervenience' are, when used in philosophical literature, 
technical terms that stand in no obvious connection to the uses they have outside 
philosophy. This means that if in philosophical literature something is said to 
supervene upon something else, this is not supposed to mean that it is something that 
'occurs as an interruption or change'.
One way of giving an initial characterisation of the philosophical concept of 
supervenience is to quote David Lewis:
"The idea is simple and easy: we have supervenience when [and only when] 
there could be no difference of one sort without differences of another sort".^  ^
The philosophical concept of supervenience is standardly taken to denote a 
dependence relation of a modal sort between distinct sets of entities: the supervening 
entities (A-entities) and the subvenient or base entities (B-entities). If A-respects 
supervene upon B-respects, then the former is dependent on the latter in the sense 
that there cannot be a variation in A-respects without a variation in B-respects. 
Variation in the supervening A-respects requires, that is, variation in the subvening 
B-respects. A useful metaphorical picture to invoke in order to characterise the 
dependence relation between A- and B-respects in cases where the former supervene 
upon the latter, consists in saying that A-respects cannot 'float free' of B-respects.
To fix the concept of supervenience further in mind, an example might be 
helpful. It is a widely held, but not uncontroversial, view that mental respects 
supervene upon physical respects. According to the simple idea of supervenience 
under consideration, this view is true if and only if  there cannot be a difference in 
mental respects without a difference in physical respects. If such a supervenience 
relation holds between mental and physical respects, then it is true that identity in
"(Lewis 1986:14)
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ternis of physical respects entails identity in tenns of mental respects. If there cannot 
be a difference in mental respects without a difference in physical respects, then any 
difference in the former respect requires a difference in the latter respect. A slightly 
different characterisation of the simple concept of supervenience is therefore this: 
A-respects supervene upon B-respects iff it is necessary that if there is no difference 
in B-respects, then there is no difference in A-respects.
Supeivenience can be construed as both a synchronic and diachronic relation. 
A supeivenience relation of the foimer kind is one that involves the A- and 
B-respects of at least two objects. If there cannot be a difference in the A-respects of 
two objects without there being a difference between them in terms of B-respects, 
then, and only then, is there a synchi onic supeivenience relation of A-respects on 
B-respects. A supeivenience relation of the latter kind is one that involves the 
relation through time of the A- and B-respects of a single object. A diachronic 
supeivenience relation implies that an object cannot change in terms of some 
A-respect from time t to time without changing in teims of some B-respect fr om 
time t to time t*. Defenders of psycho-physical supervenience ai e likely to endorse 
both these supervenience relations. Their claim is that two persons cannot differ in 
terms of mental state without differing in terms of physical constitution, and that a 
single person cannot change over time in terms of mental state without changing over 
time in terms of physical constitution.
If the core idea of supervenience is the idea of a dependence relation of a
modal sort, then we can ask the question of what the relata can be of this relation.
Between the members of what ontological categories can a supervenience relation
obtain? Up until now the relata of the supeivenience relation has been said to be
either A- and B-entities or A- and B-respects. This is quite vague since a number of
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different things can reasonably be said to fall under the concept of an entity, and to 
say that two things differ in terms A-respects is compatible with it being the case that 
they differ in terms of what A-properties they instantiate, what the A-facts are about 
them and what A-states of affairs obtain in them. The generality of the teims 
involved in this initial characterisation of supeivenience is, however, not something 
that is to be deplored. It namely makes possible a characterisation of supervenience 
that is compatible with, or makes allowance for, the fact that a supervenience relation 
can obtain between the members of a number of different ontological categories.
It is perhaps most common to present supervenience as a modal dependence 
relation between ontologically distinct sets of properties.” As an example of property 
supervenience consider the thesis that chemical properties supervene upon physical 
properties. If this thesis is true, then there cannot be a difference in terms of what 
chemical properties two substances instantiate without there being a difference in 
teims of what physical properties they instantiate. For example, if  only one of two 
substances is an acid, then the two substances cannot be identical in teims of 
molecular constitution. Any difference at the level of chemical properties requires a 
difference at the level of physical properties.
However, facts of one sort can supeivene upon facts of another sort, and 
predicates of one sort can supervene upon predicates of another sort. As an 
illustration of a supervenience thesis in teims of facts, consider the very plausible 
claim that facts about being a prime number supervenes upon facts about being 
divisible by certain numbers. Two numbers cannot differ in terms of facts about 
being a piime number without differing in teims of facts about being divisible only 
by themselves and by 1. If it is a fact about one of two numbers that it is a prime 
” See(Kim 1984:55; 1990:140)
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number, and a fact about the other number that it is not a prime number, then it 
cannot be a fact about each of the two numbers that it is only divisible by itself and 
by 1.
As an example of a supervenience thesis in terms of sets of predicates, 
consider the thesis that evaluative predicates supervene upon non-evaluative 
predicates. There cannot be a difference in terms of what evaluative predicates are 
true of two objects without there being a difference in teims of what non-evaluative 
predicates are true of them. Likewise, it is necessary, that if there is a change over 
time in terms of what evaluative predicates aie tiue of a given object, then there is a 
change over time in terms of what non-evaluative predicates are true of the object.
The above supeivenience theses are in accordance with Lewis’ 
chai acterisation of the core idea of supervenience. Despite the fact that the three 
theses carve out in different ways, Lewis' talk of a difference of one sort and 
differences of another sort, they all confoim to the simple and essential idea of 
supervenience that there cannot be a difference of one sort (a difference at the 
supervening level) without differences of another sort (differences at the subvening 
level).
3. Types o f Supervenience
In the literature, it is common to distinguish between thiee different types of 
supeivenience: namely weak (intra-world), strong (inter-world) and global 
supervenience.*'* Each type of supervenience has been given a number of different 
definitions by different authors. For the purpose of simplicity, I shall here confine
‘“'See (Kim 1984; 1987; 1990), (Blackburn 1985a), (Jackson 1998) and (McLaughlin 1995).
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myself to presenting and discussing Kim's (1987) definitions of the three types of 
supervenience.
If A and B denote two sets of ontologically distinct properties, and if A is the 
supervening set and B the subvening set, then weak supervenience can be given the 
following definition: A-properties weakly supervene upon B-properties iff:
(WS) "Necessarily, for any object x and any property F in A, if  x has F, then 
there exists a propeity G in B such that x has G, and if any y has G, it 
has F" (Kim 1987:80).”
This passage specifies the necessary and sufficient condition that must obtain in 
order for A-properties to weakly supeiwene upon B-properties. (WS) is equivalent to 
the claim that it is impossible that there should exist two things, x and y, such that x 
and y are indiscernible in respect of properties in B and yet discernible in respect of 
properties in A. This claim is, in turn, equivalent to the claim that it is necessaiy that 
if two things, x and y, are indiscernible (or identical) in respect of properties in B, 
then they are indiscernible in respect of properties in A.
Weak supervenience of A-properties upon B-properties asserts a certain 
relation between A-properties and B-properties of objects within a given world. This 
is the reason for calling it intra-world supervenience. Consider, for example, the 
thesis that mental properties weakly supeiwene upon physical properties. If this diesis 
is true, then it is true in every possible world, W, that if two creatures ai*e identical in 
teims of physical properties, then they are identical in teims of mental properties. 
This means that if some person in our world has physical properties G* and mental 
property F, then any person in our world who has physical properties G* has mental 
property F as well.
‘^ Put foiTnaliy; A-properties weakly supervene on B-properties iff:
□VxVFeA[Fx -> 3GeB(Gx & Vy (Gy->Fy))].
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The thesis that mental properties weakly supervene upon physical properties 
is, however, compatible with it being the case that G*-creatures in other possible 
worlds, including worlds completely identical to our world in terms of physical 
properties, do not have mental property F. In a world that is a complete physical 
duplicate of our world, W*, G'*'-creatures may have mental property F*, or they may 
indeed have no mental properties at all. Weak supervenience of A-properties on 
B-properties only requires that within W'*', mental properties are distiibuted 
consistently across G'^-creatures such that G’^ '-creatures aie identical in terms of 
whatever mental properties they instantiate. The significant feature of wealc 
supervenience is simply that it allows that two objects in different worlds can be 
B-identical without being A-identical.
Keeping the above definition of A and B in mind, strong supervenience can 
be given the following definition: A-properties strongly supervene upon B-properties 
iff:
(SS) "Necessarily, for any object x and any property F in A, if x has F, then 
there exists a property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily if any 
y has G, it has F" (ibid.:80).”
Strong supervenience of A-properties upon B-properties is stronger than weak 
supeiwenience in that it requires B-identical objects in different worlds to be 
A-identical. If mental properties strongly supervene upon physical properties and if 
there is a creatuie in some world, perhaps our own world, that has physical properties 
G'*' and mental propeify F, then it is tiue for any creature, not only in that particular 
world but in any possible world, that if this creature has physical properties G*, then 
it has mental property F. Strong supervenience of A-propeifies on B-properties
‘«Put formally: A-properties strongly supervene on B-properties iff: 
□VxVFeA[Fx -> 3GeB(Gx & OVy (Gy-+Fy))].
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guarantees stability across worlds for the coiTelation between specific A-properties 
and their base properties.
Kim actually presents the above two definitions of weak and sti ong 
supervenience as definitions of weak and sti'ong covaiiance. It is, however, not 
problematical to cite the two definitions as definitions of weak and stiong 
supervenience since Kim acknowledges that using the concept of covariance and not 
the concept of supeiwenience is a purely teiminological decision. It should, however, 
be noted that supervenience is not the same concept as covaiiance. The two concepts 
should therefore not, without explanation, be used interchangeably. There aie a 
number of different ways in which A-properties can covary with B-properties, and if 
A-properties supeiwene upon B-properties, then they covaiy with them in a particular 
way. A-properties can covary with B-properties in such a way that it is necessary that 
if there is a variance in the B-properties of an object, then there is a vai'iance in its 
A-properties. But this relation of covariance between A-properties and B-properties 
is significantly not the same as a supervenience relation of A-properties on 
B-properties.
An important question in connection with both weak and strong 
supervenience is the question of what the strength is of the modal term(s) involved in 
a supervenience thesis (or alternatively, what the range is of the world-binding 
quantifier(s) involved in a supervenience thesis). Standard options here include 
physical, metaphysical and conceptual necessity.*^ In general definitions of the theses 
of weak and stiong supervenience, as the ones above, no answer has to be given to 
the question of what the exact strength is of the modal term(s). Supei*venience theses 
can, depending upon what sets of propeifies are denoted by ’A' and 'B', hold with
” See (Kim 1990:141).
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valions kinds of necessity, and it is useful to have general definitions of 
supei*venience that allow for this fact.
Let us now turn to global supervenience. In global supeiwenience, the general 
principle that there could be no difference of one sort without differences of another 
sort is taken to hold for whole worlds and not for objects within either one or more 
possible worlds. What global supeiwenience of A-properties on B-properties roughly 
asserts is that two worlds cannot differ in teims of A-properties without differing in 
teims of B-properties.*^ A more precise definition of global supeiwenience is this: 
A-properties globally supeiwene upon B-properties iff:
(GS) "Any two worlds indiscernible with respect to B-properties are 
indiscernible with respect to A-properties" (Kim 1987:82).
If this definition of global supeiwenience is to be of any interest, then we need to 
know what it is for two worlds to be indiscernible with respect to a particular set of 
properties. McLaughlin notes that by worlds that are indiscernible (i.e., twins) with 
respect to A- [or B-] properties is typically meant worlds that have the same total 
pattern of distribution of A- [or B-] properties.*^ This is informative, but now we 
want to know what it exactly means for two worlds to have the same total pattern of 
distribution of A- [or B-] properties. A suggestion by Kim is that two worlds, W and 
are indiscernible with respect to B-properties if and only if for any B-propeify G 
and any individual x, x has G in W if and only if x has G in W* (Kim 1984:68). If 
some individual in W has some B-property G, then this individual's counteipart in 
W**' also has G and vice versa. This means that there is no individual in either W or 
W* that has a B-property that its counterpait in the other world does not have. The
"See, for example, (Kim 1984:68) and (McLaughlin 1995:31). 
"(McLaughlin 1995:31).
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number of B-properties in the two worlds is identical, and the B-properties are 
distributed across the same number of individuals in the same way in the two worlds.
It has been argued that on Kim's proposal, two worlds, W and W*, can be 
B-indiscemible even if they do not have the same number of individuals.^® 
B-indiscemibility between worlds that do not have the same number of individuals 
just requires that the individual(s) that exists in only one of the two worlds does not 
instantiate any B-properties. Consider two worlds, W and W**, that are such that the 
foimer has two individuals, x and y, and the latter three individuals, x, y and z. 
Assume, moreover, that whatever B-property, or set of B-properties, x and y 
respectively have in W is a B-property, or set of B-properties, that x and y 
respectively have in W*, and that z in W'*' does not instantiate any B-property.^* This 
may constitute an example of a pair of worlds that ai e B-indiscemible despite the fact 
that they do not have the same number of individuals. The reason for thinldng that W 
and W* are B-indiscernible in an example such as tliis is that it is tiue of no 
individual in either W or W* that it instantiates a B-property that is not instantiated 
by its counteipaif in the other world. W and W* contain the exact same number of 
B-properties and these B-properties are distributed in an identical way across an 
identical number of individuals in the two worlds.
It seems to me that Kim has presented us with an intuitive compelling 
account of what B-indiscernibility between two worlds consists in, and that this 
account is compatible with it being the case that two worlds can be B-identical in two 
distinct ways: one in which there is an identical number of individuals in the worlds 
under consideration, and one in which there is a non-identical number of individuals
in the worlds under consideration. One might, however, still be sceptical about the
(McLaughlin 1995:32).
^*Let us call tliis pair o f worlds 'LL'.
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idea that two worlds can be B-identical if there is not an identical number of 
individuals in the two worlds. Let me first try to give an aigument for this sceptical 
view and then try to show that this argument fails.
The argument in favour of the sceptical view can be spelled out in relation to 
the pair of worlds, LL, discussed above. The stmcture of the argument is that z in W* 
actually does instantiate a B-property and since z has no counterpart in W there is no 
individual in W that instantiates the B-property that z instantiates in There is 
therefore a B-property instantiated in that is not instantiated in W, and the two 
worlds aie therefore B-discemible. What B-property is it that z supposedly 
instantiates? If the set of B-properties is a non-empty set, then there is a B-property
that is the conjunction of all the specific B-properties: namely bi & bz & bs & bn
and if there is such a property, then there is also a conjunctive B-property of the fonn 
- i b i  &  -ibz &  - h i  &  - i b n ,  and it is this B-propeity that z instantiates.
I thinlc that a reductio can be used to show that this aigument is not very
convincing. Consider a world that is characterised by the fact that it contains physical
substances and therefore physical properties (B-propeities) and non-physical
substances and therefore non-physical properties (A-properties). We can just assume
that the world in question contains angels, and that the property of being an angel is a
non-physical property. Now, the above argument allows the conclusion that the
angels in that world have a physical property: namely the property of not being bi &
b z  &  h i  &  b n  where this set of properties is the set of instantiated physical
properties in that world, A paradigm example of something non-physical, an angel,
would actually have a physical property. This consequence of the ar gument seems to
me to be rather absurd, and I therefore think that the argument should be rejected.
The same conclusion should be reached if we consider another application of the
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ar gument. It seems that the argument can be used to show that particulars in our 
world such as cups, tables and indeed subatomic particles have a mental property:
namely the property of not being ai & az & as & an where this is the set of mental
properties actually instantiated in our world. But the idea that, say, cups and electrons 
should have a mental property is, in my mind, not one that should be taken seriously.
It is a significant feature of global supervenience that it does not entail weak 
supervenience (Kim 1987:83). The former type of supervenience can, that is, hold 
when the latter type does not hold. To see this, consider a shnple world, W, in which 
only two individuals, x and y, exist. Imagine, moreover that x has B-property G and 
A-property F and that y has G but not F. Such a world is excluded by the truth of the 
claim that A-properfies weakly supervene upon B-properties. The existence of such a 
world is, however, compatible with it being the case that A-properties globally 
supervene upon B-properties. The only thing that is requhed by the global 
supervenience of A-properties on B-properties is that there is not another world, W' ,^ 
that is B-identical to W (i.e. a world in which G is distributed over the same 
individuals as in W) but non-identical to W in terms of how specific A-properties are 
distributed across individuals. The existence of a world in which only individuals x* 
and y* exist and in which x* is G and F, and y* is G and F is tire kind of world that, 
provided the existence of W, would prove wrong the claim that A-properties globally 
supervene upon B-properties.
Kim has argued, quite convincingly in my mind, that the featur e of global
supervenience that it allows what weak supervenience excludes is a feature that
makes it difficult to see how global supervenience can qualify as a significant
dependency relation between two sets of properties (Kim 1990:155). The line of
thought is that it can hardly be the case that one set of properties (the A-properties)
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are dependent upon or deteimined by another set of properties (the B-properties) if it 
is peimitted, as it is by global supervenience of A-properties on B-properties, that 
two objects within a given world can be B-identical without being A-identical. To 
see this more clearly, consider a thesis of global psycho-physical supervenience in 
which mental properties are taken to be A-properties and physical properties are 
talcen to be B-properties. Such a thesis permits that there could exist a person in this 
world that is a complete physical replica of me but differs from me in terms of 
having no mental life at all. The fact that global psychophysical supervenience 
permits the existence of such a person should lead us to follow Kim, and conclude 
that this supervenience thesis is incompatible with any idea to the effect that the 
mental or psychological nature of the world is somehow dependent upon or 
deteimined by the physical natui e of the world.
The view that global supervenience is too weak to sustain a dependency 
relation of significance between two sets of propeities receives support from yet 
another consideration. Global supervenience of A-properties on B-properties peimits 
that worlds can differ in the smallest of details in their B-properties and yet differ 
veiy substantially in terms of thefr A-propeifies. Global supervenience of mental 
properties on physical properties permits, for example, that there can be a world, W***, 
that differs from our world in that physical respect that the pacific ocean in 
contains one more H2O molecule than our Pacific ocean, and differs fr om our world 
in that mental respect that eveiy person in is constantly joyful or perhaps in that 
mental respect tliat in W* it is only rocks of a certain kind that instantiate 
consciousness. Global supervenience of the mental upon the physical in effect says 
that if  there is some difference in physical respects between two worlds, then there is
no limit to the extent to which the two worlds can differ in terms of mental respects.
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4. Ascriptive Supervenience
A useful distinction has been drawn between 'ontological' and 'ascriptive' 
supervenience.^^ Ontological supervenience is a relation between classes of 
properties and theses of weak, strong and global supervenience are all compatible 
with ontological supervenience. The only thing that this requires is that the relata of 
these different types of supervenience theses are classes of properties. Endorsing 
ontological supeivenience in a certain area of discourse commits one to realism about 
the supeivening class of properties. It is, for example, only intelligible to hold the 
view that moral properties supeivene upon naturalistic properties if one recognises 
the existence of moral properties. Otherwise, one would hold the pai adoxical view 
that a certain class of properties, that one does not recognise the existence of, 
supeivenes upon another class of properties.
Ascriptive supervenience is, on the other hand, a relation between classes of 
judgements (e.g. moral judgements and judgements ascribing naturalistic properties 
to objects) and endorsing this kind of supeivenience in a certain area of discourse, 
does not commit one to realism about the supeivening class of properties. In Klagge's 
words;
"Ascriptive supeivenience is the view, roughly, that, logically speaking, a 
person's judgements of a certain (supervening) kind about things cannot differ 
unless judgements of the other kind about the things differ" (Klagge 
1988:462).
Applied to ethical discourse, ascriptive supeivenience is the view that a person's 
moral judgements about two objects cannot differ unless his judgements about the 
naturalistic properties of the two objects (his naturalistic judgements about the two 
See (Klagge 1988).
45
objects) differ. The underlying intuition here is that it is part of the meaning of moral 
teims that judgements involving them must supeivene upon natui alistic judgements. 
If one puts fomard identical naturalistic judgements about objects x and y, and then 
puts forward non-identical moral judgements about them, then one has 
misunderstood a part of the meaning of the moral terms that are involved in one's 
moral judgements. This means that the 'cannot' occurring in the above definition of 
ascriptive supeivenience denotes conceptual impossibility.
R. M. Hare is a classic advocate for ascriptive supeivenience. Consider this 
passage:
"First, let us take that chai'acteristic of'good' which has been called its 
supervenience. Suppose that we say 'St. Francis was a good man'. It is 
logically impossible to say this and to maintain at the same time that there 
might have been another man placed in exactly the same circumstances as St. 
Francis, and who behaved in exactly the same way, but who was different 
firom St. Francis in this respect only, that he was not a good man" (Hare 
1952:152).
Supervenience is here understood to be a characteristic of the term 'good'. Hare's
view is that anybody who judges St. Francis to be a good man is forced by a part of
the meaning of the term 'good' to give the same judgement of any other man judged
to be naturalistically identical to St. Francis. Supeivenience is, according to Hare, a
conceptual consti aint on any user of moral tenns. His remarks about supervenience
do not imply that it is logically impossible that there should be a natui alistic
duplicate of St. Francis that differs fiom St. Francis in that he is not a good man. For
this to be the case, there only needs to be a different user of moral terms that has
different moral principles, and is of the opinion that the naturalistic properties
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instantiated by St. Francis waixants the judgement that he is not a good man. This 
other user of moral terms is of coui'se also bound by the conceptual constraint of 
supeivenience. He is therefore forced, on pain of committing a conceptual mistake, to 
give an identical moral judgement of any other person he judges to be yet another 
natui alistic duplicate of St. Francis.
5. A Formal Feature o f Weak Supervenience
After this introduction to the general concept of supervenience, and a suivey of the 
most common types of supeivenience theses, I now turn to consider a foiinal feature 
of weak supervenience. Consider the suggestion that, say, aesthetic properties 
supervene on natuial properties in the way defined by (WS). Consider also a 
philosophical dualist who thinks that aesthetic properties stand in no systematic 
relation to natuial properties. In paificulai-, he thinks that aesthetic properties can 
float fi ee of natural properties. Can such a dualist agree that aesthetic properties 
weakly supervene on natural properties? Due to a particularity of (WS), it actually 
seems that he can. For any aesthetic property F, (WS) is (trivially) true if  G is taken 
to be a natuial property that it is impossible that two numerically distinct objects 
should both instantiate. If it is impossible that two numerically distinct objects should 
both be G, then it is (trivially) true that if one object is F and G, then any object that 
is G is F. So, (WS) is trivially tme in all cases where something is F and G , and it is 
impossible that two numerically distinct objects should both be G. A dualist of the 
above kind can exploit this point, and say that whenever an object instantiates some 
F, then the natural property G it also instantiates, is such a complex property that no
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other object could instantiate it. He is therefore entitled to say that aesthetic 
properties weakly supeivene on natural properties.^^
One might be of the opinion that this formal feature of the wealc 
supervenience thesis makes it the case that the original definition of wealc 
supervenience is in need of refinement. If anybody can agree that aesthetic properties 
wealcly supervene on natui al properties, then a claim to the effect that this relation 
holds, seems to become insignificant and of no interest. We want, however, such a 
claim to be of interest. It is supposed to say something interesting about the relation 
of two sets of properties. I shai e this opinion, so I thinlc Kim's original definition 
should be refined by stipulating that G must be a property that it is possible that more 
than one object should be able to instantiate. By stipulating this, one avoids the above 
problem.
One might be dissatisfied with Kim's definition of wealc supervenience for a 
different reason. This dissatisfaction is based on the idea that there is a consequential 
aspect embedded in the philosophical concept of supeivenience. The idea is that 
when one property of an object supervenes upon another property of the object, then 
the object instantiates the supeivening property in virtue of instantiating the 
subvening propeity. The supervening propeiiy F is in a sense consequential upon the 
subvening property G. The object has F in virtue of having G. Consider an instance 
of moral supervenience. If it is said that St. Patrick's property of being a good man 
supervenes upon a set of his naturalistic propeifies, then, on this suggestion, at least 
part of what is meant by this is that St. Patrick is a good man in virtue of, or because
take just one example: the dualist about aestlietics could say that what the elegance (F) of a 
particular building weakly supervenes upon is a natural property (G) tliat includes the property that the 
building instantiates in virtue of occupying a certain spatio-temporal position. It is botli physically and 
metaphysically impossible that two numerically distinct buildings (two physical structures) should 
occupy die same spatio-temporal position. It is therefore trivially true tliat F weakly supervenes on G.
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of, this set of naturalistic properties. His instantiation of the property of being a good 
man is, so to speak, a consequence of his instantiation of a set of specific naturalistic 
properties.
Let me try to spell out why this suggestion as to what is involved in our 
ordinaiy philosophical concept of supervenience is important for the question of 
whether or not the original definition of weak supeivenience should be refined. If 
there is a consequential aspect embedded in our ordinary philosophical concept of 
supervenience, then, importantly, the relation of supeivenience is not just a relation 
of necessary co-variance. To say that something supeivenes upon something else is 
not just to say that there cannot be a variation at the supervening level without a 
variation at the subvening level. The thesis of necessary co-vaiiation is an essential 
part of the concept of supervenience, but there is a further consequential aspect to the 
concept of supervenience. If there is more to the supervenience relation than it just 
being a relation of necessary co-variation, then it is important to note that (WS) 
cannot be used in a definition of supervenience if we by 'definition* mean a 
specification of the necessary and sufficient conditions that must obtain in order for a 
concept to apply. The reason for this is that (WS) only specifies a relation of 
necessaiy co-variation. It does not captuie, or say anything about, the consequential 
aspect of the supervenience relation. This is a point very neatly made by John Heil: 
"Indeed, (WS) implies only a kind of property correlation or co-vaiiation.
[...]. When a's supervene on ps, a's are in some way dependent on or 
determined by ^ s. When this is so, it is tempting to say that an object that 
possesses an a does so in virtue of possessing some This, however, would 
be to go beyond (WS). [...]. (WS) is a purely modal notion" (Heil: 148).
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(WS) only specifies the necessaiy condition that must obtain in order for 
A-properties to weakly supervene upon B-properties. It does not specify the 
sufficient condition because there is more to the supervenience relation than it simply 
being a relation of necessary co-variation. In order to capture the full meaning of the 
supeivenience relation, i.e. the 'in virtue of requirement that is embedded in the 
relation, something needs to be added to (WSF). The original definition of 
supeivenience that involves reference to (WSF) is therefore in need of refinement.
It seems to me that if  the assumption of this ai gument, the claim that there is 
a consequential aspect involved in our ordinary philosophical concept of 
supervenience, is accepted, then the argument is quite strong. It shows rather 
conclusively that the original definition of weak supervenience is in need of 
refinement. Let us, for the moment, accept the assumption. We can now ask the 
question of what a formula should look like if it is to give the necessary and 
sufficient condition that must obtain in order for one propeity to supeivene upon 
another. In his 1985a work, Blackburn offers this suggestion:
(S) N [(3x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) (Vy)(G*y Fy)]
This formula says: necessarily, if there is something that is F and G* and whose 
G*-ness underlies its F-ness, then anything G*^  is F. Blackburn's refined formula is an 
attempt to overcome the objection that (WS) only specifies a relation of necessary 
co-vaiiation. In his 1985a work, Blackburn is explicitly of the opinion that there is a 
consequential aspect embedded in the ordinary concept of supervenience and he 
thinks that the refined foimula captures this aspect.
"Belief in supeivenience is then at least the belief that whenever a thing is in 
some F state, this is because it is in some underlying G state, or it is by virtue
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of its being in some underlying G state. This is the minimal sense of the 
doch'ine" (Blackburn 1985a: 131).
(S) involves a rather uncommon sentence-operator: namely, U. This operator is in 
need of clarification. What does it exactly mean that one set of properties underlies 
another property? One cannot make use of (S) in a definition of this relation. One 
cannot, that is, define the underlying relation by saying that G*^  underlies F if and 
only if  (S). But how should we then understand the underlying-relation? Blackburn 
does not explain to us what the truth conditions are of an expression involving the 
U-operator. We laiow that the expression ’G***x & Fx' is tme just in case both of the 
conjuncts are tme, and because we know the tmth conditions of this expression, it 
can usefully be used in a foimula that is part of a definition of a particular concept. 
Because it is unclear what the tmth conditions are of the expression 'G*x U Fx', it is 
difficult to see how a foimula involving this expression can cast light on the concept 
of supeivenience.
These considerations about the U-operator should in my opinion make us
believe that Blackburn does not, by invoking the formula (S), succeed in specifying
the necessaiy and sufficient condition that must obtain in order for one property to
supervene upon another. (S) simply cannot do the work that it is supposed to do.
Of course, the discussion of a single case does not allow one to draw a
general conclusion, but it is my contention that if the supervenience relation is taken
to contain a consequential aspect, the 'in viitue of requirement, then the
supeivenience relation cannot be given a cleai* definition involving standai'd logical
notation. Any definition of the foim: 'A-properties supervene upon B-properties iff
(S)', where (S) is a formula involving standard logical notation will fail to capture the
consequential aspect of supervenience. If I am right about this, is it then the case that
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the concept of supervenience is not an interesting philosophical concept? Not 
necessarily. There is the possibility, one that I think should be endorsed, of just 
taking supeivenience to be a relation of necessary co-vaiiation. If supeivenience is 
taken to be such a relation, then we have a well-defined concept. (WS) can be used to 
give the necessary and sufficient condition that must obtain in order for one class of 
properties to (weakly) supervene upon another class. Is such a naiTow supeivenience 
concept of any philosophical interest? '^* It depends cmcially on whether or not a 
relation of necessary co-vaiiation of the kind expressed by (WS) is ever instantiated. 
If it is ever instantiated, then there is the task of explaining why it is the case that 
there cannot be a variation at the supervening level without variation at the 
subvening level.
6. Supervenience and Ethics
Let me end this chapter by saying something about why I think that the concept of 
supervenience is an interesting concept in the realm of ethics. It stiikes me as veiy 
plausible that some sort of supeivenience relation holds, in the narrow sense of 
supeivenience, between moral propeifies and natural properties. Such a commitment 
to supeivenience in the realm of ethics is something that is very widely found in the
contemporary metaethical literature.^^ If there is no relation of supervenience, in any
would be to confuse matters to use tlie term 'weak' of a concept o f supervenience that only 
involves a relation of necessary co-variation and the term 'strong' of a concept of supervenience that in 
addition to this element involves a consequential aspect. As previously shown, tliese terms are already 
in use to mark a distinction of a quite different kind between concepts of supervenience. I therefore 
suggest that the temi 'narrow' should be used of a supervenience concept that only involves the relation 
of necessary co-variation and tliat tlie term 'broad' should be used of a supeiwenience concept tliat has 
the additional aspect.
"Everyone agrees that the moral features of things supervene on their natural features That is, 
everyone agrees that two possible worlds tliat are alike in all o f their natural features must also be alike 
in tlieir moral features" (Smith 1994:21), "By all accounts it is a conceptual truth that the moral 
features o f acts supervene on theh naturalistic features:" (Smith 2000:24), "The most salient and least 
controversial part of folk moral theory is that moral properties supei'vene on descriptive properties, 
tliat the ethical way things are supervenes on the descriptive way tilings are" (Jackson 1998:118), "In 
tlie case of etliics, supeivenience seems to be built into the discourse - it is analytic - and I still see
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of the different senses of supervenience discussed in this chapter, between moral 
properties and natural properties, then it is possible that moral properties should float 
fl ee of natural properties. It is, in other words, possible that two objects, two states of 
affairs or two (entire) worlds should differ in terms of moral properties without 
differing in terms of natural properties. I do not consider this to be a genuine 
possibility. Assuming that there is some sort of supervenience relation between moral 
properties and natural properties, there is the task of identifying and describing this 
relation in detail. If and when this has been done, there is, however, also the further 
task of explaining why this relation holds. There is, in other words, the task of 
explaining what grounds the supervenience relation.^^
How should moral supervenience be chai'acterised? It seems to me that at 
least weak supervenience is appropriate here. Minimally, what one is committed to 
just in virtue of participating in everyday moral discourse and practice is that there is 
no possible world in which two (or more) things differ in terms of moral properties 
without differing in terms of natural properties (or, if one is a non-descriptivist, there 
is no possible world in which an agent's moral judgements about two (or more) 
objects differ without it being the case that his non-moral judgements about them 
differ). The kind of necessity involved in moral supervenience should be construed as 
conceptual necessity. One commits a conceptual mistake if  one deems it possible that 
two objects within the given world should differ in tenns of moral properties without 
differing in terms of natui al properties. Since global supeiwenience does not entail 
weak supeiwenience, one should not chaiacterise moral supeiwenience merely in
quasi-realism as tlie only genuine explanation of this " (Blackburn 1998:315), "Moral assessment, 
virtually everyone concedes, supervenes upon the natural world in the following sense: two situations 
can differ in their moral qualities just in case they also differ in some natural qualities" (Railton 
1995:99).
^®The notion of'grounding supervenience' is borrowed from (Heil: 150).
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tenus of a thesis of global supervenience. In my view, it is correct to say that moral 
properties globally supervene on natural properties, but any such claim is potentially 
misleading, if is not conjoined with a claim to the effect that moral properties also 
weakly supeiwene on natural properties. In the following, I shall take moral 
supervenience to be a relation of wealc supeiwenience. More precisely, I shall 
construe moral supeiwenience as the claim that moral properties (A-properties) are 
related to B-properties (natur al properties) such that:
Necessarily, for any object x and any property F in A, if x has F, then there 
exists a property G in B such that x has G, and if any y has G, it has F.^ ^
It is one thing to make a claim to the effect that a superwenience relation exists 
between moral properties and natural properties, but if this claim is not backed up by 
an explanation as to why this relation holds, then the claim amounts to a biirte 
postulate. Anyone who accepts moral supeiwenience in my definition, and who wants 
to be on philosophical safe ground has to be able to explain why this relation holds. 
Acceptance of moral supervenience does not come jfree of charge. By accepting it, 
one always incurs an explanatory burden.
Now, it might be the case that not all metaethical theories are equally good at 
explaining why moral supervenience holds. Moreover, if it is agreed that moral 
supervenience does hold, and that this relation is something that is in need of 
explanation, then it is not a harmless featuie of a par ticular metaethical theory that it 
is not able to explain why moral supeiwenience holds. It seems to me that any 
minimally convincing metaethical theory must be able to explain why moral 
supervenience holds. If it is the case that a particular theory has no explanation of
supeiwenience, then this feature of it constitutes a reason for simply dismissing the
’^The modal term here expresses conceptual necessity, and it is implicitly assumed that G is a property 
tliat more than one object can instantiate.
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theory, and if  one metaethical theory has a better explanation of moral supei-venience 
than its competitors, then this should be seen as something that gives us a reason for 
preferring this Üieory over its competitors. It is not a conclusive reason because even 
though it is important to fare well on the issue of moral supervenience, faring well on 
this particular issue is not the only thing that is important to the overall plausibility of 
a metaethical theory.
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Chapter 4
Realism, Expressivism and Moral Supervenience
1. Introductory
In this chapter, I try to bring out in more detail how considerations about 
supervenience can be used to evaluate metaethical theories. I shall be concerned with 
two such theories, and I will look at how well each of these is able to explain moral 
supei-venience. In sections two and three, I outline, refine and discuss Simon 
Blackburn's influential supervenience argument against a paificular type of moral 
realism. I argue that this argument is powerful, and that the type of moral realism that 
Blackburn considers is problematic because it cannot offer a convincing explanation 
of moral supervenience. In section foui-, I focus on the semantic tenet of Blackburn's 
quasi-realist position. In addition to giving an exposition of the key features of an 
expressivist analysis of moral utterances, I try to malce clear what might motivate 
such an analysis. In section five, I discuss the expressivist explanation of moral 
supervenience. The reason for doing this is that the issue of moral supervenience 
only provides reason to prefer expressivism over the realist position considered by 
Blackburn, if the foimer can give a convincing explanation of moral supervenience. I 
ar gue that expressivism can offer such an explanation, and that it does not have an 
independent problem on the issue of moral supervenience.
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2. Blackburn's Argument
Consider a position in metaethics that might be labelled 'Moorean realism*. This 
position essentially involves the claims that there are instantiated moral properties, 
and that these properties belong to their own ontological class. Moorean realism 
therefore advances pluralism about properties. There is a class of natur al propeiiies 
and there is a class of moral properties, and properties from the latter class cannot be 
reduced to properties from the former class (or to properties from any other class).
Moorean realism can be further specified by saying that it involves the claim 
that there is no conceptual connection between an object having certain natural 
properties and its having certain moral properties. Let x be an object, let F be a 
particular moral property and let G* be a conjunction of natur al properties. Moorean 
realism then involves the claim that there is no F and no G*^  such that it is 
conceptually necessary that if x is G*^ , then it is F. Neither is there an F and a G=^  
such that it is conceptually necessary that if x is G*, then it is not F. This means that 
Moorean realism rejects the following two theses of strict entailment (where the 
modal operator denotes conceptual necessity):
(i) □ (Vx)(G*x Fx)
(ii) □ (Vx)(G*x -4" -iFx)
Rejection of (i) entails acceptance of:
(i*) 0(3x)(G*x&-iFx)
Rejection of (ii) entails acceptance of:
(ii*) 0(3x)(G *x& Fx)
According to Blackburn, any coherent metaethical theory ought to be able to account
for moral supervenience. Moorean realism ought therefore to be able to account for
it. Blackburn contends, however, that Moorean realism is hugely problematical
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because it does not facilitate such an account.^^ Where F is a particular moral 
property and G* is a conjunction of natural properties, and the modal operator 
denotes conceptual necessity, Blackburn's definition of moral supervenience is this:
F supervenes upon G* iff:
(S) □ [(3x)(G*x & Fx & (G*x U Fx)) (Vy)(G*y -> Fy)]^ ^
As I tried to argue in the previous chapter, there is reason to regard (S) as obscure. In 
an earlier version of the argument, Blackburn defines moral supervenience like this:
F supervenes upon G* iff:
(S*) □ [(3x)(G*x & Fx) -4 (Vy)(G*y - 4  Fy)]^^
This formula does not have the controversial U-operator, and is therefore much 
clearer than (S). This is not to say that (S*) is without problems, but it is at least clear 
what it says.^‘ Because (S*) is clearer than (S), I think that the strongest version of
^^(Blackbum 1973; 1984; 1985a).
^^(Blackbum 1985a: 131)
^^(Blackbum 1984:184)
One problem is this: (S*) says that a certain conditional is necessarily true. The antecedent o f the 
conditional is an existentially quantified sentence. This means that the antecedent is true if  and only if 
tliere is something that satisfies the predicates in the existentially quantified sentence. If it is 
impossible that anytliing should satisfy these predicates, then it is impossible tliat the antecedent of the 
conditional should be true, and it is then impossible that tlie conditional should be false. If it is 
impossible that the conditional should be false, then it is necessarily true. Consider now a case in 
which 'G*' denotes a property that it is impossible that any object should instantiate. Under tliis 
interpretation of'G*', it is impossible tliat the antecedent of the conditional should be true, and the 
conditional is therefore necessarily true. This means that F weakly supervenes upon G*. So, it is a 
result o f using (S*) in a definition o f weak supervenience that it can be shown that, for example, the 
property o f being, unjust, (F) weakly supervenes upon the property of not being numerically 
self-identical (G*), or alternatively, upon tlie conjunctive property of distributing wealth according to 
tlie maxi-min principle and not distributing wealtii according to the maxi-min principle. Actually, 
every moral property, weakly supervenes on any of these properties.
Another problem is this: the antecedent of the conditional will be vacuously true if  it is 
impossible that something should simultaneously instantiate botli F and G*. F and G*^ ' might be 
properties such that it is possible that numerically different objets, or tlie same object at different 
times, should instantiate one (but not both) of them. So, if everything that is meant by wealc 
supervenience is captured by (S*), tlien it is correct to say that, for example, being unjust (F) weakly 
supeiwenes upon being completely made out of cement (G’^O- A third problem is that (S*) is vacuously 
true in cases where F and G* are properties instantiated by a single object, and it is impossible that any 
otlier object should instantiate these properties. This is the problem I touched upon in tlie previous 
chapter in relation to Kim’s definition o f wealc supervenience.
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Blackbmn's ai'gument involves reference to (S*) and not (S). In my outline and 
discussion of Blackburn's argument, I shall therefore take it to involve (S*).
By accepting (i*), Moorean realism accepts that there is a conceptually 
possible world in which there is an object that is G* and not F. By accepting (ii*), it 
accepts that there is a conceptually possible world in which there is an object that is 
G* and F. The tmth of (S*) excludes, however, that there is a conceptually possible 
world in which something is G* and F, and something else is G* and not F. But it 
seems odd that such a mixed world should be conceptually impossible when there is 
a conceptually possible world in which '(3x)(G*x & -iFx)' is tme, and a conceptually 
possible world in which '(3x)(G*x & Fx)' is tme. If it is conceptually possible that 
two such worlds should exist separately, why is it then, Blackburn asks, conceptually 
impossible that the two worlds should merge, and become a mixed world? In light of 
the tmth of (i*) and (ii*), the tmth of (S*) seems mysterious.
It is important to note that this problem is not a formal one. The set of 
sentences made up by '(S*)', '(i*)' and '(ii*)' is logically consistent, so by accepting 
the set, one does not violate any laws of logic. The problem is more of an informal 
kind: it poses an explanatory challenge to anyone who accepts this combination of 
sentences.
To ask why it is conceptually impossible that there should be a mixed world 
is equivalent to asking why (S*) is tme. There aie, at least, two straightforward 
answers to this question. The first answer is that it is tme of every object in eveiy 
conceptually possible world, that if  this object is G*, then it is F. There are, in other 
words, no conceptually possible mixed worlds simply because there is no 
conceptually possible world in which something is G* and not F. So, basically the
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first answer is that (i) is true/^ Moorean realism cannot, however, give this as an 
answer since this position essentially involves the claim that (i) is false.
The second answer involves the claim that there is no conceptually possible 
world in which something is G* and F. This is basically the answer that (ii*) is false. 
This answer is also unavailable to the Moorean realist. The reason for this simply is 
that his position involves the claim that (ii*) is tme. But then the Moorean realist is 
left with no credible explanation as to why (S*) is tme. F's supervenience upon G*, 
in the way specified by (S*), is underpinned by nothing. It is a bmte conceptual fact 
that cannot be given any deeper explanation. Blackburn does not find this a 
philosophically credible view to be committed to.^ ^
Before addressing the question of how the Moorean realist might respond to 
Blackburn's argument, I want to clarify the argument in a certain respect. In his 
presentation of the argument, Blackburn suggests that acceptance of (S*) and 
rejection of (i) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the argument to get going 
(Blackburn 1984:184; 1985a: 137). However, this suggestion is not correct. 
'-iO(Vx)(G*x -4 Fx) hK 0(3x)(G*x & -iFx)' is valid. So by rejection of (i), one is 
committed to accepting that there is a conceptually possible world in which 
'(3x)(G*x & -iFx)' is tme. Rejection of (i) does not, however, entail that there is a 
conceptually possible world in which '(3x)(G*x & Fx)' is tme. '-iD(Vx)(G*x Fx) f- 
S5 0(3x)(G*x & Fx)' is invalid, and since the inference in invalid in the system with
^^This is tlie answer tliat an analytic naturalist would give. Analytic natuialism aims at establishing that 
for every moral property, F, there is a set o f naturalistic properties, G*, such that it is conceptually 
necessary that if  something is G*, then it is F. Wliether or not the tiuth of analytic naturalism, and 
thereby tiie truth of (i) [and (ii)], can be established is a large and complicated question tliat for present 
puiposes can be left to one side. For the moment, I just want to mention, and then shelve the 
possibility o f ,countering Blackburn's argument by accepting (i) [and (ii)]. The important thing right 
now is to assess what damage Blackburn's argument does to a realist position that rejects (i) and (ii).
In Blackburn's own words: "Supervenience becomes, for the [Moorean] realist, an opaque, isolated, 
logical fact for which no explanation can be proffered" (Blackburn 1973:119).
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the greatest deductive powers, it is invalid in all the standard systems of modal 
logic. '^  ^Contrary to what Blackburn seems to think, no real mystery emerges from 
acceptance of (S*) and rejection of (i). This is so because one can explain the tmth of 
(S*) by appealing to the tmth of (ii). Acceptance of (S*) and (ii), together with 
rejection of (i) is logically consistent, and the tmth of (ii) explains the tmth of (S*). 
This would, however, be an odd combination of views to hold. If one rejects (i), what 
is the reason for accepting (ii)? A classical reason for rejecting (i) is that it is never 
the case that an object's instantiation of certain natural properties conceptually entails 
its instantiation of a certain moral property. If this is the reason for rejecting (i), then 
it is inconsistent not to reject (ii). So, strictly speaking, the argument only gets going 
against a realist position that accepts (S*) and rejects both (i) and (ii).
3. Responses to the Argument
The Moorean realist might respond to the argument by rejecting the claim that it is 
unacceptable to accept a supervenience relation as a brute conceptual fact. If it is 
acceptable to accept a supervenience relation as a bmte conceptual fact, then it is of 
course no objection to Moorean realism that it offers no explanation of this fact. I do 
not think, however, that this response from the Moorean realist is satisfying. On the 
Moorean pictur e, moral concepts are used to pick out distinctive moral properties. 
Given this account of the semantic role of moral concepts, and given that it is 
conceptually possible that something G* should be F, and conceptually possible that 
something G* should be not F, it does in my opinion seem rather odd that it is 
conceptually impossible that something should be G* and F, and something else (in
counterexample to the inference is: < {Wo, Wi) ; (DWo = a e -,G, F. DWi = a g G, -»F}>.
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that world) should be G* and not F. What explains this conceptual ban on mixed 
worlds?
A second response consists in saying that though a supervenience relation 
holds between the natural and moral properties of an object, it is not (S*) that should 
be used in a definition of this supervenience relation. The reason for this is that 
though moral supervenience is best captured by a thesis of wealc supervenience, this 
relation does not hold with conceptual necessity, and if the modal operator of (S*) 
does not denote the same kind of necessity as the modal operator involved in (i*) and 
(ii*), the proposed argument against Moorean realism collapses.
Let me comment on this escape route for the Moorean realist. For reasons I 
rehearsed in the previous chapter, I thinlc it should be accepted that moral 
supeivenience holds with conceptual necessity. A distinctively conceptual mistalce is 
made if one suggests that it is possible that two objects within a given world should 
differ in tenns of being F without differing in teims of being G*.
Kim ascribes to Moore the view that supeivenience is a fundamental
synthetic, apriori fact that is not susceptible to further explanation (Kim 2000:13).
Two things speak, in my opinion, against accepting Moore's view. Firstly, it simply
gets the modality of moral supervenience wrong. Secondly, if Moore says that
supeivenience is a synthetic, apriori fact that cannot be given any deeper explanation,
then he just postulates that a certain relation holds. To accept this is, in my opinion,
to indulge in metaphysical extravagance. What is it that secuies that identical moral
properties are always instantiated in objects that are identical in tenns of natural
properties? Why is it metaphysically necessary that if one object is G* and F, then all
G*-objects are F? Is it God who somehow secures that moral properties are always
instantiated evenly across naturalistic similarities? If it is, then we have a situation in
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which God could have distributed moral properties in objects in any way he liked,
completely independently of the naturalistic, properties of objects. For some strange
reason he, however, chose to distribute them in exactly such a way that the world
respects supervenience. I believe that we can safely dismiss this possibility. The
Moorean realist must therefore come up with some other explanation as to why it is
metaphysically impossible that naturalistically identical objects should have
non-identical moral properties.
The Moorean realist might now suggest that, at least for some F's and G*'s,
(Vx)(G*x -4^ Fx) is necessaiy and synthetic. Where the modal operators denote
metaphysical necessity, the tmth of'□(Vx)(G*x -»> Fx)' explains the tmth of
'□[(3x)(G*x & Fx) -4- (Vy)(G*y Fy)]'. This seems to be what Moore actually
suggested. He writes:
"I should never have thought of suggesting that goodness was "non-natural",
unless I had supposed that it was "derivative" in the sense that, whenever a
thing is good (in the sense in question) its goodness (in Mr. Broad's words)
"depends on the presence of certain non-ethical characteristics" possessed by
the thing in question. I have always supposed that it did so "depend", in the
sense that, if a thing is good (in my sense), then that it is so follows from the
fact it possesses certain natuial intrinsic properties, which are such that fr om
the fact that it is good it does not follow conversely that it has those
properties" (Moore 1942:588).
If an object's being good (being F) 'follows' from the fact that it instantiates certain
natuial properties (G*), then 'D(Vx)(G*x Fx)' must be tme on Moore's picture. It
simply makes no sense to say that being F 'follows' from being G* if it is possible
that something should be G* and not F. The Moorean realist might now add that the
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status of (Vx)(G*x - 4  Fx) as being necessary and synthetic is not susceptible to any
further explanation. The necessary connection expressed by the proposition is
metaphysically and explanatory rock-bottom. To accept this view is, however, in my
opinion, no less to indulge in metaphysical extravagance. Is it God who secures, for
all objects and for all metaphysically possible worlds, that if an object is G*, then it
is F (where F, we must not forget, is a property from a class of properties distinct
fr om the class of properties that G* belongs to)?
Perhaps the Moorean realist replies to this by saying that asking this question
is to ask for something that has no explanation and, importantly, does not need any
explanation. If this is what the Moorean realist says, then I do not think that anything
more can be said against him. We have arrived at a state of the debate where we are
left with nothing but clashing intuitions about what kind of facts and relations are
metaphysically unproblematic. I side with Hare when he writes:
"He [the moral realist] can, if we aie prepared to swallow it, go on saying,
without offence to supeivenience, that there just is the sui generis non-natural
property which all things of a certain kind necessaiily (but not analytically)
have...Like Blackburn, I find this hat'd to swallow, but others may have
stronger stomachs (stomachs these days are getting harder)" (Hare 1984:7).
In general, I am of the opinion that Blackburn's argument is quite powerfiil. Its
problems aie in the technical department, and relate to the question of what formula
should be used in a definition of the wealc supervenience thesis that captures moral
supeivenience. None of Blackbmn's two suggestions as to what formula should be
involved in such a definition, are entirely satisfying. However, if Blackburn's
argument is run with the definition of moral supeivenience that I suggested in the
previous chapter, then I think the argument retains its polemic force whereas its
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vulnerability to technical objections decreases significantly. Blackburn's argument is 
powerful because it brings out clearly the point that Moorean realism has a problem 
with explaining moral supeivenience when this relation is taken to hold with 
conceptual necessity. In addition to this problem, Moorean realism has, as I have 
tried to argue, a problem even if  it reh eats to the view that moral supervenience holds 
with metaphysical necessity. All in all, I therefore think that it should be concluded 
that Moorean realism fares badly on the issue of moral supervenience.
It must be stressed that even if it is hue, as I claim it is, that Blackburn's 
supervenience argument is a powerful argument against Moorean realism, it is still a 
possibility that the argument is not a good argument against moral realism as such. 
There might be versions of moral realism that have no particular problem in 
accounting for the fact that moral supervenience holds with conceptual necessity. The 
question of whether or not Blackburn's argument is a good ai gument against moral 
realism as such, is a question that can only be answered after a careful discussion of 
how other versions of moral realism fare in comparison to Blackburn's ai gument. 
Until such a discussion has been caixied out, one would be unwairanted in 
concluding that Blackburn's argument has any general scope.
In connection with this, it seems appropriate to mention that as it stands, the 
argument cannot ftmction as an argument against analytic naturalism. It is a premise 
of Blackburn's argument that there is no F, and no G* such that (i) and (ii) are true. If 
this premise is true, then analytic naturalism is false. But this has nothing especially 
to do with supeivenience. It is just a result of the fact that the tmth of analytic 
naturalism is incompatible with the tmth of this premise.
65
4. Expressivism
Blackburn has in a number of writings expounded and defended a position in 
metaethics that he calls 'quasi-realism'/^ Cential to this position is an expressivist 
analysis of moral utterances. The core idea of expressivism is that moral utterances 
have the function of expressing attitudes of approval or disapproval. A moral 
utterance such as 'x is wrong' does not express any belief of the speaker about x, and 
it does not primaiily describe x. It is not semantically equivalent to an assertion that x 
possesses the property of wrongness. The utterance expresses, on the contrary, an 
attitude of disapproval towards x. Moral utterances do not have ordinaiy 
tmth-conditions in the sense that certain states of affairs must obtain in order for the 
utterances to be true. This in turn means that the meaning of moral utterances is not 
exhausted by their truth-conditions. Blackburn has, relatively recently, given this 
description of what expressivism is:
"Expressivism denies that when we assert values [say such things as 'x is 
right' or 'x is just'], we talk about our own states of mind in actual or potential 
circumstances. It says that we voice our states of mind but denies that we 
thereby describe them" (Blackburn 1998:50).
Why is Blackburn eager to di aw the distinction between voicing and describing one's 
states of mind and to sti ess that on the expressivist view, one does the former when 
one asserts one's values? An answer to this proceeds best via a short outline of some 
of the descriptivist analyses of moral utterances that Blackburn is opposed to.^  ^
According to descriptivism, moral utterances primarily describe the object that they 
are about. Both classical analytical natui alism, i.e. naturalism of the kind that Moore
^^See (Blackburn 1984; 1993a; 1998).
^^See (Blackburn 1984:167-171).
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attempted to refute with his open question argument, and Moorean realism subscribe 
to a descriptivist analysis of moral utterances.
It makes sense to view the former position as a version of reductionism since 
it aims at reducing moral properties to natui'al properties, and tides to caiiy out this 
project by finding naturalistic synonyms for moral predicates. The underlying 
semantic idea is that predicates, in general, have a referring semantic function, and 
that synonymous predicates have the same referent. It is therefore the case, on this 
line of thought, that if it can be shown that some predicate, 'N', fi*om the class of 
naturalistic predicates is synonymous with some predicate, 'M', fiom the class of 
moral predicates, then the predicates have the same referent, and we are therefore 
entitled to conclude that the moral propeily of M-ness is identical to N-ness. The 
moral utterance that ’x is M' is a description of x. The utterance is semantically 
equivalent to the assertion that x possesses a certain property: namely M. Moreover, 
the utterance has genuine truth-conditions in the sense that it is tine if and only if x is 
N. If not the entire meaning of the utterance is exhausted by its truth-conditions, then 
at least its primary meaning is. One Icnows the primaiy meaning of the utterance 
when one Imows the conditions under which it is true. Let us call this version of 
analytical natuialism, 'objective naturalism'.^^
According to non-naturalistic moral realism, moral utterances ai e descriptive 
of a special moral aspect of reality. Sui generis moral properties are, to quote Mackie, 
"part of the fabric of the world", and moral predicates refer to these properties.
^^Tiiere is a number of doctrines that can properly be said to be versions o f analytic naturalism even 
though they depart somewhat from tlie general position outlined above. A  proper generic name for 
tliese other doctrines might be 'subjective naturalism'. What all versions of subjective naturalism have 
in common is that tliey offer an analysis o f moral predicates that involves reference to mental states. '1. 
person subjectivism' offers an analysis that involves reference to the mental states o f the speaker who 
applies tlie predicate. 'Communitarian subjectivism' offers an analysis that involves reference to the 
mental states of the limited group of people who make up tlie community, society, organisation, tiibe 
etc. to which the speaker is a member. Finally, 'universal subjectivism' offers an analysis o f moral 
predicates that involves reference to the mental states of all people.
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Saying that x is good is to give a description of x. It is to make the assertion that x 
has the property of goodness, and the utterance is true if and only if x has that 
property.^®
Blackburn dismisses the descriptive analysis of moral utterances put foi*wai*d 
by objective naturalism on the giound that such an analysis malces it impossible to 
explain how two (or more) agents, that give different analyses of given moral 
predicate, can be involved in genuine moral disagreement if they differ in their views 
as to whether or not the predicate should be applied to a particular object. The 
ai'gument is this: consider an agent who gives an analysis of the moral predicate 'M' 
('right') to the effect that it means 'N' ('maximising overall preference-satisfaction'). 
Moreover, he analyses 'wrong' to mean 'not N' ('not maximising overall 
preference-satisfaction'). Consider now another agent that gives an analysis of'M ' to 
the effect that it means 'P' ('in accordance with God's commands'). On this second 
agent's analysis, 'wrong' means 'not ?' ('not in accordance with God's commands'). 
Imagine now a situation in which the former agent says that some act is right whereas 
the latter agent says that it is wrong. Blackburn says that in such a situation, our 
intuitive response would be that the two agents aie involved in a genuine moral 
disagreement. What the former agents says is, or so it seems, denied by the latter 
agent and vice versa. The fact that the two agents give different analyses of the moral 
predicates that they use has, however, the consequence that there in fact is no genuine 
disagreement between them. When the foimer agent says that the act is right, what he 
means is that it is maximising overall preference-satisfaction. He asserts, that is, that 
the object has this specific property.
^®(Mackiel977:15).
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For there to be a genuine disagieement between him and the latter agent what 
has to be the case is that what the latter agent means by his claim that the act is 
wrong, is that the act is not maximising overall preference-satisfaction. This is, 
however, not what the latter agent means by his claim. What he means by his claim is 
simply that the act is not in accordance with God's commands. What we have is 
therefore a situation in which the former agent says that the act is maximising overall 
preference-satisfaction and the latter agent says that it is not in accordance with God's 
commands. This means, contiary to how things appear to be, that there is no genuine 
disagreement between the two agents. They do not contradict each other, and it is not 
the case that the beliefs expressed by the two agents cannot both be tme.®^
Blackburn dismisses the descriptivist analysis put foiward by Moorean 
realism on the gi'ound that it presupposes indefensible ontological and 
epistemological commitments. He is also of the opinion that expressivism avoids the 
problems that various descriptivist analyses, according to him, have. Expressivism 
can account for moral disagreement:
his discussion of analytic naturalism, Blackburn only considers objective naturalism (Blackburn 
1984:168). The reason as to why Blackburn only considers objective natuialism is perhaps tliat he is of 
tlie opinion that tlie ai'gument he offers against this version of analytic naturalism has broad scope in 
the sense that it refutes not only tlie considered version but all versions of analytic naturalism. To tlie 
extent that this is a correct interpretation o f Blackburn's argumentative sti ategy, there is room for 
doubting that it achieves what it is supposed to achieve. Consider the analysis o f moral utterances put 
forward by universal subjectivism. If one agent says that a specific act is right, then he malces the 
assertion that it is approved of by everybody. If another agent says that the act is wrong, tlien he malces 
the assertion tliat it is disapproved o f by eveiybody. In tills situation there is a genuine disagreement 
between tlie two agents. One might reply be to tliis by saying tliat this descriptivist analysis of moral 
utterances is unsatisfactory because it gives a distorted account of what moral disagreement consists 
in. It construes moral disagreement as a disagreement about sociological facts, and it camiot possibly 
be the case, one might contend, that a moral disagreement between two agents is a disagreement about 
such matters. Two things should be said in response to this: firstly, whether or not this analysis of 
moral utterances misconstiues the nature of moral disagreement is a completely different issue from 
what is raised by Blackburn's argument. If it misconstrues the natme of moral disagreement, then this 
is something that must be shown and not just assumed and, importantly, it takes additional argument to 
what is provided by Blackburn to show this. Secondly, if the above objection is grounded in tlie 
conviction that a proper analysis o f moral utterances construes moral disagreement as a disagreement 
in attitude and not a disagreement about facts (iiTespectively of these facts being sociological, 
economical or something else), tlien one simply begs the question against a descriptivist analysis of 
moral utterances.
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"The expressive theory avoids this undesirable consequence. It locates the 
disagreement where it should be, in the clash of attitudes towards [the act]" 
(Blackburn 1984:168).
When one agent says that some act is right and another agent says that it is not right 
(or says that it is wiong), then there really is a genuine moral disagreement between 
them. There is such a disagreement because what is happening in the situation is that 
the two agents express opposing attitudes towards the act. The foimer agent 
expresses an attitude of approval towards the act. By saying that the act is not right, 
the latter agent expresses a different attitude towards the act. It is not a distinct 
attitude of disapproval towaids the act, but it is nonetheless an attitude that opposes 
and clashes with the attitude expressed by the foimer agent.'^ ®
By denying that moral predicates refer to sui generis properties, expressivism 
avoids problems of accounting for how these properties fit into a general naturalistic 
world view, and how we have epistemological access to them.
What should we think of Blackburn's arguments concerning what analysis to 
give of moral utterances? In answering this question, one should separate Blackburn's 
arguments into two classes: the negative arguments against the various forms of 
descriptivism, and the positive arguments for the adequacy of an expressivist analysis 
of moral utterances. For present purposes, no stand needs to be taken on the 
soundness of Blackburn's negative ar guments. A stand needs, however, to be taken 
on his positive ones. Expressivism presents us with a simple and coherent account of
what moral disagreement consists in. Its ontological and epistemological
see that the two attitudes actually clash, imagine them being attitudes o f a single agent. Such an 
agent would have an inconsistent set o f attitudes. The inconsistency of tliis is clearly brought into the 
open by considering the fact that there is no possible world that confoims to die pattern of attitudes 
expressed by this agent. By approving o f x (the act), the agent expresses a view to the effect tiiat x is 
realised in every (morally ideal) possible world. By not approving of x, die agent expresses a view to 
the effect that there is a (morally ideal) possible world in which x is not realised. It is, however, 
logically impossible that diere should be a world in which both x and not x  is realised.
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presuppositions are, moreover, minimal. These features of the theory ar e, in my 
opinion, enough to establish expressivism as an interesting semantic theoiy that is 
worthy of further attention. If expressivism can proffer a convincing explanation of 
moral supervenience, then its credentials are further enriched. So, the question that 
needs to be addressed now is the dual one of what the expressivist explanation of 
moral supervenience is, and whether or not it is convincing.
5. The Expressivist Explanation o f Moral Supervenience
Expressivism denies theses (i) and (ii) presented in section two. Since expressivism
and Moorean realism are allied in the rejection of these theses, and since the latter’s
rejection of these theses are, at least partially, responsible for the fact that it faces a
problem in relation to moral supervenience, one might wonder if  expressivism will
not face the same problem. Blackburn is, however, of the opinion that the rejection of
(i) and (ii) yields no problem for expressivism in connection with moral
supervenience. This theoiy is quite capable of giving an explanation of moral
supervenience that can accommodate the fact that it holds with conceptual necessity.
The explanation is this:
"From the anti-realist point of view things are a little easier. When we
announce the A-commitments [moral judgements] we are projecting, we are
neither reacting to a given distiibution of A-properties [moral properties], nor
speculating about one. So the supervenience can be explained in terms of the
constraints upon proper projection. Our purpose in projecting value predicates
may demand that we respect supeiwenience. If we allowed ourselves a system
(shmoralizing) which was like ordinaiy evaluative practice, but subject to no
such constraint, then it would allow us to treat naturally identical cases in
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morally different ways. This could be good shmoralizing. But that would 
unfit shmoralizing fi'om being any kind of guide to practical decision-making 
(a thing could be properly deenied shbetter than another although it shared 
with it all the features relevant to choice or desirability" (Blackburn 
1984:186).
Supervenience is here explained as a conceptual constraint upon what it is to be
'moralising'. If one does not respect supervenience and applies non-identical
evaluative predicates to objects that one judges to be naturalistically identical, then
the practice that one is engaged in is simply not the practice of moralising. It is some
other practice that we might call 'schmoralizing'. Why cannot an evaluative practice
that is not disciplined by supervenience count as moralising? This has something to
do with the distinctive purpose of the practice of moralising. The practice of
moralising serwes, on the expressivist picture, the pur pose of being a guide to
practical decision-making. To apply an evaluative predicate to an object is not only to
express an attitude of approval or disapproval towar'ds it. It is also to commend or
condemn it, and to rank it either favourably or disfavourably in comparison to other
objects. The practice of moralising can only serve its purpose if it is disciplined by
respect for supervenience.
If an individual could be said to be moralising while adopting an evaluative
practice that consists in applying non-identical evaluative predicates to objects that
ar e naturalistically identical, then the practice of moralising could not fimction as a
guide to practical decision-making. Other people looking to the evaluative practice of
this individual for guidance concerning what to do, desire and choose, would be left
in a state of contusion since the individual would express inconsistent attitudes and
recommendations towards objects that are natur alistically identical. On some
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occasions he would approve of, commend and rank favourably objects with natural 
properties N, and on other occasions, he would disapprove of and rank disfavourably 
such objects.
To make the expressivist accoimt of moral supervenience even more clear, 
consider this passage:
"It seems to be a conceptual matter that moral claims supervene upon natural 
ones. Anyone failing to realize this, or to obey the constraint, would indeed 
lack something constitutive of competence in the moral practice. And there is 
good reason for this: it would betray the whole piupose for which we 
moralize, which is to choose, commend, rank, approve, or forbid things on 
the basis of their natuial properties" (Blackburn 1985a: 137).'**
Again, the view is that it is a conceptual consti aint upon using moral vocabulaiy that 
one respects supeiwenience and applies identical moral concepts to objects tliat one 
judges to be natur alistically identical. If one does not respect supeiwenience in one's 
use of moral concepts, then one displays conceptual confusion and makes evident 
that one is not a competent user of moral concepts. It is, according to Blackburn, 
simply constitutive of competence in the moral practice that one respects 
supei-venience. Two people can use moral concepts in obedience to the conceptual 
constraints that govern all use of moral concepts even though they adopt different 
standards, and do not apply the same moral concept to a given object characterised by 
a certain set of natural properties. Both trespass, however, on the conceptual 
constr aint tliat govern all use of moral concepts if they do not respect superwenience.
'^ ^One thing to note here is tliat Blackburn implicitly rejects the view that supervenience in tlie realm of 
ethics is a relation between properties. He commits himself to ascriptive supervenience by saying tliat 
it is moral claims (or judgements) tliat supervene upon natural claims (or judgements).
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What is the explanation as to why it is constitutive of competence with the 
moral vocabulary that supervenience is respected? Again, the explanation has as its 
starting point a certain view as to what the purpose is of using moral vocabulary. As 
the quoted passage attests, it is Blackburn's view that the purpose for which we use 
moral vocabulary it to commend, rank approve and disapprove of things because of 
their natural properties. Put slightly differently, the role of using moral vocabulary is 
to guide choices and desires among the natural featur*es of the world. Its role is not to 
describe or depict a distinct moral aspect of reality. Now, our use of moral 
vocabulary can only fulfil this purpose or play this role if it is disciplined by respect 
for supervenience. An evaluative practice in which it was acceptable to break 
supervenience and apply non-identical moral concepts to objects that are judged to be 
naturalistically identical would simply defeat or betray the pmpose for which we use 
moral vocabulary.
If one accepts the expressivist assumptions about the semantic role of moral 
judgements and the purpose for which we apply moral concepts to objects, then it 
appears to me that expressivism has a coherent and convincing explanation as to why 
it is constitutive of competence with the moral vocabulaiy that the supeivenience 
constraint is respected. I therefore do not think that there is anything in Blackburn's 
explanation of moral supervenience that should make us believe that the expressivist 
has an independent problem on the issue of moral supeiwenience. Expressivism fares 
well on this issue.
Of course, one could question and argue against the expressivist assumptions
about the semantic role of moral judgements, and the purpose for which we apply
moral concepts. This line of critique would not, however, be a direct critique of the
expressivist explanation of moral supervenience. It would be a critique of the
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expressivist assumptions on which Blackburn builds his explanation of moral 
supervenience. Such a critique may or may not be justified, but since the question 
under consideration here is the question of whether or not the expressivist has an 
independent problem on the issue of moral supervenience, it is not an interesting line 
of critique to attack the key assumptions of expressivism. This is not to be 
overgenerous towards expressivism, or in any other way to be playing it into the 
hands of expressivism. It is simply to be seeking an answer to the question of 
whether or not expressivism can account for moral supeiwenience.
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Chapter 5 
Round One of the Frege-Geach Point
1. Introductory
In this chapter, I shall continue the exploration of expressivism. The focus will be 
dkectly on expressivism's core thesis, and I shall start answering the question of 
whether or not expressivism, in the end, is a plausible semantic theoiy. What I intend 
to do is to consider in detail the objection to expressivism that historically has proved 
to be the most serious and persistent. The objection in question is what has come to 
be loiown as the 'Frege-Geach point'. At this point, I will only be concerned with the . 
initial stage of the debate relating to the Frege-Geach point. The content of the 
chapter is therefore mainly exegetical. A chapter of this nature is, however, helpful 
for the understanding of the more recent developments on the issue that I shall be 
concerned with in the two subsequent chapters.
In section two, I give an account of what the Frege-Geach point is, and why it 
might be thought to be a problem for a proponent of expressivism. Section three 
contains an outline of Blackburn's response to the problem posed by the Frege-Geach 
point. This response involves, among other things, the development of a foimal 
language into which sentences in natural language can be translated. I give an 
account of this formal language, and discuss some of its features. In sections four and 
five, I critically discuss Blackburn's response. Fust, I ar gue for a certain way of 
understanding what attitudinal inconsistency consists in. I then consider points made 
by Hale and Wright, and I end by concluding that Blackburn's strongest defence is
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defective. This is so because it does not allow us to say that a distinctively logical 
mistake is made if  one accepts the premises but not the conclusion of a modus 
ponens inference that involves sentences that are given an expressivist analysis.
2. The Problem
The recent genesis of the Frege-Geach point is in an article by Peter Geach.'*  ^With 
the exception of one quote from the original sour ce, I shall, however, talce 
Blackburn's presentation and discussion of the issue in Spreading the Word as my 
starting point.'*  ^At the beginning of his article, Geach observes that:
"a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, and now unasserted, and 
yet be recognizably the same proposition".
Consider the sentence, 'It is wr ong to tell lies'. This sentence contains the predicate 
'wrong' and the sentence can occur both asserted and unasserted. The sentence occur s 
asserted when it occurs on its own and it occur s unasserted, or embedded, when it 
occurs as a constituent sentence of a larger sentence such as a conditional or 
disjunction.'*'*
An example of a context in which the sentence occur s unasserted is the 
conditional 'If it is wrong to tell lies, then it is wrong to get your little brother to tell 
lies'. By aftirming this sentence, one does not affirm the sentence 'It is wrong to tell 
lies'. One affirms a conditional of which the original sentence is the unasserted 
antecedent. The Frege-Geach point is that a sentence such as 'It is wrong to tell lies' 
means the same whether or not it occurs asserted or unasserted. In other words, the
See (Geach 1964).
«(pp:189-196)
'*'*Tlre sentence can occur unasserted in other contexts as well: contexts such as: i t  is not the case tliat 
it is wrong to tell lies' and 'He believes that it is wrong to tell lies'.
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sentence does not change meaning in a transition from an asserted to an unasserted 
occurrence. The proof of this is that the following modus ponens inference is valid:
1) If it is wrong to tell lies, then it is wr ong to get your little brother to tell
lies.
2) It is wrong to tell lies.
3) It is wrong to get your little brother to tell lies.
A necessary condition for the validity of the argument is that the sentence 'It is wrong 
to tell lies' means the same in each of its occun ences in the argument. If the sentence 
does not have the same meaning in each of its occun ences, then there is a fallacy of 
equivocation.
Why should all this constitute a problem for expressivism? The problem is 
this: in 2), 'It is wrong to tell lies' occur s asserted and according to expressivism, an 
attitude of disapproval towards telling lies is expressed when the sentence is 
affirmed. This means that in 2), the sentence has a distinctive expressive meaning. In
1), the same sentence occurs in an unasserted context and by affirming 1), no attitude 
of disapproval towar ds telling lies is expressed. Somebody who affirms 1), affirms a 
conditional and carmot properly be said to be expressing an attitude of disapproval 
towards telling lies. This means that 'It is wr ong to tell lies' does not have, as it 
occurs in 1), a distinctive expressive meaning. The validity of the modus ponens 
inference shows, however, that 'It is wrong to tell lies’ means the same whether or not 
the sentence occurs asserted or in an unasserted context. It cannot therefore be the 
case that the sentence has a distinctive expressive meaning when affirmed on its 
own.'*^  Expressivism is therefore wrong.
'*^ This conclusion can be resisted by denying that the inference is valid. If one siniply denies that the 
inference is valid, then there is no inconsistency involved in holding tlie view that tlie sentence shifts 
meaning from an unasserted to an asserted context. Such a denial is, however, very costly. It involves 
rejecting central theses in classical logic and doing this has severe consequences for how one can
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As a first comment to the Frege-Geach point, Blackbui*n notes that 
expressivism does not have to concede defeat before the possibilities have been 
explored of giving an account of unasserted contexts that is such that the evaluative 
constituent sentences of such contexts have a distinctive expressive meaning 
(Blackburn 1984:191). The underlying idea of this thought is that the availability of 
any such account will enable the expressivist to hold that an evaluative sentence has 
a meaning in unasseited contexts that is identical to the meaning it has when it is 
affirmed on its own. What must be included in such an account, according to 
Blackburn, is an explanation of what we are up to when we make use of linguistic 
expressions in which evaluative sentences occur unasserted. What is it, for example, 
that we are up to when we express ourselves in terms of conditionals witli evaluative 
constituent sentences?'*^
Understanding of Blackburn’s answer to this question goes via understanding 
of the notion of a 'moral sensibility'. On the projective picture, a moral sensibility is a 
function fi*om input of beliefs to output of attitude. Our moral psychology works, 
according to projectivism, in such a way that we form beliefs about how the world is 
in terms of natural properties and any moral conviction is then to be seen as an 
attitudinal response to the world. Two agents may agree about the natural properties 
of an act but disagree in their attitudinal response to the act.
The moral sensibility of the one agent may be such that the act’s natural 
properties triggers an attitude of disapproval while the other agent has a moral 
sensibility that is such that the very same set of natural properties triggers no such
argue on philosophical issues unrelated to the Frege-Geach point.
In Spreading the Word, Blackburn focuses solely on conditionals, but tlie Frege-Geach point has 
general scope. All unasserted contexts, not only conditionals, pose an initial problem for an 
expressivist analysis o f moral utterances. This means that Blackburn, in order to make expressivism 
credible, must be able to give an account o f each and every unasserted context and the account must 
be such that the evaluative sentence occurring unasserted preserves its distinctive expressive meaning.
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attitude. According to Blackburn, not all moral sensibilities are admirable. Some are 
deplorable in the sense that they tiigger an attitude of approval (or disapproval) 
towards acts and social institutions that, according to a specific first order moral 
view, do not deseiwe such an attitudinal response. Other sensibilities are unadmirable 
because they are unreliable in the sense that they on different occasions trigger 
attitudes that are inconsistent with each other.
Blackburn is of the opinion that it is very important to us to rank various 
sensibilities and to endorse some sensibilities and condemn and reject other 
sensibilities. Why is this important? It is important because people’s behaviour is, to 
a large extent, a function of their moral sensibility and one of the things that have the 
most severe consequences on the desirability of the world we live in is the way other 
people behave. A world in which people keep their promises, speak the tmth and 
engage in acts of co-operation is much more desirable than a world in which people 
do not do these things.
An important feature of any moral sensibility is the way it pairs together 
different first order attitudes. It is, for example, easy to thinlc of a sensibility that pairs 
an attitude of disapproval towards telling lies with an attitude of approval towards 
getting other people to tell lies. If one’s own moral sensibility is such that one finds 
such a pairing of individual first order attitudes repugnant, what linguistic expression 
should one make use of in order to express one’s disapproval of this pairing?
Blackburn's suggestion is that the evaluative conditional is the natural way of
expressing approval of specific pairings or combinations of first order attitudes.
Somebody who affirms 'If it is wrong to tell lies, then it is wrong to get youi* little
brother to tell lies' expresses an attitude of approval towards actually combining, or
having a disposition to combine, an attitude of disapproval towards telling lies with a
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similar attitude towards getting youi* little brother to tell lies. This means that the 
function of the conditional is to express a substantial moral view or opinion: "But it 
is quite satisfactory that the conditional expresses a moral point of view" (ibid.: 193). 
People with the moral view that there is a big difference between telling lies yourself 
and getting your little brother (or anybody else, for that matter) to tell lies will reject 
or abstain from affiiming the conditional. They will reject the conditional because 
they reject the moral view that an attitude of disapproval towaids telling lies should 
be combined with a similar attitude towards getting other people to lie.
3. The Formal Language Eex
This is Blackburn's general account of what we are up to when we express ourselves 
in terms of a conditional with evaluative constituent sentences. He now supplements 
this account with a semantic theoiy. We are invited to imagine a language that is veiy 
much like ordinaiy English. The only difference is that it does not contain any 
evaluative predicates such as 'good', 'right' and 'wrong'. The expressive nature of 
value judgements in this language, Eex, is completely transparent because Eex, 
contains a 'hooray!' operator and a 'boo!' operator (H!, B!) that attach to descriptions 
of things to give expressions of attitude. 'H! (telling the tmth)* expresses approval of 
telling the tmth and 'B! (telling lies)' expresses disapproval of telling lies.
For the reasons already developed, spealcers of Eex will want a notation for
expressing attitudes towaids vaiious couplings of attitudes. Blackburn suggests that
we talk about an attitude by putting its expression inside bars. The expression
'/H!(X)/' does not express any attitude towards X but can be used to refer to approval
of X . This means that if a speaker of Eex wishes to express disapproval of approval of
X, then he should make use of this expression: 'B!(/H!(X)/)'. Another syntactical
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device of Eex is the semicolon, The semicolon is used to denote the view that one 
attitude involves or is coupled with another.'*  ^With these technical devices in place, 
it is now possible to reconstruct how a speaker of Eex will express himself if he is to 
express die moral view expressed by the evaluative conditional of ordinary English: 
4) H! (/B!(telling lies)/;/B!(getting your little brother to tell lies)/).
4) expresses an attitude of approval of making (disapproval of getting your little 
brother to tell lies) follow upon (disapproval of telling lies). In this reading of 4), 
which is the one Blackburn favours, an expression of the foim 'A;B' is not taken to 
denote the view that attitude A involves or is coupled with attitude B, but is 
interpreted as meaning 'making B follow upon A'. This means that Blackbum has 
thr ee possible interpretations of the semicolon in play. 'A;B' can mean either of'A 
involves B', 'A is coupled with B' or 'making B follow upon A'. There might not be 
much that separates the three readings but it seems to me that Blackburn's exposition 
of this syntactic device of Eex would have benefited fi om a bit more clarity and 
stringency. It is quite reasonable for the reader to wonder at this point what, if 
anything, hangs on the shift in interpretation of the semicolon.
Blackburn suggests that Eex will be spoken by people who need to signal and 
respect consistencies and inconsistencies. Consider now an agent who holds this pair 
of attitudes:
4) H! (/B!(telling lies)/;/B!(getting your little brother to tell lies)/).
5) B! (telling lies).
Is this agent committed to holding an attitude of disapproval towards getting your 
little brother to tell lies? Blackburn gives an affirmative answer:
'*^"And suppose we use the semi-colon to denote the view that one attitude or belief involves or is 
coupled with anotlier" (ibid.: 194).
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"Anyone holding this pair must hold the consequential disapproval: he is
committed to disapproving of getting little brother to lie, for if he does not his
attitudes clash" (ibid.: 195).
The important thing here is the notion of attitudes that 'clash'. Blackburn's reason for
thinking that the agent's attitudes clash is this: by holding the attitude expressed by
4), the agent has an attitude of approval towards maldng disapproval of getting your
little brother to tell lies follow upon disapproval of telling lies. By holding the
attitude expressed by 5), the agent has an attitude of disapproval towards telling lies.
By failing to have an attitude of disapproval towards getting your little brother to tell
lies, the agent's attitudes might be said to clash in the following sense: since the agent
fails to have an attitude of disapproval towai ds getting your little brother to tell lies
and actually has an attitude of disapproval towards telling lies, he fails to make
disapproval of getting your little brother to tell lies follow upon .disapproval of telling
lies. He therefore fails to do something that he himself approves of.
Put differently, and using an alternative inteipretation of the semicolon: by
failing to have an attitude of disapproval towar ds getting your little brother to tell
lies, the agent fails to couple an attitude of disapproval towards telling lies with an
attitude of disapproval towaids getting your little brother to tell lies, and he therefore
fails to couple attitudes in a way that he himself approves of.
Blackburn goes on to say that anybody who holds the attitudes expressed by
4) and 5) but does not hold the 'consequential disapproval' has a fractured sensibility
that cannot be an object of approval. The reason why such a sensibility cannot be an
object of approval is that it cannot fulfil the practical purposes for which we evaluate
things. As noted in the previous chapter, the expressivist pictuie has it that we
evaluate things in order to guide behaviour and practical decision-making. To apply
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the predicate 'good' or 'right' to an act is, among other things, to recommend to others 
the performance of the act. It is clear that if an agent's moral sensibility is fickle in 
the sense that it issues in attitudes that clash with each other (attitudes that ar e 
internally inconsistent), then the agent's practice of evaluating things cannot fulfil its 
practical purposes. The agent will in his evaluative practice both encourage the 
performance and the non-performance of ceifain acts and such a practice cannot 
function as a guide to behaviour and practical decision-making.
Blackburn is of the opinion that Bex gives the 'deep' or 'logical' structur e of 
oru* evaluative remarks. Evaluative remarks have a prepositional surface-form, but 
the logical structure of any such remark can be represented in Eex. This does not 
mean, however, that there is something mistalcen in putting oui* evaluative 
commitments in prepositional form and applying the truth-predicate to evaluative 
remarks. Since the desirability of the world we live into a large extend depends upon 
what attitudes other people hold, it is important to us that we ar e able to express 
concern for the consistency of other people's attitudes and ai e able to express 
agreement and disagr eement with their attitudinal stance.
We are, no doubt, able to do these things by speaking Eex but our practical 
need to debate, ponder and express agreement and disagreement with expressions of 
attitudes might be easier dealt with if we invent predicates answering to the two 
kinds of attitude and instead of using long and unhandy expressions such as 'B! 
(telling lies)', 'H! (keeping one's own promises)' and 'H! (/B! (telling lies)/;/B! (getting 
your little brother to tell lies)/)' we simply express ourselves in prepositional form as 
in 'It is wrong to tell lies', 'It is good to keep one's own promises' and 'If it is wrong to 
tell lies, then it is wrong to get your little brother to tell lies'.
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Since all evaluative remai*ks in ordinaiy English can be represented in Eex, it 
is possible to reconstruct the original modus ponens inference in Eex. It looks like 
this:
4) H! (/B!(telling lies)/;/B!(getting your little brother to tell lies)/).
5) B! (telling lies).
6) B! (getting your little brother to tell lies).
It is clear* that Blackbuiu would commit a mistake if he says that the original 
inference is valid because it is impossible that the premises should be true and the 
conclusion false. As the reconstruction of the inference in Eex shows, neither* the 
premises nor the conclusion are sentences that express a proposition. Blackburn does 
not make this mistake. His thought is that what underpins the inference is the idea, 
already described, that affir*mation of the premises and failure to accept the 
conclusion involve a clash of attitudes (ibid.: 195).
4. Critiques o f Blackburn's Response
My first point of critique of Blackbuiu’s response to the Frege-Geach point centres on 
Blackburu's thought that one has clashing attitudes if one affirms 1) and 2) but fails 
to accept 3). It seems to me to be a misdescription of such an agent to say that his 
attitudes clash. To see this, we need to understand what the necessary and sufficient 
conditions are for a clash of attitudes. When we have to our* disposal the two 
operators that Blackburu has introduced, it seems that a clash of attitudes can obtain 
in one of thr*ee ways: an agent has a set of clashing attitudes just in case he has at 
least one of the following pairs of attitudes: 'H! (X)' and 'B! (X)', ’H! (X)' and 'H! 
(not-X)' or 'B! (X)' and ’B! (not-X)’.'*® If this is accepted, then it is not true to say that
'’^ This view about what conditions must obtain in order for attitudes to clash is very similar to that 
expressed by Hale: "But we might, I tliink, say that attitudes clash if  they consist o f approval and
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the agent under consideration has a set of clashing attitudes. He has none of the thr ee 
pairs of attitude. He has an attitude of disapproval towards telling lies and fails to 
have an attitude of disapproval towards getting your little brother to tell lies.
It is a mistake to infer from this failure that he has an attitude of approval 
towards getting your little brother to tell lies. There is logical space to occupy 
between approval and disapproval of X. If one does not disapprove of X, then one 
does not necessarily approve of X. One can have an attitude of toleration or 
indifference towards X. We do not know what the agent's reason is for not accepting
3). It can either be because he has an attitude of approval towards getting your little 
brother to tell lies, or because he has an attitude of toleration or indifference towards 
it.
Whichever of these two attitudes he actually holds, it is not the case that this 
attitude in combination with his attitude of disapproval towaids telling lies clashes 
with his attitude of approval towai ds making disapproval of getting your little brother 
to tell lies follow upon disapproval of telling lies. Only two attitudes clash with the 
attitude expressed by 1): namely the ones expressed by:
7) B! (/B! (telling lies)/;/B! (getting your little brother to tell lies)/)
8) H! -I (/B! (telling lies)/;/B! (getting your little brother to tell lies)/)'*  ^
and the agent has neither of these. In my opinion, there is therefore reason to be 
sceptical about the coherence of the idea that the agent has clashing attitudes. 
Blackburn is mistalcen in saying that an agent affirming 1) and 2) is, on pain of
having clashing attitudes, committed to accepting 3).^ **________________
disapproval towards the same action-type, or if  they are attitudes of approval towards x-ing and 
not-x-ing" (Hale 1986:74).
'*^ The negation involved in 8) is not the ordinaiy, truth-functional one. Informally, 8) should be read as 
expressing approval towards not combining the attitudes conjoined by the semicolon.
°^In saying this, I to some extent echo what Wright says in this passage: "Blackburn does indeed speak 
of the 'clash o f attitudes' involved in endorsing the premises o f the modus ponens example, construed 
as he construes it, but in failing to endorse the conclusion. But nothing worth regarding as
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5. An Alternative Analysis o f 1)
If there is no case for saying that the inference to 3) from 1) and 2) is underpinned by 
the fact that acceptance of 1) and 2) together with failure to accept 3) result in a clash 
of attitude, what is it then that undeipins the inference? Bob Hale has, on behalf of 
the expressivist, offered an analysis of 1) that is different from the one given by 
Blackburn (Hale 1986:74). According to the alternative analysis, affirming the 
evaluative conditional commits one to disapproving of anyone who disapproves of 
telling lies but does not disapprove of getting your little brother to tell lies. This 
attitudinal commitment can only be represented in Eex if Eex is supplemented with a 
kind of negation This sign enables us to represent 'lack of attitude’. ’-/H!(X)/' 
denotes, for example, lacking an attitude of approval of X. On the alternative 
analysis, 1) is therefore the surface-form of:
9) B! (/B! (telling lies)/; -/B! (getting your little brother to tell lies)/)
Consider now an agent who has this attitudinal commitment and who 
moreover affirms 2) and fails to accept 3). An agent with this pattern of attitudes 
combines an attitude of disapproval towards telling lies with lack of disapproval 
towards getting youi* little brother to tell lies. By affiiming 1), the agent, however, 
explicitly disapproves of such a combination of attitudes. If this alternative analysis 
is adopted, then the expressivist can say that an agent affirming 1) and 2) but fails to 
accept 3) is involved in a special kind of inconsistency.
The agent is not inconsistent in the sense that he has clashing attitudes but 
since it, according to Hale, makes sense to see an agent's adoption of an attitude as an 
action of liis^ *, the agent is inconsistent in the sense that he fails to make his actions
inconsistency seems to be involved. Those who do that merely fail to have every combination of 
attitudes of which they themselves approve" (Wright 1988:33).
^*This appears to be correct. It would be a mistake to tliink that what falls under the concept o f an 
action is only a kind o f intentional bodily movement that causes physical change to the environment in
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cohere with his attitudinal commitments. The agent disapproves of any sensibility 
that combines an attitude of disapproval towards telling lies with toleration or 
condonation of getting your little brother to tell lies. This is a moral principle of his. 
He, however, fails to make his own actions cohere with this principle since he adopts 
the veiy combination of attitudes that he disapproves of.
Another way of describing the agent, one that goes beyond Hale’s way of 
putting matters, is to say that the agent fails to live up to his own ideals or values. He 
sees avoidance of a certain combination of attitudes as an ideal or something 
desirable but he then fails to live up to his own ideal in the sense that he adopts the 
very combination of attitudes that he disapproves of. Hale suggests that the proposal 
sketched by him:
"appeals to a notion of moral inconsistency which is plausible independently 
of projectivist leanings - one is guilty of a morally important kind of failing 
(we might as well call it inconsistency) to the extent that one fails to malce 
one's actions accord with one's principles" (ibid.:74).
It seems to me that Hale's alternative analysis of 1) together with the addition of the 
negation sign to Eex marks an improvement upon Blackburn's original suggestions. 
The special merit of Hale's proposal is that it allows the expressivist the view that 
one is involved in inconsistency if one affirms the premises of the original inference 
but fails to accept its conclusion. The expressivist can then say that what undeipins 
the original inference is the fact that acceptance of its premises combined with failure 
to accept its conclusion yields inconsistency in the explained sense.
which the agent is placed. Tliis concept of an action would preclude the intelligibility o f a notion such 
as an 'an act o f thinking' and it would make it wrong to suggest that when an agent tries to remember • 
something, he is perfoiming a certain act. If'mental acts' such as thinking and remembering can 
properly be said to fall under the concept of an action, as I think they can, tlien I can see no reason 
why it should be wrong to say tliat an agent performs an action when adopting a (new) attitude.
It should be noted that Hale’s suggestions do not constitute any major 
problem for Blackburn. In the broad perspective, the suggestions are minor 
coixections and additions to a general kind of analysis developed by Blackburn and 
no loss of standing will fall upon Blackburn if he simply accepts these minor 
corrections and additions. Blackburn can rightfully say that far* fr om showing the 
utter impossibility of giving an expressivist analysis of evaluative conditionals,
Hale's suggestions actually do something to bolster the idea that such an analysis is 
tenable.
Before concluding that Blackburn has, with the help of Hale, presented us 
with a convincing expressivist analysis of evaluative conditionals and thereby done 
much to show that unasserted contexts do not pose a problem for expressivism, we 
should, however, consider a rather classic objection put forward by Hale.^  ^The 
objection has its starting point in the question of what is wrong, on the expressivist 
account, with affinning the premises of an instance of a moral modus ponens and 
then failing to accept the conclusion of the inference? Put slightly differently: what 
kind of mistake is made by someone who accepts the premises but not the conclusion 
of such an inference?
The answer we get is that the mistake is of a moral kind. The agent who 
accepts the premises but fails to accept the conclusion seems to be morally flawed in 
the sense that he fails to be tiue to one of his own moral principles. He does what he 
himself explicitly disapproves of. It is possible, for the salce of the argument, to agi ee 
that this amounts to some sort of inconsistency on the pait of the agent but, 
importantly, the expressivist account does not give us the resources to say that the
agent commits a logical mistake or that he is logically confused in accepting the
^^Hale's objection is in (Hale 1993a:344). The objection owes much, as Hale himself recognises, to 
considerations made by Crispin Wright. See (Wright 1988).
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premises but failing to accept the conclusion of the inference. Wright has, however, 
urged that there is a sti ong intuitive pull to regard the agent as committing a mistake 
that is not, or at least not merely, a moral mistake (Wright 1988:33).
I agree with this. It seems intuitively right to say that someone who affirms 1) 
and 2) but fails to accept 3) has, in addition to whatever other flaws he may posses, a 
flaw in his logical reasoning. The expressivist account does not at all squar e with this 
stiong intuitive pull. The expressivist account, whether in its original or amended 
form, of an evaluative conditional, is therefore mistaken. This is a conclusion that 
Blackburn accepts. In a later work, he presents a new analysis of evaluative 
conditionals: an analysis that aims at steering clear* of the difficulties that faced his 
previous one.
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Chapter 6 
Round Two of the Frege-Geach Point
1. Introductory
My main aim in this chapter is to give an account and critique of the formal logical 
system that Blackburn develops in the article "Attitudes and Contents" (AC)/® The 
account of this system is found in sections two to five. In these sections, I try, among 
other thmgs, to make clear how this new logic for expressions of attitude enables 
Blackburn, given certain assumptions about the notion of validity, to show that 
Geach's inference is valid. Moreover, I give an account of Blackburn's way of 
explaining the meaning of standard connectives in cases where these operate on 
sentences that are not truth-apt. Section six contains a discussion of one of the rules 
of Blackburn's logical system, and I argue that Blackburn fails in an attempt to 
overcome a dilemma set out by Hale. In section seven, I argue for the claim that 
Blackburn's assumption about the well-formedness of a cerlain formula in his formal 
language yields a significant problem that does not admit of any obvious solution. 
Section eight contains the two conclusions of the chapter. The first conclusion is that, 
because of the problems discussed in sections six and seven, Blackburn's logical 
system is unsatisfactory as it stands. The second conclusion is more positive in 
nature, and it is that Blackburn, with the intr oduction of a commitrnent-semantics for 
binary cormectives, has suggested an interesting route forward for the expressivist: a 
route that deserves further and detailed attention.
^®(Blackbum 1988).
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2. A New Formal Language
Thé problem that a conditional with evaluative constituent sentences presents for the 
expressivist is a particular instantiation of a more general problem. As previously 
mentioned, evaluative sentences can occur unasseited, not only in conditionals, but in 
a number of different contexts. Blackburn's aim in AC is, at least partly, to offer an 
analysis that has general scope in the sense that it can be used to explain and make 
sense of the character and status of evaluative sentences in all the unasseited contexts 
that such sentences can occur in. In AC, Blackburn abandons the view that Eex is a 
formal language that can be used to bring out the underlying structure of oui" ordinary 
evaluative talk. The formal language that Blackburn introduces as a replacement for 
Eex is supposed to exhibit explicitly the expressive nature of ordinary moral 
discourse, and it is a language that syntactically is very similar to the language of 
standard deontic logic. The two sentence-forming operators of standard deontic logic, 
'O' and '?' are, however, replaced with two attitude-operators: namely the familial* 'H!' 
and a new one, 'T!'.
In the new approach, the two sentence-foiming operators are applied to 
sentence-letters. In this they are similar to the two sentence-foiming operators of 
standard deontic logic. In deontic logic, the formula 'Op' is, when given an 
interpretation, a report that p is obligatory according to some background set of 
noims. The formula is therefore an expression with a genuine truth-condition. The 
two attitude-operators can, in contr ast to this, be used to foim formulae that are 
expressive of attitude. Applying 'H!' to a sentence letter results in a formula that, 
when given an interpretation, is expressive of attitude. According to Blackbur n, 'H!p' 
"can be seen as expressing the view that p is to be a goal, to be realised in any perfect 
world" (Blackbui*n 1988:189).
92
Consider this sentence in natural language: 'It is right to keep promises'. On 
the expressivist picture, an agent who advances this sentence, expresses approval of 
keeping promises. Such an agent can be seen as expressing approval of a certain state 
of affairs obtaining: namely a state of affairs in which promises are kept. This state of 
affairs is represented by the sentence 'promises are kept'. The underlying fbim of the 
sentence is now seen to be 'Hip' where 'p' is the sentence 'promises are kept'. An 
agent who approves of a state of affairs in which promises are kept sees the state of 
affairs represented by 'p' as a goal that is to be realised in any (morally) perfect world.
Consider another sentence in natural language: 'it is wrong to tell lies'. What 
is the underlying form of this sentence in the new formal language? Blackburn no 
longer wants to make use of the B!-operator so it cannot be: 'B! (telling lies)'. An 
agent who disapproves of lying can be seen as approving of the obtaining of a certain 
state of affairs: namely a state of affairs in which lies are not told. This state of affairs 
is represented by the sentence: 'lies are not told'. The underlying form of'it is wrong 
to tell lies' is therefore: 'H!p' where 'p' is the sentence 'lies are not told'. '^^  An agent 
who disapproves of lying is committed to the view that a possible world is (morally) 
perfect just in case the proposition expressed by 'p' is true in that world.
'T!p' is, in Blackburn's new formal language, definitionally equivalent to 
'-iH!-ip'. 'Tip' expresses the view that the state of affairs represented by 'p' is 
consistent with, but not necessary for, a perfect world. Blackburn's general idea is 
that just as well as 'Op' can be seen as a wff in standard deontic logic, 'Hip' and 'Tip' 
can be seen as wffs in a logical system of expressions of attitude: "Thus, in the 
language to come. Hip is to be treated as a well-formed foimula capable of entering 
the same embeddings as p" (ibid.: 192).
‘^‘The underlying form can also be taken to be where 'p' is the sentence 'lies are told'.
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3. Features o f  the Language
The foniial logic that Blackburn develops for expressions of attitude is, to a large 
extent, modelled on a system of deontic logic developed by Hintikka.^^ Blackburn's 
development of Hintikka's system gets under way with the suggestion that we 
consider a set of sentences, L, that contains sentences with the 'H!'- and'T!'-operator 
applied to them (let us call these sentences 'attitude-expressing' sentences) as well as 
declar ative sentences to which no attitude-operators are applied (let us call these 
sentences 'state-describing' sentences). If, for example, L is (H!p, T!q, -ip}, then the 
first two sentences of the set can intuitively be seen to represent the attitudinal 
commitments of a given agent whereas the last sentence can be seen to represent a 
state of affairs of the world in which the agent lives. L is therefore to be interpreted 
as a partial description of a possible world. With this interpretation of L in place, L 
tells us that the agent, whose attitudinal commitments ar e represented by 'Hip', and 
'Tlq', lives in a world that is less than ideal from his perspective. He takes the state of 
affairs represented by 'p' to be a goal, but he lives in a world in which '-ip' is realised.
Relative to L there is a morally ideal world: namely the world in which all the 
things that are taken to be goals are realised. To take a simple example: if L is {Hip, 
q}, then a world characterised by {Hip, p} is a morally ideal world relative to L. The 
new world is a perfect world since everything that is taken to be an ideal in the 
original world is realised in the new world. Blackburn now introduces four important 
notions:
- 'a next approximation to the ideal, L*, of L' (ibid.: 194). A next 
approximation, L '^, to the ideal of L is defined as a set of sentences that ar e brought 
about by applying the following rules to the sentences of L:
‘ See (Hintilcka 1969).
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1 )IfH !A eL ,th en H !A eL -
2) If H! A e L, then A e L*
3) If T!A e L, then a set L*** containing A is to be added to the set of next
approximations for L
4) IfL* is a next approximation to the ideal relative to some set of sentences
L, then, if A e L' ,^ then A e subsequent approximations to the ideal L**,
L * * * .
“ 'a set of final ideals': "a set of final ideals, {L**-**...} of L is obtained when 
further use of these rules produces no new sentences not already in the members of 
L*** of the set" (ibid.: 194).
- 'a route to an ideal': "..to each branch of a disjunction there conesponds a 
route to an ideal" (ibid.: 194).
- 'unsatisfiability of a set of sentences': "A set of sentences L is unsatisfiable 
iff each route to a set of final ideals S results in a set of sentences S one of whose 
members contains both a formula and its negation" (ibid.: 194).
Let me try to explain these four notions by relating them to a concrete example. Let L
be {Hip^Hlq, T!-iq, H!p}. These three sentences should be taken to constitute the
root of a tree. The tableaux rules for the connectives of propositional logic apply to
the connectives of Blackburn's logic. Importantly, this means that conditionals are
tr eated as disjunctions. The first of the sentences generates branching, so we get a
tr ee that branches. At the end of the left hand branch, we get 'T!-ip' and at the end of
the right hand branch, we get 'H!q'. The set of sentences on the left hand branch is
{T!-iq, H!p, T!-ip} and the set of sentences on the right hand branch is {T!-iq, H!p,
H!q}. One first next approximation to L on the left hand branch is L*l. This is the
set {H!p, p}. A second first next approximation to L on this branch is L*2. This is
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the set {^q, H!p, p}. A third first next approximation to L on this branch is L*3. This 
is the set {^p. Hip, p}.
The first next approximation to L on the right hand branch of the tree is L*4. 
This is the set {H!p, p, H!q, q}. The second first next approximation to L on this 
branch is This is the set {-iq, H!p, p, H!q, q}. Here is the complete tree:
H!p-^H!q, L
T hq,L
H!p,L
T!-ip, L H!q, L
H!p,L*l H!p,L*4
p, L*1 p, L*4
H!q,L*4 
iq , L*2 q, L*4
H!p, L*2
p, L*2 iq , L*5
H!p, L*5 
ip , L*3 p, L*5
H!p, L*3 H!q, L*5
P,L*3 q,L*5
X X
A set of sentences on the hue can intuitively be seen to represent a world. On the left 
hand branch, the set (L*l, L’^ 2, L*^ 3} is a set of final ideals relative to L. A set of 
final ideals is a set of worlds. Each set of sentences (i.e. each world} on this branch is 
a final ideal relative to L. Why is the set {L" l^, L*2, L"^ 3} a set of final ideals relative 
toL?
The answer to this question is that if you apply the rules to the sentences of 
L*l, then you get a set of sentences, L*^*l, that has the same sentences as L*l. If you 
apply the mles to the sentences of L’'"2, then you get a set of sentences, L*"^2, that has 
the same sentences as L^2 and if you apply the mles to the sentences of L*3, then 
you get a set of sentences, L*'^3, that has the same set of sentences as L*3. Your new 
set {L^*l, L*'^2, L*"^3} contains no sentences that do not already exist in the set 
{L*l, L*2, L*3}. The latter set is therefore a set of final ideals relative to L. What is 
it for a set of sentences (a world) to be a final ideal relative to L? Simply to be part of
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a set of final ideals relative to L. On the right hand branch of the tree, {L'M, L*5} is a 
set of final ideals relative to L and each set of sentences in the set is a final ideal 
relative to L.
Now, to the explanation of'unsatisfiability'. Firstly, it should be noted that a 
route to a set of final ideals corresponds to a branch on a ti*ee. Returning to our main 
example, L is unsatisfiable. The reason for this is that each route to a set of final 
ideals involves a set of sentences that contains a sentence and the negation of the 
sentence. On the left hand branch of the tree, this set is L*3. This set of sentences 
contains both -ip and p. On the right hand branch of the tree, this set is L*^ '5. This set 
of sentences contains both -iq and q.
Blackburn's four rules are not completely self-explanatoiy, so a few 
comments on them seem needed. Rule 1) captures the idea that if  something is 
considered to be a goal by an agent, then it continues to be a goal in the world that is 
a next approximation to the ideal relative to L. If one talces it to be a goal that, for 
example, promises are kept, and one lives in a world (L) in which it is not the case 
that promises are kept, then the goal continues to exist in a world (L'^) that is an 
approximation to the ideal of L in the sense that promises are kept in this world. Rule
2) specifies the intuition that if something is a goal, then this goal must be realised in 
any world tliat is a next approximation to the ideal of L.
Rule 3) has some similarity with the rule for the possibility-operator in
standard systems of modal logic. If'T! A' belongs to L, then rule 3) says that A is
compatible with, but not necessary for, a perfect world. Consider the original tr ee. L
is, on the left hand branch, {T!-iq, H!p, T!-ip}. Since -iq and -ip are not necessaiy for
perfection, there is a morally perfect world relative to L in which neither -iq nor -,p is
realised. On the tree, this world is L*l. Rule 3), however, says that there is at least
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one development (world) in which what is tolerated in L is realised. In L there are 
two tolerations, so the left hand branch of the tree contains a world in which the first 
toleration is realised, L*2, and a world in which the second toleration is realised,
L*3.
Blackburn's logical system is supposed to provide the means by which it is 
possible to check whether or not a set of sentences is consistent. The notion of 
consistency that Blackburn has in mind is, in Hale's interpretation, this:
"What matters for the consistency of L is that there should be at least one set 
of final ideals providing for the realisation, separately, of each of the T! A in, 
or implied by L, compatibly with realisation of all the H!B in or implied by 
L" (Hale 1993a:346).
Let me try to spell this out in a little more detail. Consider again L, on the left hand 
branch of the original tree. L contains two tolerations. The second toleration should 
be realised in a world different fiom the world in which the first toleration is realised. 
The intuition behind this is the following: I might take p to be a goal, tolerate that -iq 
and tolerate that -,p. The fact that I tolerate that -iq and tolerate that -ip does, 
however, not mean that I tolerate -iq and -ip together. So, in order to check whether 
or not my attitudes are consistent I should not consider a world in which both of my 
tolerations are realised together. I should fhst consider a world in which my first 
toleration is realised and then see if that world is consistent when whatever it is that I 
take to be a goal is realised in that world. After that, I should consider a different 
world in which the second of my tolerations is realised and then see if  that world is 
consistent when whatever it is that I take to be a goal is realised in that world. My 
attitudes ai e consistent only if both the two worlds ai e consistent. This procedure is
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followed on the original tree by opening up the two worlds L*2 and L is 
inconsistent since L*^ 3 is inconsistent.
The idea behind rule 4) can be brought into the open by taking L to be 
{H!H!p, H!q}. There is only one first next approximation to the ideal of L: namely 
L*. L* is {HÎHlp, H!p, H!q, q}. is not a final ideal relative to L. Application of 
the rules to the sentences of L'*', yields a further approximation to the ideal of L: 
namely This is the set {H!H!p, H!p, p, H!q, q}. is a final ideal relative to L, 
i.e. a morally perfect world relative to L. If rule 4) was not in place, then 'q' would 
not cany into firom L*. A consequence of this would be that a morally perfect 
world relative to L, would not contain the realisation of one of the ideals that obtain 
in L, and such a world could hardly be said to be a morally perfect world relative to 
L.
If these considerations help to make clear the rationale behind 4), then 
Blackburn has a comment on 4) that, at least to my mind, somewhat perplexes the 
picture: "If L* is already a next approximation to the ideal and contains a sentence A, 
then except where A derives fiom realization of a toleration, it must transfer to 
further approximations to the ideal (Blackburn 1988:195).
Let L be {H!H!p', T!q}. One first next approximation to the ideal of L is L*l.
This is the set {H!H!p, H!p}. A second first next approximation to the ideal of L is
L*2. This is the set {H!H!p, H!p, q}. Application of the mles to the sentences ofL*l
gives L** l^ which is the set {H!H!p, H!p, p}. Application of the mles to the
sentences ofL*2 gives L**2 which is the set {H!H!p, H!p, p, q}. {L**l, L*^ *2} is a
set of final ideals relative to L. Rule 4) clearly says that 'q' should carry over fi'om
L*2 into L*'^2, but fi'om what Blackburn says in the above passage, 'q' should not
carry over into L**2 since 'q' in L'^2 derives fiom realisation of a toleration. There is,
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in other words, an inconsistency between what Blackburn's mle 4) actually says and 
what Blackburn says as a comment to the rule.
In connection with these considerations about mle 4), a feature of mle 3) 
springs to mind. If mle 3) is to be understood literally, then a fonnula of the foim 
'T! A' in L"*" should carry over into subsequent approximations. Rule 3) only says that 
if'T!A' belongs to L, an initial set, then the toleration must be realised in at least one 
of the next approximations to the ideal of L. The mle is silent on what is to happen if 
the formula occurs at L* or any next approximations to the ideal of L. The only mle 
one has to go by in this scenario is 4). Application of this rule, however, means that 
'T! A' automatically caries over and is never realised. But if the toleration is never 
realised, then we will never get an answer to the question of whether or not an 
original set of sentences is consistent in the desired sense of'consistent'. If a 
toleration is implied by one of the formulae of L, but does not occur* explicitly in L, 
as it is the case in, for example, 'H!(p->T!q)', then this toleration must be realised at 
some point in order to see whether L is consistent.
Blackburn seems to be in agreement with this. As a comment to i*ule 3), he 
says: "The mle is that if T!A is present in a set, then there must be a next set in which 
A is present, although it is not to be in all" (ibid.: 194). Blackbui*n here talks generally 
about a set of sentences, and not only about the set of sentences that is the initial set.
My wori*y about the foi*mulation of 3) also has force against the formulation
of mle 2). 2) only says that if  HIA belongs to the initial set, then A is realised in any
first next approximation to the ideal of L. However, what Blackbui*n means is that if
HIA is present in a set, not only the initial set, then A must be present in any set that
is a fiiilher approximation to the ideal of L. At one place, Blackburn says: "We want
to iterate the procedure of generating a next ideal. This can be done by repeated use
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of these mles" (ibid.: 195). The idea is that if  the set {H!H!p, H!p, H!T!q, T!q} is 
the result of applying the mles to the initial set, then the mles are to be reapplied to 
this set in order to generate a further approximation to the ideal of L. My 
interpretation of Blackburn is that both mle 2) and 3) are to be applied to this set. 
Blackburn certainly thinks that mle 2) should be applied, and since there is nothing in 
the formulation of the mles that suggests that mle 3) is different from mle 2) in this 
respect, I assume that mle 3) should also be applied. If mle 2) and 3) are different in 
this respect, it is a mistake not to state that cleaiiy in the foimulation of the mles.
4. Validity, Consistency and the Merits o f the Language 
After this account of the four mles that ar e to be applied in order to generate next 
ideals, attention can now be directed at the notion of validity. I here quote all that 
Blackburn says on this important issue:
"Logical tmth of A is unsatisfiability of the negation of A; B is a logical 
consequence of A if and only if A->B is valid, that is (A&-,B) is unsatisfiable" 
(ibid.:193).
If I understand Blackbm*n con ectly, then the definition of validity is a definition of 
semantic validity. To repeat a point made earlier: presented with the question of what 
the distinctive feature is of a semantically valid inference, Blackburn cannot say that 
what is special about it is that it is impossible that its premises should be tme and its 
conclusion false. In other words, he cannot say that a semantically valid inference is 
necessarily tmth-presei-ving. The quoted passage suggests that Blackburn would say 
that one tests an inference in natural language for semantic validity by checking 
whether or not a certain set of sentences in the fomial language is unsatisfiable. What
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sentences should go into the this set? The premises of the inference and the negated 
conclusion. The inference is semantically valid just in case this set is unsatisfiable.
How might Blackburn's fonnal language and definition of validity help him 
deal with Geach's original modus ponens inference? In AC, Blackburn no longer 
holds the view that conditionals with evaluative constituent sentences sei*ve the 
semantic function of expressing second order attitudes. The underlying foim o f'If it 
is wi'ong to tell lies, then it is wrong to get your little brother to tell lies' is not 
intei-preted as being ’H!(/B! (telling lies)/;/B I (getting your little brother to tell lies)/)' 
but something much simpler, namely: 'H!p-s-H!q'. The underlying form of Geach's 
inference is therefore now seen to be this: 'H!p->H!q, H!p h H!q'. Is the MPP 
inference in natural language valid? The set of sentences, L, that is to be checked for 
satisfiability is {H!p-^H!q, H!p, T!-nq}. This is the same set of sentences as in the 
originally worked out example in section three. We already know tliat this set is 
unsatisfiable. It can therefore be concluded that the MPP inference is valid.
One of the advantages of Blackburn's logical system is that it enables him to
deal with patterns of inference other than modus ponens. If the expressivist has a
problem with Geach's inference, then he also has a problem with an inference such as
this: 'either it is right to keep promises or it is right to tell the tmth; it is not right to
keep promises; therefore, it is right to tell the truth'. There is a very strong appearance
that this is a valid inference in natuial language. Blackburn's proposal in Spreading
the Word as to how the expressivist should deal with Geach's inference is a proposal
with very nanow scope in the sense that it cannot, or at least cannot obviously, be
used to deal with other patterns of inference. It is difficult to see how an agent
affinning the major premise of the above inference could properly be seen as
expressing a second order attitude towards a certain combination of first order
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attitudes. So, even if Blackburn's proposal in his earlier work was entirely successful, 
he would still be faced with the task of making sense of patterns of inference 
different fiom modus ponens. Translated into the foimal language, the above 
inference will be of the foim: 'H!p v H!q, T!-ip h H!q'. The set of sentences, L, that is 
to be checked for satisfiability is {Hip v Hlq, TI^p, T!-iq}, and it can be shown that 
this set is unsatisfiable.
Let me try to make cleai* the link between the notion of'unsatisfiability of a 
set of sentences' and the notion of'inconsistency of a set of attitudes'. Consider an 
agent who accepts the premises but not the conclusion of Geach's inference. He has a 
set of attitudinal commitments that is represented by this set of sentences: {H!p->H!q, 
H!p, T!-iq}. Depending upon how he resolves the conditional, the agent will have 
either of the following sets of attitudes: {Hip, Tl-^q, T!-ip}, {Hip, T!-,q, Hlq}. Both 
of these sets are inconsistent. If the agent has the first set, then he takes -,p to be 
compatible with a morally perfect world but another of his attitudes is that p must be 
realised in a world if that world is to be perfect. But then the agent is committed to 
the view that there is at least one possible world that is morally perfect and in which 
-Ip and p are both realised. But such a world is logically impossible. The same type of 
problem arises in relation to the second set.
Consider now the fact that the set of sentences {Hlp->Hlq, Hip, Tl-iq} is 
unsatisfiable as is evident from the closed tree of section thiee. The fact that this set 
is unsatisfiable is evidence that the set of attitudes that this set of sentences can be 
taken to represent, is inconsistent. Why is this? We know fiom the definition of 
consistency of a set of attitudes that such a set is consistent just in case it meets both 
of the following conditions: 1) for each of the tolerations in the set there is a logically
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possible world in which that toleration is realised and in which everything endorsed 
in the set is realised: 2) there is a logically possible world in which eveiything 
endorsed in L is realised. If such a set of consistent worlds exist, then the set of 
attitudes represented by the sentences of L is consistent.
The ti ee of section thr ee can be interpreted as an attempt to check whether or 
not a set of attitudes represented by the sentences of L meets conditions 1) and 2). 
The set of attitudes represented by the L-sentences on the left hand branch of the tree 
is inconsistent because what happens if  we try to realise in a world, L"^ 3, one of the 
tolerations of L and all the endorsements of L, is that we get a logically impossible 
world. The syntactical fact that the set of L-sentences on this branch is unsatisfiable 
can be talcen to show that the set of attitudes represented by these sentences is 
inconsistent. Similarly, on the right hand branch of the tree. The L-sentences here 
constitute a set of sentences that is unsatisfiable. This is a syntactical fact. It can, 
however, be taken to show that the set of attitudes represented by L is inconsistent. 
L'^5 is namely a world in which we try to realise a toleration of L and all the 
endorsements of L, and what we get is a logically impossible world.
Consistency in goals or attitudes is a cardinal viitue for Blackburn as is 
evident from these passages:
"There is nothing suiprising about using realisations of goals or ideals as the 
final test for consistency. The ordinary way of finding whether 
recommendations are consistent is to imagine them caiTied out and see if this 
can be consistently done" (ibid.: 189).
"In turn this gives us a needed notion; a person may be something worse than 
’immoral', or possessing contingently defective attitudes, but not be
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inconsistent in the sense of believing anything logically false. He may simply 
have ideals that admit of no consistent realisation" (ibid.: 196).
The content of a more informal answer to the question of what the distinctive feature 
is of a valid pattern of inference, can now be seen. On Blackburn's account, Geach's 
inference is valid because acceptance of its premises and failure to accept its 
conclusion saddles an agent with an inconsistent set of attitudes. More generally, 
Blackburn will say that when it comes to valid inferences whose constituent 
sentences are evaluative (non-truth-apt), the designated semantic value that is 
preserved from premises to conclusion is consistency in attitude.
5. A New Semantics For Connectives
If all the moves that Blackburn has made so fai" aie granted him, then he is in a
position to show that the set of sentences that represents the attitudinal commitments
of an agent who accepts the premises but not the conclusion of evaluative modus
ponens, modus tollens and disjunctive syllogism inferences, is an unsatisfiable set. In
other words, Blackburn is in a position to show that an agent ends up with
inconsistent attitudes if he accepts the premises but not the conclusion of inferences
that are instantiations of the above patterns of inference.
Before being too confident on Blackburn's behalf, there are, however, various
points about his account that needs to be addressed. The most important question is
perhaps the one of how the connectives of the formal language aie to be understood.
One thing that is immediately cleai* is that Blackburn cannot treat the connectives of
his foimal language in the usual tiuth-fimctional way. Foimulae like 'H!A' and 'T!B'
are, in Blackburn's foimal language, given an expressive inteipretation. Their
function is not to express propositions but to express attitudes, and as a result of that
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they do not have a genuine truth-value. Given that 'H! A' and 'TÎB’ function 
expressively, how are we to understand complex expressions in which foimulae of 
the above kind lie within the scope of the classic sentence-operators?
Blackburn is aware that he needs to address this question. Let us begin with 
Blackburn's account of the cases in which foimulae that function expressively lie 
within the scope of the negation sign. As noted in section two, 'H!p' expresses 
approval of its being the case that p. '-iH!p' expresses toleration of -ip. The intuitive 
explanation of this is the following: an agent who denies that a world is morally 
perfect just in case p is realised in that world, sees the realisation of -np as being 
consistent with a world being morally perfect. Such an agent tolerates, so to speak, 
the realisation of -ip. Now, toleration of something can, as we know by now, be 
expressed with the use of the T!-operator. So, 'T!-np' is substitutionable for '-iH!p'. 
According to Blackburn, the two foimulae express, if  not exactly the same attitude, 
then at least an almost identical attitude.
In the former formula, the scope of the negation is a sentence that expresses a 
proposition, whereas the scope of the negation of the latter formula is a sentence that 
do not express a proposition. This feature of the latter formula might, Blackburn 
acloiowledges, make us uneasy but the fact that it, and every other instance of 
external negation, can be converted into a formula where the scope of negation is a 
proposition-expressing sentence, should, according to Blackburn, dissipate any such 
unease (ibid.: 192).
When Blackburn is to give an interpretation of formulae in which
sub-formulae that ai e expressive of attitude occur within the scope of binary
connectives, Blackburn opts for a different strategy than the one he uses to give an
interpretation of formulae in which sub-formulae that are expressive of attitude lie
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within the scope of negation. The general strategy for dealing with foimulae of the 
former kind draws upon the way formulae with a dominant binaiy connective are 
standardly treated in a sentence tableaux of propositional logic. Ordinary evaluative 
talk contains sentences such as Tones is innocent or Jones should be punished*. The 
underlying form of this is 'p v H!q' where 'p' stands for 'Jones is innocent' and 'q* 
stands for 'Jones is punished'.
Blackburn offers an expressive interpretation of the disjunction. An agent 
who advances it, does not say anything that can be evaluated in terms of truth, but 
expresses a special kind of commitment. Blackburn brands this 'a tree-tying account' 
of a disjunction with an evaluative disjunct. The idea is that by advancing the 
disjunction, an agent ties himself to a tr ee of possibilities. The analogy is that in 
propositional logic, an agent who affirms 'p v q' is tied to a tr ee of possibilities. It is 
not a possibility for such an agent, if he is to avoid being inconsistent, to go on to 
affirm '-,p' and '-iq'. If the agent goes on to do just this, then he is inconsistent in the 
sense that he holds beliefs that cannot all be true.
One can be in a certain non-cognitive state to the effect that one is prepared to
accept either of two commitments, where the notion of a 'commitment' is taken to be
broad enough to cover both a regular* belief and an attitudinal stance, and it is this
psychological state that one expresses by advancing the disjunction. Blackburu's
tree-tying account of evaluative disjunction amounts to the development of what can
be called a 'conunitment-semantics' for disjunction. Blackburn's idea is that the
meaning of this sentence-operator* can be explained by spelling out what kind of
commitments an agent incurs if he asserts a sentence in which this sentence-operator
is the main connective. Basically, one who asser*ts the above disjunctive sentence
about Jones is committed to do either of two things: accepting the proposition
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expressed by the first disjunct or endorsing the attitude expressed by the second 
disjunct.
Blackburn repeats his tree-tying account when he is to explain the meaning of 
the 'if.., then..' sentence-operator in cases where this connective binds together 
sentences that do not both have a (genuine) truth-value. 'A-j-B' is, in standard 
propositional logic, equivalent to '-lA v B' and Blackburu takes it to be the case that 
the commitment incurred by asserting an evaluative conditional is a cormnitment to a 
disjunction. If one, for example, asserts the conditional 'if organised sports games are 
good, then organised sports games ought to be part of the school curriculum' 
(H!p-»H!q), then one is committed to either of two attitudes: tolerating that it is not 
the case that organised sports games take place or approving of it being the case that 
organised sports games ar e part of the school curriculum. So by asserting the 
conditional, an agent is, according to Blackburu, tied to a tree of possibilities 
concerning what attitudes to adopt. The fact that he is so tree-tied can, furthermore, 
be used to assess the consistency of his attitudes. Suppose that the agent goes on to 
accept that organised spoils games are good (accepts 'H!p') but does not accept that 
organised sports games ought to be part of the school cuniculum (does not accept 
'H!q'). Then he has accepted the premises of a moral modus ponens but failed to 
accept its conclusion and we know already that no matter how the agent resolves the 
conditional, he ends up with an inconsistent set of attitudes.
6. A Problem With Rule 4)
I hope that the previous sections constitute an acceptable account of the main ideas of
AC. The question that now needs to be answered is the question of what we should
think of Blackburn's new ideas. One cause for concern is Blackburn's rule 4). In my
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account of this rule, I said that there is an inconsistency between what rule 4) actually 
says and what Blackburn says as a comment to the rule. This inconsistency is well 
explained by the fact that Blackburn, as noted by Hale, faces a dilemma concerning 
rule 4).^ ® The dilemma is this: with rule 4) in place *H!T!p h H!p' is valid since 
{H!T!p, T!-ip} is unsatisfiable. But the fact that this inference is valid is an unwanted 
result. This means that if you endorse tolerating that p, then you are committed to 
endorsing that p. But one can surely endorse the toleration of, say, the occurrence of 
a rally in favour of the local communist party without endorsing the occurrence of the 
rally.
However, an amendment of the rule along the lines suggested by Blackburn, 
has as a result that V  H!(H!p->-p)' is not valid.^  ^What you get when you negate this 
sentence is the sentence 'T!(H!p & -ip)', and this sentence can only be shown to be 
unsatisfiable with the original, unr estricted, mle 4) in place.
To this, one might reply: 'What is so bad about the fact that 'h H!(H!p->p)' is 
not valid? Isn't the solution to the dilemma just to adopt the amended mle and accept 
that the above inference is not valid?' I do not think so. If'h  H!(H!p->p)' is not valid, 
then 'T!(H!p & -ip)' is satisfiable. This means that in Blackburn's logical system for 
expressions of attitude, it is consistent to have the attitude 'T!(H!p & -ip)'. But a 
logical system that allows that attitude to be consistent cannot be right. If anything is 
intolerable from the perspective of a given agent, it is surely a situation in which that 
agent approves of something, and the negation of what he approves of, is the case.
An agent with the attitude expressed by 'T!(H!p & -ip)', however, tolerates such a 
situation. Such an agent has no proper grasp of the concept of toleration. His 
'^ (^Hale 1993a:348).
^^The amendment is suggested in (Blackbm-n 1988:195), and the passage where it occurs is quoted in 
section thr ee.
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attitudinal stance is not so much str ange from a first order moral perspective: rather, 
it is conceptually incoherent. We want this to be reflected in a proper logic of 
attitudes and we therefore want V  H!(H!p->-p)' to be a theorem is such a logic. So, I 
think the dilemma facing Blackburn in relation to mle 4) is real enough.
The existence of the dilemma shows that mle 4) is neither acceptable in its 
original form nor in its amended form. The wealcest conclusion to be drawn from this 
is that further work needs to be done on mle 4). As a response to Hale's criticism, 
Blackburn suggests that 4) should be substituted with:
4') IfL* is a next approximation relative to some set of sentences L, then if 
L* contains H!(X) then a subsequent approximation L** contains X and all 
the other sentences of L* (Blackburn 1993b:381).
With this rule in place, 'T!(H!p & -ip)' can be shown to be unsatisfiable. L* is {H!p, 
-ip}. Since L* contains 'H!p', which is an instantiation of the fonn 'H!(X)', L** 
contains, in addition to 'H!p' and 'p', '-ip'. {L*, L**} is a set of final ideals relative to 
L. This set contains a set of sentences that involves a sentence and its negation. L is 
therefore unsatisfiable and 'h H!(H!p->p)' is therefore valid.
What about the first example? Does 4') secure that 'H!T!p h H!p' is invalid? 
Blackburn thinks so: "Certainly this blocks the unwanted result that Hale cites. 
Eveiything stops where it should, at {Tip, -np}" (Ibid.:3 81). The set of sentences that 
is to be checked for satisfiability is {HITIp, Tl-ip}. L*1 is {-ip, HITIp, Tip}. There 
is, however, a further next approximation to the ideal of L. This is the set in which 
the toleration of L*1 is realised. L**l is {p, HITIp, Tip, -ip}. Importantly, '-ip' of L*1 
carries over to L**l because 4') says that if L* contains something of the form 
'HI(X), tlien all the sentences of L* caiiies over to subsequent approximations. In the
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present example, '-ip' is a sentence of L*l, and this set contains 'H!T!p’. L**l 
therefore contains ’-ip'. This means that L**l contains a sentence and its negation and 
(HITIp, Tl-np}is therefore unsatisfiable. This has as a result that, contrary to what 
Blackburn thinks, when 4') is in place, 'HITIp h Hip' is still valid. The substitution of 
4) with 4') should therefore not be considered to be a proper solution to the initial 
dilemma. With 4') in place, we still get an unsatisfactory result.
What could Blackburn reply to this? He could say that the ability to show that 
that {HITIp, Tl-ip} is unsatisfiable rests on a sti'ong, and mistalcen, reading of rule 3). 
In particular, it is because rule 3) is applied to one of the sentences of L*1 that we get 
a new set of sentences, L**l, that contains '-ip' and therefore get closure of the three. 
But perhaps this is a mistaken application of mle 3). A wealc reading of 3) is that this 
mle is only to be applied to an initial set of sentences, and not to any sets of 
sentences that are next approximations to the ideal of L. On the weak reading of 3), 
{HITIp, Tl-ip} is satisfiable since 'Tip' of L*1 never gets realised and we therefore 
never get a set of sentences that contains both '-ip' and 'p'. As Blackburn says in the 
above quote, everything stops where it should: namely at {Tip, -ip}.
What should the response be to Blackburn's suggestion that a wealc reading of 
mle 3) should be adopted? One might argue against the suggestion on the ground that 
its adoption has as a result that an inference that intuitively seems to be valid cannot 
be proved with the available mles. Consider now the inference: 'HITIp h Tip'. It 
seems to me that this inference is intuitively valid. Approval of tolerance of p seems 
to entail tolerance of p. I would be inconsistent in my attitudes if I, on the one hand, 
approved of toleration of, say, the occurrence of a rally in favour of the local
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communist party, and then, on the other hand, did not tolerate the occurrence of the 
rally.
The inference cannot, however, be shown to be valid when 3) is given a weak 
reading. It can only be shown to be valid when 3) is given a strong reading. So, it is 
not, I conclude, a viable option for Blackburn to insist on a weak reading of 3). This 
mle must be given a strong reading. But then Blackburn's substitution of 4) with 4') 
does nothing to overcome Hale's dilemma. This dilemma still stands.
7. Further Critiques o f the Formal Language
Let me now try to present an objection to Blackburn tliat turns on a feature of his 
formal language. As is evident from the following passage, Blackburn considers 
formulae involving reiterated H!-operators to be wffs in his formal language:
"to take a trivial case H!H!H!p gives as an ideal the set {H!H!H!p, HÎHÎp, 
H!p, p} (all the states commended are imagined realised)" (Blackburn 
1993b:380).
If'H!H!p' is a wff in Blackburn's formal language, then the sentence in natural
language that this formulae is supposed to be a representation of, must be considered
to be a meaningful sentence. Blackburn's formal language is supposed to give a
precise mapping of natural language so that the deductive relationships between
sentences in natural language can be studied in the formal language. But giving
inference mles for the H!-operator, not only when it is applied to a sentence-letter but
also when it is reiterated as in 'H!H!p', has no relevance for the project of casting
light on the deductive relationships of sentences in natur al language if the sentences
that formulae involving reiterated H!-operators are supposed to be representations of,
are considered to be meaningless. What is the point of maldng clear what can be
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inferred from 'H!H!p' if the natural language sentence that this formulae is supposed 
to be a representation of, is meaningless? Blackburn's view that 'H!H!p' is a wff in 
his formal language therefore commits him to the view that the natur al language 
sentence that this formulae is a representation of, is a meaningful sentence.
If this is accepted, then we can ask the question of what natural language 
sentence it is that 'H!H!p' is a representation of. 'H!p' is the formularisation of'it is 
good that p'. It would therefore seem natural to think that 'H!H!p' is the 
formularisation of:
(1) It is good that it is good that p.
Blackburu is therefore, it seems to me, committed to the view that (1) is meaningful. 
The central question now is what (1) means on the expressivist picture. A good way 
of approaching this question is to look at what an expressivist could say about the 
meaning of tlie semantically simpler sentence:
(2) It is good that p.
One possible explanation of the meaning of (2) begins with the observation that a 
declar ative sentence such as 'football is played in the park', can be uttered with 
various forces. To keep things simple, we can here just focus on asserioric, 
interrogative and expressive force. If'p' is uttered with assertoric force, then the 
proposition expressed by 'p' is asserted. If'p' is uttered with interrogative force, then 
no proposition is asserted: rather a question is being asked - namely the question of 
whether football is played in the park. If'p' is uttered with expressive force, then no 
proposition is asserted: rather an attitude is expressed towards the state of affairs in 
which the proposition expressed by 'p' is true.^^
distinction should here be made between two different senses of'expresses'. It is sometimes said 
that a sentence expresses an attitude: "A parallel to tlie idea that a certain sentence expresses an 
attitude ('Hurray to the Bears')" (Blackburn 1988:186). Strictly speaking, what a sentence can express 
is a proposition. A sentence cannot express an attitude. People, not sentences, have attitudes tliat they
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In spoken language, intonation can be a guide to the force of an utterance. 
This is especially clear in connection with interrogative force, 'p' uttered with a 
special intonation often indicates that a question is being asked, rather than 
something is being asserted. In written (natural) language, there exist signs that 
indicate what kind of force a sentence is being put forward with. As an example of 
this, consider the fact that '?’ after a declarative sentence, as in ’p?', indicates that ’p' is 
put forward with interrogative force. A sincere agent who writes 'p?' has not thereby 
asserted a proposition: rather he has asked a question. What about assertoric force? 
There is no sign in conventional, written language that indicates that a sentence is 
being put forward with assertoric force. However, as has been noted, the fact that a 
declarative sentence in a non-fictional text stands by itself between full stops, 
indirectly indicates to the reader that a proposition is asserted. Borrowing Frege's 
sign for assertion, 't-', it is possible to malce explicit that a sentence is put forward 
with assertoric force. An agent who writes 'h p' indicates thereby that he asserts the 
proposition expressed by 'p'.
Spoken natural language does not allow us, by a special intonation in the 
utterance of'p', to indicate that the 'p' is uttered with assertoric force. The default 
position, however, is that if a declarative sentence is uttered by itself, i.e. in between 
full stops, and if  it is not embedded in a larger sentence, as in, say, a conjunction or a 
conditional, then it is put forward with assertoric force. Regar ding expressive force, 
there is no sign in written, natur al language that indicates that 'p' is put forward with 
expressive force. In Blackburn's fonnal language, such a sign, however, exists. A 
sincere agent who writes 'H!p' in this language does not thereby assert a proposition
can express, and the sense of'express' used in relation to people is different from the sense of'express' 
used in relation to sentences expressing a proposition.
See (Geach 1965:456).
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(especially not the proposition expressed by the sentence T approve of p'). The agent 
rather expresses approval of the state of affairs in which the proposition expressed by 
'p' is true. Writing 'H!p' is equivalent to writing something like 'Hurray to p'.
If Frege's assertion sign and Blackburn's sign for expressive force were 
adopted into conventional, written language, we could have these three sentences: 'l- 
p', 'p?' and 'H!p'. Each of these three sentences has its own distinctive meaning. Just 
to focus on the two latter sentences: to understand what an author was doing who 
wrote 'p?', it would be insufficient to know the truth-conditions of'p'. To understand 
the meaning of'p?', one would have to understand that a question is being asked. 
Similarly with 'H!p'. To understand what an author was doing who wi'ote 'H!p', it 
would be insufficient to know the tiuth-conditions of'p'. To understand the meaning 
of'H!p', one would have to know that by writing 'H!p', an author expresses approval 
of the state of affairs in which the proposition expressed by 'p' is true. The three 
sentences mirror some of the various things that we can do with a proposition: 
namely assert it, question its truth and approve of it being true.
Now, if conventional natural language does not allow us to indicate
expressive force by use of a special sign, how do we then indicate this special force?
The expressivist could here say that we do this by using the string of words 'it is good
that'. As noted, 'H!p' is the proper formularisation o f  it is good that p'. In the fonnal
language, 'H!' is an indicator of expressive force, so it is very natural to suggest that
'it is good that' indicates in natural language, what 'H!' indicates in the formal
language. There is not anything essentially misguided about the idea of indicating
force through use of a certain string of words. The interrogative force of an utterance
can be indicated by placing the string of words 'is it the case that' before a declai*ative
sentence. A sincere agent who writes 'p?' could just as well have written 'is it the case
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that p'. Similarly, an agent who utters 'p' with a special questioning intonation could 
just as well have uttered the words 'is it the case that p'.
Let us now return to the meaning of (2). On the assumption that the stiing of 
words 'it is good that' functions as a force indicator of expressive force, the 
expressivist could explain the meaning of (2) by saying that by uttering (2), a sincere 
agent expresses approval of the state of affairs in which the proposition expressed by 
'p' is true.
The view that the string of words 'it is good that' is a force indicator, however, 
commits Blackburn to the view that (1) is a sentence involving reiterated force 
indicators. This is not an attractive view to be committed to. In general, it is difficult 
to see what the meaning is of sentences involving reiterated force indicators. What 
does 'h h p' or 'p??', for example, mean? Sentences such as these do not have a 
conventional meaning. There is no conventional use of these sentences in natural 
language that establishes the meaning of the sentences. It is, of course, open to a 
theorist to put foi*ward a stipulative definition that makes clear what, say, 'p??' means 
in his use of the sentence and malces clear how he thinks that 'p??' should be used.
So, it is not the case that sentences involving reiterated force indicators are 
intrinsically meaningless.
This might provide an opening for Blackburn. Perhaps Blackburn can just put
fornard a stipulative definition of what he talces (1) to mean? In my opinion,
however, this is not a proper response to the original problem. Blackburn's formal
language in which 'H!H!p' is a wff is not just any language. As already noted, it is a
fonnal language that is supposed to provide a formal mapping of natural language as
it is actually spoken. Giving a stipulative definition of the meaning of (1) as a
response to the question of what (1) means, is, in effect, just to admit that (1) does
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not have a conventional meaning in natuial language and if (1) does not have a 
conventional meaning in natmal language, then there is no case for thinldng, as 
Blackburn does, that the formula in the formal language, that is the representation of 
(1), is awff.
1 thinlc that these considerations show that Blackburn is ill advised to explain 
the meaning of (1) by construing the string of words ’it is good that’ as a force 
indicator of expressive force. Taking into account the fact that the H!-operator in the 
formal language functions as a force indicator of expressive force, it, however, seems 
that this is the explanation that he is committed to.
Let us, for the sake of the argument, leave this problem to one side and allow 
the expressivist to give an alternative explanation of the meaning of (1): an 
explanation that, importantly, does not have to cohere with the role played by the 
H!-operator in the formal language. What might such an alternative explanation look 
like?
Let us again begin with (2). The expressivist could here offer the following
analysis; ’it is good that’ is a piece o f ’expressive' vocabulary that can be put in front
of a proposition-expressing sentence to form a new sentence such that when a sincere
agent utters the new sentence, 'it is good that p’, he expresses an attitude of approval
towards the state of affairs described by the proposition-expressing sentence. Such an
analysis coheres well with what Blackburn says in this passage:
"Normally, iff  make plain to you what I feel, say about the Bears, I will most
probably do so using a sentence with an ’expressive’ predicate: 'the Bears ar e
great!’’’ (Blackburn 1988:187).
At this level of semantic complexity, the expressivist analysis is intelligible: but what
happens if we move a step up on the ladder of semantic complexity and arrive a (1)7
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One possible way for the expressivist to analyse (1) consists in repeating the analysis 
given of (2). This would involve saying that 'it is good that p' is a sentence that 
expresses a proposition and that 'it is good tliat' can be put in front of this sentence to 
generate a new sentence such that when an agent utters this new sentence, he 
expresses approval of the state of affairs described by the proposition-expressing 
sentence 'it is good that p'. An expressivist cannot, however, give this analysis since 
it involves accepting that 'it is good that p' is a sentence that expresses a proposition 
and this is something that can only be accepted at the price of abandoning 
expressivism.
This shows that expressivism is open to the critique that it offers no uniform 
account of the semantic role of'it is good that'. In (1), this string of words does not 
attach to a sentence expressing a proposition to generate a new sentence such that 
when an agent utters this new sentence, he expresses approval of the state of affairs 
described by the proposition-expressing sentence. However, this is exactly what the 
string of words does in (2). The meaning of (1) is therefore still left unexplained.
A more radical way in which Blackburn could reply to the objection that he 
cannot render (1) meaningful, consists in denying that (1) is meaningful. This is 
actually what I think he should do. (1) is a gr ammatically correct sentence, but it is 
not obvious (at least not to me) that it has a clear meaning. The problem is, however, 
that if Blackburn denies that (1) is meaningful, then 'H!H!p' is not a wff in his formal 
language. Two options are now open to Blackburn. The first consists in biting the 
bullet and acknowledging that formulae involving reiterated H!-operators are not 
wffs in his formal language. The second consists in rejecting my suggestion that (1) 
is the natural language sentence that 'H!H!p' is the representation of. It is some other
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natur al language sentence that 'H!H!p' is the representation of and this other sentence 
is, contrary to (1), meaningful.
If Blackburn takes the first line, then it is, however, impossible to see how it 
can be the case, let alone a trivial case, as Blackburn insists it is, that H!H!H!p gives 
as an ideal the set {H!H!H!p, H!H!p, H!p, p}. This case involves a formulae that is 
not a wff, and it is surely absurd to exemplify the inference rules of a logical system 
by making use of a sentence that is not a wff in the formal language of that system.
If Blackburn takes the second line, then it becomes very difficult to 
understand what the H!-operator means in Blackburn's fonnal language. As 
previously noted, the sentence in natural language that 'H!p' is a representation of, is 
'it is good that p'. How this could be consistent with the denial that H!H!p is a 
formularisation of (1), I simply fail to see. In general, I therefore think that there is no 
obvious way for Blackburn to escape the problem that his admission of the 
well-formedness of'H!H!p' presents him with.
8. Concluding RemarJçs
I think that the objections pressed in the previous two sections show that Blackburn's 
logical system is unsatisfactory as it stands. However, if  we leave to one side the 
technical, or semi-technical, problems discussed in these sections, then it seems to 
me that Blackburn, with the introduction of the idea of a commitment-sernantics for 
binary connectives, has made real progress, at least in comparison to the ideas of 
Spreading the Word, in relation to the two important questions of what, on the 
expressivist picture, sentences like Geach's conditional mean, and what the validity 
of, say, a moral modus ponens consists in. This idea seems promising, and it should 
be pursued and developed further.
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Chapter 7
Round Three of the Frege-Geach Point
1. Introductory
In a number of recent writings, Blackburn has refined his commitment-theoretic 
account of evaluative compounds.*^ ® He has also argued that what validates an 
evaluative instantiation of a standardly accepted pattern of inference, is the fact that 
accepting its premises and failing to accept its conclusion, requires incurring an 
inconsistent bundle of commitments.'^^ It is a central part of Blackburn's 
commitment-semantics to give the commitment condition for each of the 
sentence-operators in natur al language. To give the commitment condition for, say, 
conditionals consists in spelling out precisely what complex commitment it is that a 
speaker incur s by accepting an evaluative conditional. Bob Hale has offered a 
critique of Blackburn's commitment-theoretic account of evaluative conditionals 
(Hale 2002).
In sections two to five of this chapter, I present this critique and give an 
account of Blackburn's reply to it. In section six, I argue that Blackburn's reply is 
flawed because the account of conditionals and disjunctions that is involved in this 
reply, fails to validate all standardly accepted patterns of inference. In the last section 
of the chapter, I place the relatively technical point of section six in a broader 
perspective: I argue that this point seriously diminishes the plausibility of
^See (Blackburn 1998; 2002).
"Logic is our way of codifying and keeping track of intelligible combinations o f commitments" 
(Blackburn 1998:72). Blackburn's definition of (semantic) validity is this: an inference is valid just in 
case acceptance of its premises togetlier with failure to accept its conclusion result in an mconsistent 
set o f commitments.
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Blackburn’s overall quasi-realist project. The chapter ends with some concluding 
remarks on expressivism and the Frege-Geach point.
2. First Proposal
Two sorts of conditionals fall under the concept of an evaluative conditional: a) 
conditionals in which the antecedent and the consequent ar e attitude-expressing, and 
b) conditionals that have either an attitude-expressing antecedent or an 
attitude-expressing consequent ('or* here represents an exclusive disjunction). It is 
impossible to formulate the commitment condition for evaluative conditionals in full 
generality if a term cannot be found that is neutral between the two types of 
commitment that are incun ed by direct affirmation of the constituent sentences of a 
conditional of type b). The teim 'accept' may be employed here (Hale 2002:146). In 
full generality, the commitment condition for evaluative conditionals is therefore 
this: to accept 'p-^ -q' is to incur a commitment to:
(1) either not accept that p or accept that q.
Where 'p' expresses a proposition, 'a commitment to accept that p' means 'a 
commitment to believe the proposition that is expressed by direct affirmation of p'. 
Where 'q' is an attitude-expressing sentence, 'a commitment to accept that q' means a 
'commitment to endorse the attitude that is expressed by direct affirmation of q'.
The point now is that this commiünent condition for a conditional enables an 
expressivist to show that a modus ponens inference involving an evaluative 
conditional is valid. Consider an agent who accepts the premises of such an inference 
but fails to accept its conclusion. Such an agent must have either of the following two 
sets of commitments: i) accepting that p, not accepting that p and not accepting that
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q: ii) accepting that p, accepting that q and not accepting that q.^  ^Either way the 
conditional is resolved, the agent ends up with inconsistent commitments. He either 
accepts that p and does not accept that p or he accepts that q and does not accept that
q-
Given the earlier definition of validity, and given the fact that an agent who 
accepts the premises but not the conclusion of a modus ponens inference, ends up 
witli inconsistent commitments, it can be concluded that this pattern of inference is 
valid.
As Hale notes, an expressivist who adopts a commitment-semantics must 
hope that the semantics makes valid, not only a modus ponens inference, but all the 
standardly accepted patterns of inference (ibid.: 147). In line with Hale’s way of 
proceeding, let us take a modus tollens inference as an example. Does the 
commitment-semantics make it the case that an agent is inconsistent if he accepts the 
premises but not the conclusion of such an inference?^^
Let the conditional of the inference be an evaluative conditional of type b). 
The conditional can be resolved in two different ways, so depending on how the 
conditional is resolved, the agent is either committed to: i) accepting that -iq, 
accepting that q and not accepting that -ip: or ii) accepting that -iq, not accepting that 
p and not accepting that -ip. In the latter case, the agent does not accept that p and he 
does not accept that -ip. i) is clearly an inconsistent set of commitments. It involves 
both accepting that -iq and accepting that q. The inference is, however, valid just in 
case ii) is also an inconsistent set of commitments. Hale’s major point now is that ii)
failing to accept that q, the agent is not committed to accepting that -iq. But he is committed to 
not accepting tliat q.
®^ The commitment condition for negation is this: to accept that -,p is to incur a commitment to accept
that -ip, and not merely a commitment to not accept that p.
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is not inconsistent. Not accepting that p and not accepting that -np is the right 
response in cases where the available evidence leaves it unclear whether p is true or 
not.
A modus tollens inference should be validated by the commitment-semantic 
approach if this approach is a good one. The inference is, however, not validated.
The approach therefore fails, or at least prima facie fails, to yield a conception of 
validity that, when the constituent sentences of standar dly accepted patterns of 
inference are construed as having no truth-value, preserves the validity of these 
patterns of inference.
3. Second Proposal
A first reply to Hale's objection is that it rests on a mistalcen account of what the
commitment condition is for a conditional (ibid.: 147). Hale has taken Blackburn's
view  to be that the complex commitment incuiTed by accepting 'p-^ q' is the
commitment described by (1). But perhaps Blackburn's view is that the commitment
incurred is a commitment to:
(2) either accept that -ip or accept that q.
Does the latter commitment condition for a conditional validate a modus tollens
inference? An agent who accepts the premises of such an inference but fails to accept
its conclusion will have either of the following two sets of commitments: i) accepting
that -ip, accepting that -,q and not accepting that -ip or: ii) accepting that q, accepting
that -iq and not accepting that -ip. Both sets are inconsistent. The first set involves
accepting that -ip and not accepting that -ip whereas the second set involves
accepting that q and accepting that -iq. The inference is therefore validated. '^^
®'*This commitment condition also validates a modus ponens inference. One set o f commitments
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This commitment condition for a conditional has, however, an unattractive 
feature. The argument to show this has as its premise the plausible thesis that any 
account of a conditional should be such that when the account is adopted, all 
instances of'p^p ' are easily acceptable. If'p' is a sentence with a truth-value, then 
'p-)-p' is a tautology and if'p ' is taken to express an attitude, it is uncontroversial, 
though uninstructive, to assert anything of the form 'p->p'. On the first account of 
what is involved in accepting a conditional, 'p-»p' raises no problems. The incurred 
commitment to either not accept that p or accept that p is easily acceptable even in 
cases where there is not sufficient evidence to establish the truth-value of p. In such 
cases, one simply chooses to not accept that p.
On the second and sti onger account of what is involved in accepting a 
conditional, this possibility is, however, not open. On this account, one is forced to 
either accept that -,p or accept that p. But in cases where the available evidence is 
insufficient to establish whether or not that p (in Hale's terminology, such cases are 
'states of information neutral with respect to p' or simply 'neutral information states'), 
we should neither accept that p nor accept that -ip. This means that in cases where 
there is insufficient evidence to establish whether or not that p, we should be 
unwilling to accept 'p^p' since this commits us to something that we do not want to 
be committed to. It is, however, then the case that this account of the conditional 
lacks a feature that any plausible account should have: namely the feature of making 
it unproblematic to accept 'p-»p' irrespective of what sentence 'p' is.
There are two possibilities for rejecting this argument. Firstly, one can deny 
the existence of neutral information states. If one denies the existence of such states.
involves: accepting that -ip, accepting that p and not accepting that q. The other set involves: 
accepting tliat q, accepting that p and not accepting tliat q.
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then, on the stronger account of the conditional, 'p->p' is easily acceptable for every p. 
Neutral information states seem, however, to be a common phenomenon. Secondly, 
one can reject the argument by rejecting the view that for every p, 'p-^p'. If it is not 
the case that for every p, 'p-»p', then it cannot be a requirement on a plausible account 
of the conditional that it for every p, makes 'p-»p' easily acceptable. It seems, 
however, to be a very radical and counterintuitive move to reject that for every p, 
'p~>p'. To reject this would involve a denial of the law of self-entailment.
The overall conclusion of Hale’s discussion is that an expressivist who tiies to 
develop a commitment-semantics as a means to deal with the Frege-Geach point is 
faced with a dilemma: if he defends the weaker commitment condition for a 
conditional, then in cases where there is insufficient evidence to establish whether or 
not that p, the account fails to make valid modus tollens inferences with 'p' as the 
antecedent of the conditional. If he defends tlie str onger commitment condition, then 
he offers an account of the conditional that can validate modus tollens inferences but 
it is an unacceptable consequence of this account that there will be instances of'p-^p' 
that are not easily acceptable.
4. A Reconstruction o f the Argument
In his response to Hale, Blackburn stresses the fact that when Hale ponders the 
question of exactly what one is committed to if one accepts ’p^q', Hale only 
considers two possibilities: namely (1) and (2). Blackburn quickly dismisses the idea 
that (2) should be a plausible commitment condition for a conditional. Blackburn 
agrees with Hale that any account of the conditional should make it unproblematic to 
accept 'p^p', no matter what sentence 'p' is taken to stand for. (2) can only make
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unproblematic the acceptance o f ’p->-p' for all 'p' if it is denied, for all p, that one can 
be in a state of neutr al information with regards to p. Blackburn, however, contends 
that such a denial makes no sense: "Expressivism is perfectly hospitable to neutral 
information states ..." (Blackburn 2002:168).
Now, if (2) is unacceptable for the expressivist, what about (1)? As will be 
remembered, Hale’s objection to taking (1) to be the commitment condition for a 
conditional is that this commitment condition fails to malce valid modus tollens 
inferences. To make Hale’s objection even more clear-, Blackburn reconstructs Hale's 
argument and introduces some new terminology, (ibid.: 169). In addition to 'accepting 
that p', we now have 'rejecting that p’ and 'shoulder-shrugging p'. To reject that p is 
equivalent to accept that -,p and, similarly, to accept that p is equivalent to reject that 
-np. To shoulder-shr-ug p is neither to accept that p nor to reject that p. To 
shoulder-shrug p is the right attitude to adopt towards p if  one is agnostic about p 
and/or in a state of neutr al information with regards to p. If one shoulder-shrugs p, 
then one also shoulder-shrugs ~ip. It is by definition impossible to accept that p and 
shoulder-shrug -ip. As noted, if one accepts that p, then one automatically rejects that 
-Ip, and rejection of -ip cannot coexist with shoulder-shrugging -ip. Finally, 
Blackburn introduces the tenu ’avoid’. This term covers both rejection and 
shoulder-shrugging. One can, that is, avoid p in two distinct ways: either by rejecting 
it or by shoulder-shrugging it.
If this new terminology is adopted and if the commitment condition of a 
conditional is talcen to be, not exactly (1), but a slight reformulation of it: namely:
(1*) either avoiding p or accepting that q.
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then the force of Hale's objection is, according to Blackburn, clear. (P )  has the merit 
of making acceptance of'p-»p' unproblematic no matter what sentence p is taken to 
stand for. If p is a sentence such that an agent is in a neutral state of information with 
regards to it, then the agent just discharges the disjunctive commitment incuned by 
accepting 'p->p', by shoulder-shrugging p.
What about the case in which an agent accepts the premises of a modus 
tollens inference but fails to accept its conclusion? If the commitment condition for a 
conditional is the one given by (1*), then such an agent does not necessarily have an 
inconsistent set of commitments. Let us just consider the two scenarios in which the 
commitment incurred by accepting 'p-^q' is resolved by 'avoiding p'. i) By accepting 
the minor premise of the inference, the agent rejects that q. If he avoids p by 
rejection, then he rejects that p. By failing to accept the conclusion, he fails to reject 
that p. This means that the agent rejects that p and does not reject that p. Tliis is 
inconsistent: ii) By accepting the minor premise of the inference, the agent rejects 
that q. If he avoids p by shoulder-shrugging, then he shoulder-shrugs p. By failing to 
accept the conclusion, he fails to reject that p. In this scenario, there is no 
inconsistency. More precisely, there is no inconsistency involved in 
shoulder-shrugging p and failing to reject that p.
5. Blackburn's Response
Blackburn does not see himself as falling victim to Hale's objection because he is of 
die opinion that neither of Hale's two alternatives regar ding the commitment 
condition of a conditional matches the one that he actually offers in Ruling Passions. 
In his book, Blackburn says that when one accepts a conditional (or a disjunction), 
then:
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(3) "I am in a state in which if one side is closed off to me, I am to switch to 
the other - or withdraw" (Blackburn 1998:71).
Blackburn seeks, in other words, to avoid Hale's dilemma by arguing for two clahns: 
a) that the choice that the expressivist faces with regard to the commitment condition 
of a conditional is not, as Hale seems to think, a choice between (1) and (2) but a 
choice between (1), (2) and (3), and b) that (3) avoids the problems that maiTed the 
other two alternatives. What are the alleged merits of (3)? Blackburn stresses that 
'closed off in (3) means 'rejected' and not merely 'avoided': "In present terms this 
means that if one side is rejected, I am to accept the other or withdraw" (Blackburn 
2002:171).
Let us first focus on 'p-^p'. This conditional is to be equated with the 
disjunction '-ip v p'. The idea is that by accepting the conditional, an agent enters into 
a mental state such that if one side of the disjunction is rejected, then the other side is 
to be accepted. Here it is important to note that the commitment condition of the 
conditional is of a conditional foim: it says that i f  one side of the disjunction is 
rejected, then the other side is to be accepted. (3) is silent on the issue of what is to 
happen if one side of the disjunction is shoulder-shrugged and it leaves 
shoulder-shiugging p an open possibility. This commitment condition works well for 
'p-»"p'. If an agent accepts 'p-^p', then he is committed to accepting the disjunction '^p 
V p'. If he then rejects, say, '-ip', then he must accept that p or withdraw his initial 
acceptance.
How does (3) work in relation to a modus tollens inference? Let me try, on 
Blackbuin's behalf, to tianslate the content of (3) into a form that resembles the form 
in which Hale has presented the various suggestions as to what the commitment
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condition is for a conditional. By accepting an agent incurs the following 
commitment:
(3'^) If -Ip is rejected, then accept that q and if q is rejected, then accept that
- I p '
Where 'R' stands for 'rejected' and 'A' stands for 'accept', (3’^ ') can be formularised like 
this: [R(-ip) A(q)] & [(R(q) A(-ip)]. Again, (3*) leaves shoulder-shiugging p an
open possibility. Now, if (3*) is taken to be the commitment condition for a 
conditional, consider an agent who accepts the premises of a modus tollens inference 
but fails to accept its conclusion. By accepting the major premise, he incurs the 
commitment described in (3’^ ). By accepting the minor premise he rejects that q. This 
means that he must accept that -ip. The commitment condition explicitly says that if 
q is rejected, then -ip is to be accepted. An agent who accepts the premises of a 
modus tollens inference but fails to accept its conclusion therefore fails to fulfil the 
commitment that he has incuned by accepting the major premise of the inference.
The overall foim of (3"^ ) is, in my reconstruction, a conjunction. The 
commitment described by (3*^ ) is therefore fulfilled just in case one satisfies both of 
the conjuncts. An agent who accepts the premises of a modus tollens inference but 
fails to accept its conclusion fails to fulfil the second conjunct and therefore fails to 
fulfil the overall commitment incurred by accepting the conditional. What about an 
agent who accepts the conditional, accepts that -,q and accepts that -ip? Intuitively, 
we want to say that he has fulfilled the overall commitment. (3=^ ) nicely secures this 
result. The agent rejects that q and accepts that -ip. Thereby he satisfies the second 
conjunct. By not rejecting that -ip, he satisfies the conditional of the first conjunct
129
and thereby satisfies this conjunct. This means, in turn, that he has fulfilled the 
overall commitment.
6. A Problem For Blackburn's Response
What should we think of Blackburn's reply? I think that Blackburn is right in
believing that (3*) avoids the problems of (1) and (2). As shown above, (3*) works
well for both 'p^p' and a modus tollens inference. Does this mean that Blackburn is
on safe ground? Not exactly. Blackburn treats conditionals as disjunctions. This
means that Blackburn will give (3) as an answer to what one is committed to if  one
accepts 'p V q'. One incurs a conditional commitment:
"Suppose I hold that either John is to blame, or he didn't do the deed. Then I
am in state in which if one side is closed off to me, I am to switch to the other
- or withdraw the commitment" (Blackburn 1998:71).
Keeping in mind that rejecting that p is equivalent to accepting that -ip, and letting 'A'
stand for 'accept', the commitment incuned by accepting 'p v q' can be formularised
like this: [A(-ip) -5- A(q)] & [(A(-iq) A(p)]
I will now raise an objection to the view that (3) is an acceptable account of
the commitment condition for disjunction. Consider the disjunction '(p&q) v (p&r)'.
Let us call this disjunction 'D'. D is a paificular instantiation of the logical foim. 'A v
B'. From each of the disjuncts of D, p can be derived. This means that by accepting
D, one incui's an unconditional commitment in teims of accepting a sentence. Merely
by accepting D, one is committed to accepting that p. Nothing has to happen in order
for this commitment to kick in. Depending on whether p expresses a proposition or
expresses an attitude, one is unconditionally committed to either holding a
proposition to be true or endorsing an attitude. D is a counterexample to Blackburn's
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commitment-tiieoretic account of disjunction. This account cannot be correct since 
there is at least one instantiation of a disjunction that is such that when it is accepted, 
one incurs an unconditional commitment to accept a sentence.
Blackburn can reply to this objection by saying that it fails to take into 
account an important distinction. This is the distinction between: a) the claim that 
acceptance of a disjunction carries with it no unconditional commitment to either of 
the disjuncts, and b) the clahn that acceptance of a disjunction carries with it no 
unconditional commitment at all. The proposed counterexample is only a 
counterexample to Blackburn's commitment-theoretic account of disjunction on the 
assumption that this account commits Blackburn to b). At this stage, Blackburn can, 
however, simply deny that it is b) that he is committed to. He can insist that 
depending on the exact content of the disjuncts, acceptance of a disjunction 
sometimes cairies with it an unconditional commitment to a sentence. He could 
continue by saying that D is an example of a disjunction that is such that acceptance 
of it carries with it an unconditional commitment to a sentence that is different from 
its disjuncts.
However, this reply only works if Blackburn's commitment-theoretic account 
of disjunction enables him to explain how an unconditional commitment to a 
sentence can follow from acceptance of a disjunction. The major problem for 
Blackburn's commitment-tiieoretic account of disjunction is that this account does 
not facilitate such an explanation. The proposed account fails to validate any 
inference that proceeds by disjunction elimination.
Consider again D. Blackburn ought to be in a position to say that acceptance
of D entails a commitment to accept that p. No inconsistency results, however, from
pairing acceptance of D with failure to accept that p. Blackbuin therefore has no right
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to say that acceptance of D entails a commitment to accept that p. This can be 
brought out by considering how a proof proceeds of the inference: A[(p&q) v (p&r)] 
h A(p).
1 (1) [A-n(p&q) A(p&r)] & [A-i(p&r) A(p&q)] 1 ASS^^
2 (2) -,A(p) 2 A8S^
1 (3) A—i(p&q) —> A(p&r) 1 &E
1 (4) A-i(p&r) —> A(p&q) 1 &E
2 (5) -,A(p&r) 2
2 (6) —iA(p&q) 2 L
1.2 (7) —A—i(p&q) 3,5 MTT
1.2 (8) —lA—i(p&r) 4,6 MTT
The proof stops here. The individual commitments of an agent who accepts 
the premise and fails to accept the conclusion are the ones in line (2), (5), (6), (7) and 
(8). This set of commitments is not inconsistent. In particular, there is nothing 
inconsistent about -iA(p&r) and -iA-i(p&r) and there is nothing inconsistent about 
-iA(p&q) and -iA-i(p&q). Since the set of individual commitments is not 
inconsistent, Blackburn cannot account for the validity of this simple inference. This 
is very unfortunate when you talce into account that in propositional logic, Üie 
inference '(p&q) v (p&r) h p' can be shown to be valid by a simple proof involving 
disjunction elimination.
To this Blackburn might reply that it is a mistalce to think that the proof stops 
at line (8). It actually continues like this:
1.2 (9)A(p&r) 8K^«
^^The commitment incurred by accepting the premise.
^^The commitment incurred by failing to accept the conclusion, 
is the rule that -A (A ) entails -A(A&B)
''^Rule K is the rule that -A (-A ) entails A(A).
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1.2 (lO)A(p) 9M ^
1.2 (11) A  2, 10 CD
1 (12)^-.A(p) 2, 11 CD
1 (13)A(p) 12 DN
However, as Blackburn admits himself, rule K is not acceptable. Not accepting that 
-ip does not commit one to accepting that p. One can, for example, be in a state of 
neutial information with regards to p. In such a situation, it is consistent to not accept 
that -Ip and to not accept that p.
Another, more simple example might help to bring out Blackburn’s difficulty
in accounting for the validity of inferences whose validity can be shown by
application of the rule of disjunction elimination. Consider the inference: A(p v p) h
A(p).
This is a valid inference in propositional logic.™ However, on Blackburn's
commitment-theoretic account of disjunction, no inconsistent set of commitments 
follows from accepting the premise and failing to accept its conclusion.
1 (l)[A (-tp)-^A (p)]& [A (-ip)-^A (p)] IASS
2 (2) -,A(p) 2 ASS
I (3)A(-ip)-^A(p) 1 &E
1.2 (4)iA(-np) 2,3 MTT
The proof stops here and no inconsistency has emerged. In particular, there is nothing 
inconsistent about -A(p) and -iA(-ip).
^^Rule M is die rule that A(A&B) entails A(A) and A(B).
^^More precisely, 'p v  p h p' is a valid inference in propositional logic.
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7. Expressivism Entails Revisionism
The two above examples warrant the conclusion that Blackburn has not presented us 
with an acceptable commitment-theoretic account of disjunction. This is not a small 
and insignificant point. Let me defend this claim. The expressivist should be allowed 
to explain the validity of evaluative instantiations of standardly accepted patterns of 
inference in some other way than in terms of necessary truth-preservation. If this is 
not allowed, then a victoiy over expressivism is secured from the very outset of the 
debate between expressivism and its various descriptivist opponents. Such a victory 
is, however, not of much interest. The starting-point of a debate about what analysis 
to give of moral sentences should, in my view, include the observation that there are 
certain patterns of inference in natural language that are veiy compelling. One str and 
of the debate should then proceed by looking at how the various contenders in the 
debate explain this compellingness. Any theory that has no convincing explanation of 
this should be rejected. This approach secures a theory-neutral starting-point that 
allows all theories a first move.
If this methodological view is adopted, then Blackburn’s alternative 
explanation of validity should be taken serious. What Blackburn attempts to do is 
exactly to tackle the question of why certain patterns of inference in natural language 
are compelling. The problem is, however, that Blackburn’s explanation i*uns into 
difficulties. In paificulai*, the problem is that whereas (3) has the merit of making an 
agent inconsistent if he flouts inferences of the form of modus ponens and modus 
tollens, and thereby indirectly has the merit of validating these specific patterns of 
inference, it does not validate all the standardly accepted patterns of inference.
This is a very unfortunate result for Blackburn’s overall quasi-realist project.
This is so because the main promise of this project is that expressivism does not
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entail revisionism about everyday moral discourse. However, it now seems that 
revisionism about moral discourse actually is a consequence of expressivism. Certain 
veiy shnple patterns of inference that are valid under a descriptivist and 
tL*uth-functional account of moral sentences, come out as invalid when an 
expressivist account of moral sentences is in place.
This concludes my discussion of expressivism and the Frege-Geach point. 
Despite the fact that expressivism fares well on the issue of moral supervenience, it 
should nevertheless be rejected. As 1 have tired to show in this chapter, Blackburn 
fails in his most recent attempt to overcome the Frege-Geach point. This point 
therefore still constitutes a major obstacle to the plausibility of expressivism.
It is important to be aware that the objection in section six (assuming that it is 
sound) does not conclusively show the falsity of expressivism. It is a relatively 
technical point, and the expressivist might be able to overcome it by doing either of 
two things: a) hang on to the general commitment-theoretic approach, but make 
changes in his view about what the commitment conditions are for the vatious 
evaluative compounds, b) abandon the general commitment-theoretic approach, and 
develop some other strategy for dealing with the Frege-Geach point. The fact that 
routes a) and b) are open to the expressivist does not, in my view, render the critique 
of section six irrelevant and/or unimportant. Philosophical progress derives 
essentially from a dialectical process, and the critique offered in section six, 
contributes, I hope, to that process.
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Chapter 8 
Ethical Naturalism and the Open Question Argument
1. Introductory
If a methodological naturalist, who is interested in the internal accommodation 
project outlined in chapter one, should not be an expressivist, what then should he 
be? In this chapter, I begin to explore, somewhat indirectly, the realist alternative to 
expressivism that Cornell realism represents. In section two, I address the question of 
what realism and moral realism is, and I argue for a certain way of characterising 
these general positions. In section three and four, I discuss analytic ethical naturalism 
and the 'open question argument’. I argue that the latter argument is very weak, and 
that it does not succeed in showing the falsity of analytical ethical naturalism. In the 
last section, I draw attention to the fact that even if the open question argument was a 
sound argument, this would not be something that forces the methodological 
naturalist into the arms of expressivism. Analytic ethical natui alism is not the only 
realist alternative to expressivism.
2. Realism
Consider these two claims:
a) moral discourse is as its surface-grammar suggests: namely truth-apt (this 
involves the claim that moral predicates have a refeiring semantic function).
b) moral predicates do not refer to sui generis moral properties, but to 
properties that have a place within a general naturalistic world view.
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The way of carrying out the internal accommodation project, that I presently want to 
consider, has a) and b) as its core clahns. The general naturalistic world view that is 
assumed in this way of canying out the internal accommodation project is similar to 
the kind of naturalistic world view described in chapter one. This is a rather naiTow 
naturalistic world view and this means that what is involved in b) is ontological 
reductionism. Moral properties are taken to be either strictly identical to, or 
constituted by, natural propeities. If one adopted a more expansive view about what 
naturalism entails in terms of ontological commitments, then it is not at all clear that 
ontological reductionism would be a result of b). On such a line of thought, one 
would reject Moore's view about the ontological status of moral properties, claim that 
moral predicates have a refening semantic function, and insist that, whereas the 
properties that moral predicates refer to, are not reducible to any of the properties that 
occur in the explanatory theories of our best empirical science, these properties have 
a place within a general (expansive) naturalistic world view.^^
Features a) and b) of this way of carrying out the internal accommodation 
project entail a version of moral realism. The question of what exactly moral realism 
is, is best answered via an exposition of what realism in general is. Realism (or 
metaphysical realism) can be preliminary described as the view that the entities, 
properties and facts referred to in a ceifain area of discourse have objective existence. 
Consider discourse about the external world: our discourse about the external world 
contains reference to various objects, and to be a realist about this discourse is to 
believe that these objects have objective existence. A sentence such as 'There is a car 
parked in front of the church' is part of our discourse about the external world. It 
involves reference to two objects and the realist believes that these two objects exist
^^See (McDowell 1995) for an outline and defence o f this general line of thought,
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objectively. Moral realism is the view that properties such as goodness, rightness and 
wrongness that are commonly referred to in moral discourse have objective 
existence, and that there are objective moral facts.
This preliminary characterisation of metaphysical realism is of course only 
helpful if the notion of'objective existence' is spelled out. One way of casting light 
on this notion is to explain it in terms of the notion of 'mind-independence'.^^ In 
connection with external objects such as cars, the notion of mind-independence can 
be explained as the idea that such objects exist and that their existence does not 
depend upon what we think about them or upon what concepts we possess. External 
objects have a mind-independent existence in the sense that they would exist in a 
world without minds.
There is, however, a problem involved in invoking the notion of 
'mind-independence' in an explication of the notion of'objective existence'. This 
strategy makes it impossible for the realist about mental states to make plain what his 
realism consists in. To be a realist about mental states is to believe that mental states 
have objective existence. The realist about this area of discourse cannot, however, 
explain what objective existence is, by saying that mental states are objective in the 
sense that they would exist in a world without minds. The reason for this is simply 
tliat in a world without minds, there would be no mental states. One might reply to 
this by saying that the fact that there is a certain area of discourse in relation to which 
the originally suggested definition of metaphysical realism is inadequate, should not 
discredit the definition. It is, one might argue, quite acceptable since it works well for 
so many other areas of discourse. The reply to this line of thought should be that 
since metaphysical realism is a position that one can adopt about any area of
“See (Timmons 1999:35).
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discourse, the definition of the notion should be 'area-independenf. This means that 
the definition should be such that no matter what area of discourse one is a realist 
about, one should be able to explain the 'realist' part of one's position by offering the 
definition.
I suggest therefore that the notion of'ascription-independent' is substituted for 
the notion of'mind-independent'. On the realist picture, mental states are objective in 
the sense that they exist and belong to objects independently of our ascriptions, in 
thought or speech, of mental states to objects. Similarly, the defining feature of moral 
realism would, on this approach, be the idea that moral properties are objective in the 
sense that they belong to objects independently of oui* ascriptions of moral properties 
to these objects.
Metaphysical realism often goes hand in hand with a certain general semantic 
theory. This theory says that the discourse that we are realist about is tmth-apt. The 
sentence 'There is a car parked in fi*ont of the church' is in this sense truth-apt. The 
sentence is, commonly, used to assert a proposition, and propositions can be 
evaluated in terms of truth and falsity. This leads to the theory of truth that 
chai acteristically goes hand in hand with metaphysical realism. Declarative sentences 
of an area of discourse that is given a realist interpretation, express propositions, and 
propositions are true if  and only if they con espond to the way the world is. This 
means that the propositions that are expressed by the declarative sentences of an area 
of discourse that is given a realists interpretation, ai e made true and false by the way 
the world is. Here it is important to note that whereas being a realist about a certain 
area of discourse entails a commitment to the view that the statements of the 
discoui'se are truth-apt, the reverse does not hold. For example, one can take moral
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statements to be truth-apt without being committed to a realist interpretation of the 
discourse that these statements belong to7^
A moral realist is a metaphysical realist about moral discourse, and he is 
therefore committed to the following ontological and semantic theses:
- There are (instantiated) moral properties and facts.
- Such properties and facts are objective (i.e. ascription-independent).
- Moral discourse is truth-apt.
- The statements constituting the discouise are either true or false (depending 
on whether or not they correspond to objectively existing moral facts).
3. Narrow Reduction
If a methodological natui alist is to be a moral realist, then he is faced with the task of 
accommodating the tenets of moral realism within the naturalistic world view. One 
way of carrying out this task is via what can be labelled 'naiTow reduction' (Timmons 
1999:37). The idea behind narrow reduction can be introduced with the use of a 
non-moral example. For the methodological naturalist, the statement 'Jones is 
punctual' is problematic. It contains reference to a property of punctuality, and this 
property seems ontologically dubious. Let us call such a problematical statement a 
'higher level statement' (or 'A-statement') and let us call the problematical property a 
'higher level property' (or 'A-property'). The methodological naturalist can cariy out 
the accommodation project if he can reduce higher level properties to properties that 
fit into his naturalistic world view. Let us call such properties 'lower level properties' 
(or 'B-properties'). If it can be shown that the A-property of punctuality is identical to 
a certain B-property, then the A-statement 'Jones is punctual' is not problematic
^^See (Wright 1996) and (Skorupski 1999).
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anymore. The property that is referred to in the statement is a property that fits into a 
naturalistic world view, and it is therefore unproblematic for the methodological 
naturalist to use and accept the statement.
The important question is, however, how this reduction is to be carried out. 
How is it possible to show that an A-property is identical to a B-property? According 
to nan ow reductionism, this is possible if and only if it is possible to show that the 
predicates that stand for A-properties are synonymous with predicates that stand for 
B-properties. Applied to the example presently under consideration, this means that 
just in case it is possible to find a naturalistic predicate that means the same as 
'punctual', are we wairanted in saying that the property of punctuality is identical to 
the property that this naturalistic predicate refers to. The methodological naturalist 
might suggest that 'punctual' means the same as 'always arriving on time'. This latter 
predicate refers to the property of always arriving on time, and if  this piece of 
conceptual analysis is accepted, then the methodological naturalist is warranted in 
saying that the property of being punctual is identical to the property of always 
arriving on time.
Methodological naturalists who tiy to cany out the accommodation project
via narrow reduction can be called 'analytic naturalists'. They subscribe to a
synonymy criterion of property identity. According to this criterion, the referent of an
A-teim is identical to the referent of a B-term if and only if, the two terms are
synonymous. If we apply the synonymy criterion of property identity to moral
discouise, then we get 'analytic ethical naturalism'. In the statement 'Lying is wrong',
the predicate 'wrong' occurs. This predicate refers to the property of wrongness. In
order to be able to identify this property with a natural property, the analytic ethical
naturalist must be able to find a predicate that means the same as 'wrong'. He might
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suggest that the predicate 'diminishes overall well-being' means the same as 'wrong'. 
Just in case, the analytic ethical naturalist is successful in establishing this claim, is 
he waiTanted in holding that wrongness is identical to diminishing overall well-being.
The analytic ethical naturalist can now say that since the predicate 'wrong' 
refers to a certain natural property, there is nothing problematic in him using and 
accepting sentences in which this predicate occur. The use and acceptance of such 
sentences does not commit him to the existence of a sui generis property of 
wrongness. The analytic ethical naturalist can furthermore accept the claim that there 
is an objective property of wi'ongness in the world (this is why his position is a 
version moral realism). He can accept this claim because the property of wrongness 
is identical to a certain objective, natural property.
From this account of analytic ethical naturalism it is easy to see that it is only 
going to work if moral terms have analytically true naturalistic definitions. Defenders 
of analytic ethical naturalism of course believe that such definitions can be found, 
and they therefore subscribe to a thesis that can be named: 'analytic semantic 
naturalism' (ASN). According to ASN, fundamental moral terms like 'good' have 
analytically true naturalistic definitions. Since analytic ethical naturalism is only 
going to work if ASN is true, the plausibility of this thesis must be assessed in order 
to answer the question of whether or not analytic ethical naturalism is a plausible 
metaethical theory.
4. The Open Question Argument
One particular argument looms large in the discussion of ASN. This is Moore's 'open 
question argument' (OQA). '^* As a prelude to this argument, a distinction should be
See (Moore 1993:chapter one).
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made between two different construals of ethical naturalism. Ethical naturalism can 
be construed as a thesis about the meaning of words. Ethical naturalism is here 
equivalent to ASN. Ethical naturalism can, however, also be construed as a thesis 
about the ontological status of the property of goodness. Ethical naturalism is here an 
ontological doctrine that essentially involves the claim that the property of goodness 
is identical to some other property, such as, say, pleasantness. Ethical naturalism (in 
both of these constmals) is the intended target of the OQA.
In order to show that the property of goodness cannot be reduced to any other 
property, Moore puts forward the OQA. The argument claims that if  ethical 
naturalism (understood as an ontological doctiine) is true, then a certain question is 
not an open question. This question is, however, an open question. Therefore it 
cannot be the case that ethical natuialism is tine.
Imagine that a certain analysis of'good' is put forward. According to this 
analysis 'good' means 'N' (where 'N' is some naturalistic predicate). If this analysis is 
true, then tlie question 'Is x which is N, good?' turns into the question 'Is x which is 
N, N?'. This is not an open question that it, according to Moore malces sense to ask.^  ^
The question is a closed question to which the answer is trivially 'yes'. Moore insists, 
however, that the question 'Is x which is N, good?' is an open question that it always 
makes sense to ask, no matter what naturalistic (or non-naturalistic predicate) 'N' is 
taken to stand for. Therefore it cannot be the case that 'good' means the same as 'N' 
(Moore 1993:67). This view of Moore's can also be expressed by saying that 'good' 
lacks natuialistic (or non-naturalistic) synonyms.
’^Here, Moore's way formulating himself is rather misleading. Strictly speaking, it is not the case that 
it makes no sense to ask this question. It actually makes perfect sense to ask it, but what is special 
about the question is, that it is a question to which the answer is trivially 'yes'.
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A traditional objection to Moore's argument consists in the claim that it does 
not prove what Moore takes it to prove/^ The OQA is a semantic argument. It is an 
argument which is concerned with the meaning of different words. The argument 
may prove that 'good' does not have the same sense as any other predicate. Moore's 
argument may, that is, prove that ASN is false. But from this, it does not follow that 
the property of goodness is a sui generis property that is different from any other 
property. Moore's aigument does not show that ethical naturalism, understood as an 
ontological doctrine, is false. The falsity of the first kind of natmalism does not entail 
the falsity of the second kind of naturalism. This can be seen by considering what the 
result would be if Moore's way of reasoning was sound. If it were, this would have 
the paradoxical result of showing that e.g. water is not identical to H2O. 'Water' does 
not mean the same as 'H20'. As a result of this, the question 'Is x which is water, 
H2O?' is an open question. It is not a question to which the answer is tiivially 'yes' 
because 'water' and 'H20' have the same sense. Now, if Moore's way of reasoning is 
sound, then we can go on to conclude that a sample of water is an entity that is 
ontologically different from a sample of H2O molecules. But this is plainly false.
Is it possible to explain why Moore makes this unwairanted slide fr om a 
semantic conclusion about the meaning of'good' to an ontological conclusion about 
the property of goodness? If we focus on the theory of meaning to which Moore 
subscribes, then such an explanation can be found. Moore is of the opinion that 
names and predicates denote certain objects or properties. Names and predicates get, 
moreover, their meaning from the object or property that they denote. If a name or 
predicate does not denote a certain object or property, then the name or predicate is 
without meaning. In line with this theory, the predicate 'good' gets its meaning from
See (Pigden 1993:426).
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the propeity it denotes. Moore takes it to be the case that ’good' denotes a simple and 
indefinable property of goodness. Other predicates have the same structirre as 'good'. 
'Yellow' denotes the property of yellowness and 'pleasant' denotes the property of 
pleasantness. Since predicates get their meaning fiom the properties that they denote, 
a straight fomard conclusion can be drawn fiom the fact that 'good' is a meaningful 
predicate that does not mean the same as any other predicate: namely that the 
property of goodness is different fiom any other property. In short, Moore subscribes 
to the synonymy criterion of property identity. But as the above examples illustrate, 
this criterion is clearly false. A possibility that Moore does not envisage consists in 
the idea that two non-synonymous predicates may denote the same property.
As it is evident fi*om the above discussion, the OQA does not succeed in
showing that ethical natuialism (understood as an ontological doctrine) is false. Does
it even succeed in showing that ASN is false? The OQA rests on the assumption that
a coiTect analysis of a concept cannot be unobvious and informative to a competent
speaker (a speaker who knows the meaning of the analysandum and the analysans).
To see this, assume for a moment the opposite: assume, that is, that an analysis of
concept C can be given in terms of concept Œ , and that this analysis is unobvious
and informative to an agent who is a competent speaker in the above sense. If this
assumption is tme, then the analytical naturalist can give the following, convincing
answer to Moore's objection. Due to the truth of the above assumption, it is quite
possible for, some analysandum (C) and analysans (C*), that the statement 'x which
is C is C*' is unobvious and informative for a competent speaker. It is therefore quite
possible that for such a speaker, the question 'is x which is C, C*?' is an open
question in the sense that it is not a question to which the answer is trivially 'yes'. For
the speaker, this question is not like the question 'is x which is C, C?' which
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obviously is not an open question in the present sense of 'open'. The point that the 
analytical ethical natuialist can now make is, that the fact that the question 'is x 
which is C, is open for a competent speaker does not necessaiily show that C* 
does not have a sense equivalent to the sense of C. Because of the truth of the 
assumption that there can be unobvious and infoimative analyses, the fact that the 
question 'is x which is C, is open for a competent speaker is compatible with it 
being the case that the analysis of C in terms of is a correct analysis.
To guard against this move, Moore, and others who want to invoke the OQA 
against ASN, has to insist that there cannot be such a thing as unobvious and 
infoimative analyses. This means that there is only one way of answering the 
question of whether the OQA proves the falsity of ASN, and that is to establish the 
truth-value of the assumption that there can be unobvious and informative analyses. 
The assumption appears to me to be tme. For example, consider the concept of a 
triangle (C), and the concept of a three-sided, closed geometrical figure with an 
angle-sum of 180 degrees (C^). An agent can, it seems to me, be a competent 
speaker, and yet find the correct analysis of C in teims of C*, unobvious and 
infoimative. Why is this possible? One reason has to do with what it is to be a 
competent user of concept C. It seems to me that one is a competent user of this 
concept if and only if one applies it to the conect class of objects, that is to the class 
of triangles. But one can be a competent user of C in this sense, and yet not be fully 
conscious of the criteria, or sense, by which one applies the concept. In this case, 
what the analysis of C in tenns of C* does, is to make explicit the sense of C, and for 
someone who has not previously been fully conscious of the sense of C, this analysis 
of the concept, is likely to be unobvious and infoimative. The analysis makes
something explicit to the agent that he has hitherto only been implicitly awaie of.
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So, it should be concluded that there can be unobvious and informative 
analyses.’  ^Moore's argument is therefore not successful in showing that ASN is 
false. The assumption that the OQA rests on is false, so as the argument stands, the 
analytical ethical naturalist has nothing to fear from the OQA. The fact that 'is x 
which is N, good?' is an open question, does not automatically show the falsity of an 
analysis of the concept of being good in terms of being N. For all the opemiess of this 
question, 'N' might be synonymous with 'good'.
It is important to note that these considerations do not vindicate analytical 
ethical naturalism. The main claim of this position is that fundamental moral terms 
can be given an analysis in naturalistic vocabulary. If the analytical etliical naturalist 
adds to this, the claim that these analyses are going to be unobvious and infoimative, 
then he has a convincing reply to the OQA. This of course still leaves the analytical 
ethical naturalist with the substantial task of providing us with convincing examples 
of such analyses. The mere fact that there can be unobvious and informative analyses 
does not in itself show that there actually are unobvious and informative natuialistic 
analyses of fundamental moral terms.
5. Another Alternative
Two main points emerge from the discussion of ethical naturalism and the OQA. 
Firstly, that the OQA cannot be used to show that analytical ethical naturalism is a 
flawed position. If the only argument against this position is the OQA, then the 
analytical ethical naturalist is waiTanted in holding that his position is an open option 
for a methodological naturalist who is interested in giving a realist interpretation of 
moral discourse.^^ Secondly, and more important for my purposes, is the point that
’’For a similai* conclusion, see (Smitli 1994:38) and (Pigden 1993:427).
cethi(
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^^For contemporary attempts to vindicate analyti  ethical natmalism, see (Smith 1994) and (Jackson
even if the OQA (or any other argument) is successful in showing that ASN is false 
(and thereby refuting analytical ethical naturalism), then this is not something that 
shows that the methodological naturalist who is interested in accommodating moral 
discourse is forced to embrace some non-descriptive (e.g. expressivist) interpretation 
of moral discourse. This is so, because analytical ethical naturalism is not the only 
option available for a methodological naturalist who is attracted to a realist 
interpretation of moral discourse. Cornell realism is another alternative for such a 
naturalist.
1998).
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Chapter 9 
The Semantic Views of Cornell Realism
1. Introductory
Presenting a full account of Cornell realism, and the way in which the 
accommodation project is carried out within this tradition is a complex task. What I 
intend to do in this chapter is to focus on one aspect of the general program: namely 
its semantic tenets. The semantic views of Cornell realism have been developed in 
greatest detail by Richard Boyd.^  ^In sections two to four of this chapter, I give an 
account of Boyd's position, and present a veiy influential argument against it, set 
forward by Mark Timmons.^° In section five, I discuss Timmons' argument, and 
develop a defensive strategy against it. The conclusion of the chapter is that 
Timmons' argument does not succeed in its intended purpose: i.e. it cannot be 
invoked to show that the semantic views associated with Cornell realism are 
mistaken. This does not amount to a vindication of these views. However, the 
conclusion of the chapter is, if  tme, interesting because it means that if the semantic 
views associated with Cornell realism are mistaken, this is not for the reason that 
many writers suppose.
’^(Boyd 1988).
^ (Timmons (1999). The argument has previously been presented in a series o f co-autliored articles. 
See (Horgan & Timmons 1991), (1992a) and (1992b). For a discussion o f the argument, see, for 
example, (Gampei 1997), (Copp 2000), (Brink 2001), (Bloomfield 2003) and (Miller 2003). Miller 
(2003:168) suggests that the argument poses a challenge to defenders of Cornell realism whereas 
Bloomfield (2003:199) concludes that the argument is fatal for Cornell realism. Gampei, Copp and 
Brink all argue that tliere are ways for the Cornell realist to overcome the argument. Their replies to 
tlie argument differ, however, from the one I shall go on to suggest.
149
2. A Causal-Functional Account o f Moral Terms
Prior to presenting his ar gument, Timmons recapitulates Boyd's semantic views and 
in the process of doing so, he introduces a number of technical terms and definitions 
that ar e not found in Boyd's text. Since my aim is not to present an exegesis of Boyd's 
views, but rather to offer an assessment of the strength of Timmons' objection, I find 
it convenient in the following to account for Boyd's position by partly relying on 
Timmons' exposition of it.
According to Timmons, Boyd is committed to a causal regulation thesis 
(CRT) for moral terms.
CRT: "For each moral term t (e.g., 'good'), there is a natural properly N,
such that N and N alone regulates the use of t by humans" (Timmons 
1999:58).
CRT expresses an empirical thesis to the effect that humans only use the predicate
'good' about actions, policies and institutions that possess natural property N. The
possession of N by some act, policy or institution causes humans to apply 'good' to it.
Timmons then says that Boyd is of the opinion that the truth of CRT allows one to
treat moral terms as semantically akin to natural kind terms: that is, moral terms
rigidly designate certain natural properties, and they possess synthetic definitions
(ibid.: 5 8). The semantics of Cornell realism (in Boyd's development) can be
summarised in a thesis called 'Causal Semantic Naturalism' (CSN).
CSN : "Each moral term t rigidly designates the natural property N that
uniquely causally regulates the use of t by humans" (ibid.:58).
Assume that it is the natural property N that causally regulates the use of'good' by
humans. According to CSN, it is then the case that 'good' rigidly designates this
natural property. Not only in the actual world, but in all the possible world in which
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'good' has a refening function, 'good' refers to N. Since Cornell realism, according to 
Timmons, sees moral properties as fiinctional properties, the semantic view of this 
position can ultimately be expressed in a thesis called 'Causal Semantic 
Functionalism Thesis' (CSFT),
(CSFT): "Each moral term t rigidly designates the unique functional
property that causally regulates the actual-world uses of t by 
humans" (ibid.:58).
The basic idea behind frmctionalism about moral properties is that such properties 
have an essence that is to be explained in terms of the causal relation(s) that these 
properties enter into. Functionalism can be further specified by the claim that moral 
properties are identical to second order properties, and not the first order properties 
that realise them.
How do we find out what the functional essence of, say, goodness is? This is
largely an empirical matter, just as it is an empirical matter what the essence of, say,
water is. Let T be a normative theory and let't' be a property-expressing moral term.
For each't', T specifies the t-role: the functional essence of the property expressed by
't'. Let Tc be, say, hedonistic utilitarianism and let't' be, say, 'right'. Then Tc might
specify the functional essence of rightness like this:
Rightness Tc: x is good iff x causes a maximisation of human pleasure.
Tc also specifies the t-role for the properties expressed by 'f^', etc. Different
moral theories give different accounts of the functional essence of rightness: i.e. they
give different specifications of the t-role o ft'. Assume now that an empirical
investigation is initiated tliat aims at finding out what the underlying nature is of the
things that people apply the term't' ('right') to. Assume, moreover, that it turns out
that people apply 'right' to things that cause a maximisation of human well-being
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(assume, that is, that human uses of'right’ is causally refla ted  by things that cause a 
maximisation of human well-being). It also turns out, we may assume, that for all the 
other moral terms ('f^', ’t*"^  etc.), people apply these terms to things whose underlying 
nature is as is specified by Tc. Tc is then a moral theory whose claims about the 
functional essence of t, V^ , t**, etc. conectly captures the functional essence of the 
properties that causally regulate human uses o ft', 't*', etc. In this case, Tc is 
vindicated as the correct moral theory, and the functional essence of rightness is the 
t-role o f t ' as specified by Tc.
"The idea is that even though people often disagree morally, and even though 
mistaken moral beliefs commonly occur, nevertheless, human moral terms 
and moral beliefs still are causally regulated by some unique set of fiinctional 
properties whose essence is captured by theory T. Coherentist methodology in 
ethics is supposedly an epistemologically appropriate way to learn about T 
empirically" (Horgan & Timmons 1992b:242).
So according to Timmons, Cornell realism gives a causal-functional account of the 
semantics of moral terms. On this account, moral terms such as 'good' function like 
natural kind terms in the sense that, thr ough their use of them, ordinary competent 
speakers purport to refer to some objective natural (functional) property that 
regulates their use and whose essence is discoverable through moral inquiry 
(Timmons 1999:59). Timmons rejects this account of how moral terms function: he 
is of the opinion that there is a radical difference between the semantics of natural 
kind terms and moral terms.
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3. Putnam's Twin-Earth Example
In his attempt to undermine the causal-functional account of moral terms, Timmons 
first considers how philosophers have argued for causal accounts of natural kind 
terms, Putnam's twin-earth thought experiment is here the important argument.^^ 
Consider an agent who grants that human uses of'water' is causally regulated by a 
certain physico-chemical substance but rejects the claim that 'water' rigidly 
designates the substance that happens to fill the 'water-role' on earth. Putnam 
subscribes to the distinction between a description being meaning-fixing and 
reference-fixing. The description 'clear, odourless liquid that falls from the 
sky....etc.', does not give the meaning of'water'. It fixes, however, the reference of 
'water' via a clause like this:
Water (earth): x is water iff x has the same molecular structure as the 
substance that is actually dominantly causally responsible for earthlings' 
perception of a clear, odourless liquid that falls fr om the sky...etc.
On earth, it is H20 that fills the water-role since it is H20 that is dominantly causally
responsible for earthlings perceptions of a clear, odour less liquid etc. This point
can also be put by saying that on earth it is H20 that plays the appropriate causal role 
of water since it is H20 that is dominantly causally responsible for earthlings' 
perception of a clear, odourless liquid that falls from the sky...etc.
Putnam's thought experiment is designed to convince the sceptic that 'water' is 
a rigid designator. The thought experiment goes like this: imagine a twin-earth that is 
completely identical to earth except for the fact that the substance that fills the 
water-role on twin-earfh has a molecular structure that can be abbreviated XYZ 
(where having a XYZ molecular structure is not identical to having a H20 molecular-
See (Putnam 1975a),
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structure). This substance has all the superficial properties that water has on earth and 
the people on twin-earth (twin-earthlings) use the term 'water' to refer to it. The idea 
now is that twin-earth might constitute an example of a possible world in which 
'water' refers to a substance that is not H2O. On ear th, 'water' refers to H2O and on 
twin-earfh, 'water' refers to XYZ. If this is true, then it cannot be the case that 'water' 
is a rigid designator.
Putnam, however, rejects the idea that twin-earth constitutes an example of a 
possible world in which 'water' has a referring function, but in which 'water' does not 
refer to H20. His argument is this: suppose that an earthling (E) travels to twin-ear*th 
and meets a twin-earthling (TE). As observers to this meeting, we are awar e of the 
difference in what causally regulates earthlings' and twin-earthlings' use of'water'.
We are aware, that is, of the fact that on earth, the use of'water' is causally regulated 
by H2O whereas the use of'water' on twin-earth is causally regulated by XYZ. 
Suppose now that (E) and (TE) have a conversation during which (E) says '0  is 
water' and (TE) says '0  is not water'.
What intuitions are generated by reflection on this scenario? According to
Putnam, the intuition generated is that there is no genuine disagreement between (E)
and (TE) about the natur e of 0 . Our intuition is that the two parties are speaking past
each other since (E) uses 'water' to refer to H20 and (TE) uses 'water' to refer to XYZ.
On Putnam's view, the situation involving (E) and (TE) is much similar to a situation
in which we observe two persons talking about where the exact location is of the
referent of'Tony'. We ar e aware that one of them uses 'Tony' to refer to the PM of
Britain whereas the other uses 'Tony' to refer to an American jazz-singer. In a
situation in which one of them says that Tony is in London and the other one says
that Tony is not in London, we would not at all be tempted to think that there is a
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genuine disagreement between them about the exact location of Tony. We would, on
the contrary, think that the two persons ar e speaking past each other.
Putnam's argument now proceeds by asking what semantic account of'water'
can explain the intuition created by reflection on the twin-earth example. His claim is
that this intuition is explained by the truth of a certain theory of meaning. This theory
is a referential theory of meaning that equates the meaning of natural kind terms with
the reference of these terms. Natural kind tenns do not have an intension in the
descriptivist sense of'intension'. Natural kind terms therefore cannot be given
analytic definitions that reveal the intension of the terms. The meaning of a natural
kind term like 'water' is a certain natural Idnd whose essence can be discovered
thr ough empirical investigation. If this referential theory of meaning is true, then we
can see how it can be the case that the twin-ear thian term 'water' does not mean the
same as the earthian term 'water'. The two terms have different meanings because
they have different referents. The twin-earthian term 'water' refers to XYZ whereas
the earthian term 'water' refers to H2O.
We already know that the reference of the earthian term 'water' is fixed via a
clause that involves a description of the causal-functional role of water. The
reference of the twin-earthian term 'water' is fixed via a much similar clause:
Water (twin-earth): x is water iff x has the same molecular structure as the
substance that is actually dominantly causally
responsible for twin-earthlings' perception of a clear,
odourless liquid that falls from the sky...etc.
On twin-earfh, it is XYZ that plays the appropriate causal role of water. So, on
Putnam's view, both 'water(E)' and 'water(TE)' are rigid designators. In all possible
worlds in which 'water(TE)' has a referring fimction, it refers to XYZ. We now have
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an explanation of the intuition that (E) and (TE) talk past each other when (E) says 
that 0  is water and (TE) says that 0  is not water. A genuine disagreement between 
(E) and (TE) regaining the nature of 0  presupposes that both parties in the dispute 
mean the same with the term 'water'. (E) and (TE) do not, however, mean the same 
with 'water'. The referential theory of meaning is true, and on earth, 'water' refers to 
H2O. This means that 'water' in the mouth of (E) means H2O. On twin-earth, 'water' 
refers to XYZ. This means that 'water' in the mouth of (TE) means XYZ.
4. Timmons'Argument
Let us now return to the causal-functional theory of moral terms and consider 
Timmons' objection to it. Timmons argues that if'good' is semantically akin to 'water' 
in the sense that 'good' rigidly designates the natural property that causally regulates 
tlie use of it by humans, then it should be possible to construct a twin-earth scenario 
with 'good' that has the feature that reflection upon it generates intuitions similar to 
those generated by reflection on Putnam's original scenario. Conversely, if the 
intuitions generated by reflection on the twin-earth scenario with 'good' are radically 
different from the ones generated by reflection on the original scenario, this will be 
empirical evidence that 'good' is not semantically akin to 'water' (Timmons 1999:60).
Suppose that 'good' functions semantically as the causal-functional theory
says it does. Suppose moreover that the natural property that causally regulates
human uses of'good' is natural property N (the functiorial property of causing a
maximisation of human pleasure). Now, consider moral twin-earth which is almost
completely identical to earth. Moral twin-earthlings have a moral vocabulary that
works much like human moral vocabulary. They use the tenns 'good', 'right' and
'wrong' to evaluate actions, institutions and policies. The uses of these terms on
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moral twin-earth have all the formal marks that we take to chaiacterise moral 
vocabulary and moral practice. Twin-earthlings are, for example, generally motivated 
to perform acts that they take to be good. For twin-earthlings, considerations about 
the goodness of an act generally override other kinds of considerations, such as 
considerations about whether or not it is prudential from a first order perspective to 
perform the act. As a result of this, if  some earthlings visited moral twin-earth, then 
they would be strongly inclined to say that the twin-earthlings' terms 'good', 'right' 
and 'wrong' mean the same as our terms 'good', 'right' and 'wrong'.
Let us now suppose that we investigate twin-English moral discour se and 
discover that the twin-earthlings' use of moral terms is causally regulated by natural 
properties different fiom the natural properties that causally regulate human uses of 
moral terms. The twin-English term 'good' tracks a certain natural (functional) 
property, but this property is, say, the natural property N* (where N is not identical to 
N'^). So we may suppose that there is a difference between earth and twin-earth 
regarding what natural property causally regulates the use of'good'. Such an 
difference implies that there is a difference between earth and twin-earth in regards to 
what first order moral theory is in place. On twin-earth it is, we may assume, a 
version of deontology that is in place. This theory specifies the functional role of 
goodness (roughly) as follows:
Goodness Td: x is good iff the performance or endorsement of x is caused by 
a motive to adhere to the prescriptions of the categorical 
imperative.
If we reflect upon this moral twin-earth scenario, what do we want to say about the
meaning of the earthian term 'good' and the twin-earthian term 'good'? Two options
are, according to Timmons, available (ibid.:62). On the one hand, we can say that the
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earthian terni 'good' does not mean the same as the twin-earthian term 'good'. This is 
the view we are forced to hold if we believe that moral terms are semantically alcin to 
natural kind terms. On earth, 'good' refers to a certain natural property and on 
twin-earth, 'good' refers to a different natural property. The two terms have different 
referents and since the meaning of moral terms 0/they ar e semantically akin to 
natural kind terms) is equivalent to their referent, then the conclusion must be that 
the two terms have different meanings. The earthian term 'good' is not translatable 
with the twin-earthian term 'good'.
According to Timmons, it is, however, the case that if  we take this line, then 
it seems that we are unable to account for what appears to be a genuine moral 
disagreement between an earthling and a twin-earthling that arises if the two meet 
and (E) says that 0  is good and (TE) says that 0  is not good. On Timmons' view, this 
exchange of statements strongly suggests that (E) and (TE) have a genuine moral 
disagr eement. What (TE) says seems to contr adict what (E) says and therefore they 
have a disagreement. But actually there is no disagreement between them. If'good' in 
the mouth of (TE) does not mean the same as 'good' in the mouth of (E), then his 
statement is not a contradiction of (E)'s statement.
On the other hand, we can say that the earthian term 'good' does not differ in
meaning from the twin-earthian term 'good'. If we take this line, then we reject the
idea that the referential theory of meaning is true of moral terms. If it is the case that
the earthian term 'good' does not have the same referent as the twin-earthian term
'good' and if the two terms mean the same, then it cannot be true that the meaning of
'good' is equivalent to its referent. If this was true, then the ear thian 'good' and the
twin-earthian 'good' would differ in meaning. If we reject the idea that the referential
theory of meaning is true of moral terms, then we are forced to reject the idea that
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moral terms are semantically akin to natural kind terms and then we reject Boyd's 
account of the semantics of moral terms.
A consequence of saying that the earthian term 'good' and the twin-eartliian 
term 'good' does not differ in meaning is that we will be able to say that (E) and (TE) 
really are engaged in a genuine moral disagreement. Since (TE) means by 'good' 
exactly what (E) means by 'good', then his statement is a contradiction of what (E) 
says.
According to Timmons, the latter option constitutes the most natural way of 
thinlcing when presented with the moral twin-earth scenario. Having considered this 
scenario, the intuitively natural thing to say is that the earthian term 'good' is 
tr anslatable with the twin-earthian term 'good'. But if the causal-functional account of 
moral terms was right and moral terms were semantically akin to natur al kind terms, 
then it should seem intuitively natural to say that the two terms differ in meaning.
This intuition we do not have, according to Timmons, and this is strong empirical 
evidence for the claim that Boyd's account of the semantics of moral terms is wrong.
5. Replies to Timmons' Argument
What should the reply be to Timmons' argument? In my opinion it has a certain 
prima facie appeal. There are, however, a number of strategies that a defender of the 
causal-functional account can employ. Firstly, he could reject the empirical thesis 
upon which Timmons' argument rests: namely the thesis that reflection upon the 
moral twin-earth example generates the intuition that (E) and (TE) ar e engaged in a 
substantial moral disagreement. The truth of this thesis is not evident and since the 
thesis plays an important role in Timmons' argument, the naturalist could say that the
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onus is on Timmons to provide evidence for its tmth. Lacking any such evidence, the 
argument is inconclusive and suggestive.®^
Since I am interested in providing a defensive strategy against the str ongest 
possible version of Timmons' argument, I am, however, going to assume the truth of 
the thesis upon which his argument rests. Granting that we have the intuition that 
Timmons says we have, a distinction can be made between two versions of his 
argument.®  ^The first version rests not only on the assumption that we have the 
intuition in question, but also on the additional assumption that this is the correct 
intuition to have. But to assume that the intuition that (E) and (TE) mean the same by 
'good' is the correct intuition, is to beg the question against the causal-functional 
account of moral terms. It is to presuppose the tnrth of a theory of meaning of moral 
terms that is non-referential (e.g. an expressivist theory). So, I contend that this 
version of the argument can just be rejected.
The second version of the argument does not rest upon the additional 
assumption. It rests only on the assumption that people actually have the intuition 
that Timmons mentions. This second version is not question-begging, but it is a 
much weaker version than the first. This version of the argument merely poses a 
challenge to someone defending a causal-functional account of moral terms to come 
up with an explanation as to why people have this intuition. Can such an explanation 
be provided? I think so.
What is our present situation in relation to the question of what causally 
regulates the use of'good'? It seems fair to say that we do not Icnow what property it 
is that plays this regulative role, and we do not even know i/there is a unique
(presumably functional) property that plays this role. It is important to note that
®^ This strategy is noted by Copp (2000:119).
®®This is a point made by Miller (2003:167).
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Timmons builds into his twin-earth example that we know what propeity it is that 
uniquely, causally regulates the use of'good' on eaith. This means that by asking us 
to consider his twin-earth example, he asks us to do two different things: firstly, to 
imagine ourselves being in a situation in which we Icnow something that we at 
present do not know. Secondly, to consider what our intuitions would be if we were 
in that position.
My suggestion is that due to our present situation in relation to 'good', it is 
difficult for us, thiough the workings of our imagination, to get a proper grasp, of 
what it would be like to be in a position in which one had the knowledge stipulated 
by Timmons. If the situation described by Timmons were one that were only 
marginally different from our present situation, then it would be relatively easy for 
us, thi'ough the workings of oui* imagination, to get an accurate picture of what it 
would be like to be in that position. The situation described by Timmons is, however, 
a situation that is significantly different from our present one, and therefore there is a 
gi eater likelihood tliat om  imagination gives us a distorted picture of what it would 
be like to be in that position. This idea should appear uncontroversial. It is, for 
example, veiy probable that the pictuie given to me by my imagination about what it 
would be like to have six fingers on my left hand, is more accurate than the picture 
given to me about what it would be like to have two left hands.
Because it is difficult for us to get a proper grasp of what it would be like to
be in a position in which one Icnows that the use of'good' is causally regulated by
natural property N, our judgement about what our intuition would be in that situation
should be treated with some scepticism. It is quite likely that our judgement about
what our intuition would be in a situation in which we have the knowledge specified
by Timmons, actually is a judgement that is infoimed and influenced by our present
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situation in which we do not have this knowledge. And a judgement that is so 
informed, is likely to be a judgement to the effect that our intuition is that (E) and 
(TE) are engaged in a substantial moral disagreement. Why is this? This is due to the 
fact that at present it does not appear to us that the use of'good' ti*acks any unique 
property. On the contiary, it seems as if'good' is applied to a number of different 
things that do not have any unifying, underlying property in common. In such a 
situation, reflection upon the conversation between (E) and (TE) is likely to generate 
the intuition that the two parties mean the same by 'good', but simply have different 
moral standards.
Is it plausible to suggest, as I have done, that there is a causal relation 
between our present situation in relation to 'good' and our judgement about what out 
intuition is about a certain twin-earth example? One way to evaluate the suggestion 
involves getting clear about what its implications are, and then inquiring into whether 
these implications are plausible. If it turns out that the implications are implausible, 
then this is evidence for the claim that the initial suggestion is implausible. 
Conversely, if the implications are not implausible, then this does something to 
bolster the initial suggestion.
So, what are the implications of my suggestion? One important implication is 
that if  a change were to occur in our situation in relation to 'good', then a change 
would occur in our judgement about the intuition in question. Why is this? Well, to 
suggest that A causally influences B would look very implausible in light of evidence 
to the effect that B stays the same despite major changes in A.®^  We would, for 
example, grow increasingly sceptical about the suggestion that the amount of time
spent outdoors by an individual, causally influences the individual's experienced
®'*This is so only on the assumption that B is not causally over-determined: i.e. that B is not causally 
influenced by anything else than A.
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degree of psychological well-being, if it turned out that the degree of experienced 
psychological well-being remained stable across big variations in the amount of time 
spent outdoors. If the suggestion were anyway near the truth, we would expect 
changes in the amount of time spent outdoors to result in changes in experienced 
psychological well-being.
Now, in my view, it is not implausible to thinlc that if a change were to occur 
in OUI" situation in relation to 'good', then a change would occur in our judgement 
about what our intuition is about the twin-earth example in question. Imagine a futui*e 
state of affairs (FSA) in which we do not only know that the use of'good' is causally 
regulated by natural property N, but in which we are also very comfortable with this 
loiowledge. To be 'comfortable' in this respect means that we have had the 
knowledge for generations and that the knowledge is common knowledge. The vast 
majority of people in (FSA) have grown up being told that the use of'good' tiucks 
natural property N and that goodness is always co-instantiated with N-ness in acts, 
policies and institutions. Eveiybody knows that when an agent talks about goodness, 
he talks about N-ness. Due to these stipulations about (FSA), oui* situation in that 
state of affairs in relation to 'good' is very similar to our present situation in relation 
to 'water'.
Consider now what our intuition would be about Timmons' twin-earth
example if we reflected upon it from the perspective of (FSA). It is not evident what
the answer would be to this question. First of all, people have different intuitions.
Secondly, it is, as I have tried to argue, difficult to get a proper grasp of what it
would be like to be in such an unfamiliar situation as (FSA) arguably is. Some people
might mistake an intuition arising from their present situation with an intuition
arising from (FSA). Other people might be able to form a proper picture of what it
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would be like to be in (FSA) and therefore be able to report what their intuition 
would be in this situation. However, my view is that there is reason to expect that the 
intuition in (FSA) would be different from our intuition in our present situation.
Keep in mind that in (FSA) we are comfortable with the idea that when (E) talks 
about goodness, he talks about N-ness, and we laiow that when (TE) talks about 
goodness, he talks about N*-ness. If anything surprises us about (TE)'s use of'good', 
it is not likely to be the fact that he uses it to refer to a natuial property. It is, I think, 
more likely to be the fact that he uses it to refer to the specific natuial property N^ 
and not N.
In (FSA), 'good' is used by speakers in a way very similar to the way in which 
'water' is used by present speakers. This warrants, in my view, the expectation that 
the intuition we will have in (FSA) about a twin-earth example involving 'good' is 
going to be similar' to the intuition that we presently have about a twin-ear th example 
involving 'water'. In shor't, it is to be expected that we would have the intuition that 
(E) and (TE) ar e not engaged in a substantial moral disagr eement.
Where does all of this leave us? The answer is that a defender of 
causal-functional account of moral.terms has nothing to fear from Timmons' moral 
twin-earth argument. At best this argument poses an explanatory challenge, but as I 
have tried to show in the previous section, this challenge can be met. From the fact 
that Timmons' specific argument does not show the falsity of tire causal-functional 
account, it cannot, however, be concluded that this account is conect. There might be 
other arguments that bring out difficulties with this account. Any such argument 
deserwes, however, its own attention, and my aim in this chapter has only been that of 
defending the causal-functional account against a single, very influential argument.
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Chapter 10 
Cornell Realism and Moral Supei*venience
1. Introductory
My aim in this chapter is twofold: to give an account of some of the key 
metaphysical commitments of Cornell realism, and to discuss whether or not Cornell 
realism can give a convincing explanation of moral supeiwenience. In pursuing this 
aim, I shall concentrate on the works of David Brink (Brink 1984; 1989; 2001) since 
it is in his works that the most explicit formulation is found of the metaphysical 
commitments of Cornell realism. In section two, I outline and discuss Brink's view of 
moral properties. Section three explicates Brink's notions of strong and weak 
supeiwenience: In sections four and five, I discuss Brink's explanation of moral 
supervenience. I argue that his functionalist view of moral properties means that the 
explanation of moral supeivenience that he explicitly offers, is not completely 
satisfactoiy. I also make explicit the exact nature of the explanatoiy challenge that I 
think Brink faces. In section six, I argue that Brink can meet Üiis explanatory 
challenge. In particular, I argue that the special modal force with which moral 
supeiwenience holds is not a problem for Brinlc. The overall conclusion of the chapter 
is given in section seven, and it is that Cornell realism does not have a problem on 
the issue of moral supervenience.
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2. Moral Properties as Natural Properties
Brink asserts that what is distinctive of ethical naturalism is the claim that moral 
properties are natural properties: "The ethical naturalist claims that moral facts and 
properties are natural (i.e. natural and social scientific) propeifies" (Brink 1989:156). 
This general char acterisation of ethical naturalism lends itself to two distinct 
interpretations:
a) moral properties are identical to natural properties (the ’is' of identity)
b) moral properties are constituted by natural properties (the 'is' of 
constitution)
What does it mean that moral properties are identical to natural properties? It means,
or should be taken to mean, that moral predicates and certain naturalistic predicates
designate the same properties in all possible worlds:
"..but as the claim that moral terms and certain natural and social scientific
terms designate or express the same properties (i.e. refer to the same
properties in all possible worlds" (Brinlc 1989:157).
To take a non-moral example: the claim that the property of being water is identical
to the property of being H20 does not mean that there is one property of being water,
and another, distinct, property of being H20, but that these two properties ar e
nonetheless identical. It simply means that 'water' and 'H20' designate the same
substance in all possible worlds.®^
When construed as a theory that makes identity claims, ethical naturalism
implies that moral and natural properties are necessarily identical (ibid.: 157).
According to Brink, naturalistic identity claims in ethics should be construed on the
^^The clause o f necessary co-reference is important here. Without it, one would, for example, be 
waiTanted in holding the view that the property of having a kidney is identical to the property of 
having a heart. 'Has a kidney' and 'has a heart' are coextensive in our world, but the property o f having 
a Iddney is different from the property of having a heart.
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model of other common identity claims such as ’water is H20', ’temperature is mean 
kinetic, molecular energy’ and 'light is electromagnetic radiation’. The important 
features of these identity claims are that they are synthetic and necessaiy.
Brink here follows Kripke (Kripke 1980). The fact that an identity claim is 
synthetic does not rule out that it is also necessary. The pair of notions ’necessaiy’ and 
’contingent’ are metaphysical notions and should neither be confused with the pair of 
notions 'a priori’ and ’a posteriori’, which are epistemological notions, nor with the 
pair of notions ’analytic’ and ’syntlietic' which are semantic notions. Natural kind 
teims each denote a natural kind that has an essence, and this essence is discovered 
through empirical enquiiy. When an essence of a natural kind has been discovered, 
the true metaphysical nature of the kind has been revealed. This means that in any 
possible world in which instantiations of this natural kind have membership, these 
instantiations have this nature. The claim that 'water is H20’ therefore expresses a 
necessary tmth even though the claim is not analytically tme.
Moving on to b), the question arises of what it means that moral properties
are constituted by natural properties. Brinlc chaiacterises the constitution relation like
this: "If G actually composes or realises F, but F can be, or could have been, realised
differently, then G constitutes, but is not identical with, F" (ibid.: 157). To shed more
light on the constitution relation, consider, for example, the relation between a
bronze statue and the lump of bronze with a paiticulai* shape that takes up the same
position in space as the statue. Is the bronze statue identical to the lump of bronze of
that particular shape? The answer seems to be ’no’ since the statue and the lump of
bronze of that particular shape have different persistence conditions. Imagine that the
statue is a full size depiction of Napoleon standing with his right hand in the air.
Now, if you go and slightly bend one of the fingers on ’Napoleon’s’ right hand, then,
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according to Brink's intuition, the statue will continue to exist whereas the lump of 
bronze of the particular shape will cease to exist. What we have after this act of 
vandalism is the same statue but a different lump of bronze. The lump of bronze is 
different because it is of a slightly different shape than it used to be. Because the 
statue can sui vive certain changes in the arrangement of bronze-molecules, it is the 
case that the statue could have been realised somewhat differently from the way it is 
actually realised.
The relation of constitution might be applied to the issue of what the relation 
is between natural and moral properties in the following way: one might say that 
though the latter are not identical to the former, they aie nonetheless constituted by 
them. The reason for saying this would be the assumption that though moral 
properties ai e actually realised or composed of natural properties, moral properties 
could have been realised by properties that are not natural: say, non-natuial or 
supernatural ones.^  ^In other words, moral properties could have been realised 
differently from the way they are actually realised. Now, if one takes the view moral 
properties are natural properties in the sense that they are constituted by natuial 
properties, then, according to Brink, one is debarred from taking the view that moral 
properties are identical to natuial properties (ibid.:158;177). The argument is this:^^
1) If moral properties are identical to natural properties, then it is 
necessary that moral properties are identical to natural properties.
2) Moral properties, though actually constituted by natural properties 
could have been realised by a different type of properties.
Brink's view, Moore construes goodness as a non-natural property because he construes it as a 
property that is ontologically sui generis.
^^Let us call this argument 'A'.
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3) Therefore, it is not necessary that moral properties aie identical to 
natural properties.
4) Therefore, it is not the case that moral properties are identical to 
natural properties.
The counterfactual assumption embedded in the second premise is, according to 
Brink, tme.
"But it may seem that moral properties, even though actually realised by 
natural properties could have been realised by properties that are not natural, 
for instance supernatural properties" (ibid.: 177).
In Brink's opinion, the above argument therefore provides the naturalist with a reason 
to resist the identification of moral and natui al properties.^® He offers yet another 
ai'gument as to why the natui alist should resist this identification. The starting-point 
of this argument is the thesis that moral properties are functional properties that are 
niultiply realisable. Brinlc's functionalism about moral properties is explicitly 
modelled on functionalism in the philosophy of mind:
"A plausible claim about a vaiiety of propeiiy types and tokens (properties 
and property instances) is that they could have been realised in a variety of 
different ways. Functionalist theories of mind, for example, are based partly 
on this kind of claim about the one-many relationship between mental states 
and physical systems. [..]. A similar claim seems plausible about moral 
properties. For example, both the property of injustice and particular
instances of injustice, in whatever social and economic conditions they are
Brink says that identity implies constitution (ibid.: 157). This is, however, not tlie case. Assume that 
being F is identical to being G. Assume also that identity implies constitution. On these assumptions, 
we are wananted in concluding that being F is constituted by being G, On Brink's view, the 
constitution relation is a contingent relation. If being F is constituted by being G, then it is possible 
that something should be F and not G. But then it cannot be the case Üiat being F is identical to being 
G, The reason for this simply being that Brink construes identity as a necessary relation. If being F is 
identical to being G, tiien it is impossible tiiat something should be F and not G.
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actually realised, could have been realised by a vaiiety of somewhat different 
configurations of social and economic properties and property instances" 
(ibid.:158).®'
How might the multiple realisability of moral properties provide a reason for 
resisting the identification of moral properties with natural properties? Brinlc writes: 
"Moral properties could have been realised by an indefinite and perhaps 
infinite number of sets of natural properties. If we deny that identity is a 
relation that can hold between relata that are indefinitely or infinitely 
disjunctive - say, because we insist that identity holds only between genuine 
properties and we deny that disjunctive properties are genuine properties (cf. 
Armstrong 1978: II, 19-23) - then the multiple realisability of moral 
properties provides us with a reason for resisting the identification of moral 
properties and natural properties" (Brinlc 1989:158).^®
I do not think that this ai'gument is entirely clear. Some of the confusion aiises fi'om 
the fact that Brink talks somewhat interchangeably about various kinds of relata. One 
might wonder what exactly the supposed problem is: is it that identity is a relation 
that cannot hold between relata that ai e 1) disjunctive, 2) indefinitely disjunctive or
3) infinitely disjunctive? There is, it seems to me, a problem with an identity claim 
that involves an indefinite disjunction as one of its relata. Consider the claim A  is 
identical to B or to C or to.. '. Assume a standaid truth-functional semantics for 
connectives under which the meaning of a connective is identical to the ti'uth-table 
for a compound in which the connective is the main connective. Under such a 
semantics, we know the meaning of, say, ’A or B' just in case we know exactly which
®®Brink also advances functionalism in tihis passage: "The moral realist might claim that moral 
properties aie functional properties. He might claim that what is essential to moral properties is the 
causal role which they play in the characteristic activities of human organisms" (Brink 1984:121). 
^^Letus call this argument 'B\
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inteipretations make the compound true and which makes it false. What is involved 
in the initial identity claim is an open sentence. Since the disjunction involved is 
open, we do not know exactly what interpretation makes it false. We therefore do not 
laiow the meaning of the disjunction, and as a result of this, we do not know the 
meaning of the identity claim in which it is involved.
Since an infinite disjunction is also an open sentence, the same argument can 
be used to show that an identity claim involving an infinite disjunction is 
problematical.
Is there also a problem with disjunctions per se? In other words, is there a 
problem with an identity claim that involves a (closed) disjunction as one of its 
relata? One might think so on the ground that whereas there is a predicate 'is A or B', 
there is no property of being A or being B. I thinlc that there is good reason to reject 
the view that there are disjunctive properties. The argument is tliis: a plausible 
criterion for distinguishing between properties is a causal criterion. Property A is 
different from property B just in case an object instantiating A but not B, plays a role 
in the causal nexus that is different fi'om the role played by an object that instantiates 
B but not A. This criterion explains the intuitive difference between, say, being a 
spoon and being a goldfish.
Imagine now that an object instantiates the propeiiy of being a spoon. Does 
this object also instantiate the property of being a spoon or a goldfish? On the causal 
criterion, the object instantiates this disjunctive property just in case its instantiation 
of it gives the object causal powers different from those it has in viitue of 
instantiating the property of being a spoon. This does not, however, seem to be the 
case. An object's (alleged) property of being a spoon or a goldfish does not give the
object causal powers over and above those it has in vii'tue of being a spoon.
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So, I think that there is reason to believe that there, in addition to a problem 
with indefinite and infinite disjunctions, is a problem with disjunctions per se. A 
disjunctive property is not a genuine property, and it seems plausible to say that 
identity is a relation that can only hold between genuine properties. Therefore, an 
identity relation cannot hold in cases where one (or both) of the relata is disjunctive.
Suppose that one denies the assumption that a disjunctive propeity is not a 
genuine property. One would then find the above argument unconvincing. Can Brinlc 
constmct another argument that, without contioversial claims about the status of 
disjunctive properties, takes us fi'om the premise that M is multiple realisable to the 
conclusion that M should not be identified with any of the natural properties that 
might realise M on different occasions? Perhaps one is tempted to give an affiimative 
answer to this because of the availability of the following ai'gument: Assume that M 
in the actual world is realised by N***. Since M is multiple realisable, there is, 
however, a possible world in which M is realised by Suppose now that the 
identity theorist says that M is identical to N*, and toN'^'^. Since identity is a 
transitive relation, this claim entails that is identical to N"***. This is surely false, 
so anyone who thinlcs that M is multiple realisable should resist the identification of 
M with any of the natural properties that on different occasions might realise On 
the basis of arguments A and B, Brink thinks that the ethical naturalist should refer to
Biis argument is not conclusive. In my view, a plausible response to the idea that M is multiple 
realisable is to combine a type-type identity tlieory between M and some type of réaliser property, say 
witli the idea o f restricted identity (see Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson 1996:99). The property of 
being unjust (M) might be a functional property so that in different worlds, different combinations of  
social and economic properties (N*, N** etc.) realise M, Tins does not, however, seem to rule out the 
possibility o f making true identity claims about the types of things that m*e injustice in different 
worlds. So, assume that M is realised by N* in the actual world, and that M is realised by N** in a 
different possible world. The identity theorists must then restiict himself to saying something like this: 
'In tlie actual world, injustice is N' '^, and 'In possible world Wi, injustice is N**'. Analogously, what 
plays the pain role in humans might be C-fiber stimulation, and what plays tlie pain role in dolphins 
might be D-fiber stimulation. This is, however, compatible witli true type-type identity claims o f the 
following kind: 'Pain in humans is C-fiber stimulation', and 'Pain in dolpliins is D-fiber stimulation'.
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the 'is' of constitution when asked to explicate the defining claim of his position: that 
moral properties are natural properties.
"There is perhaps some reason, then, to construe ethical naturalism, or for that 
matter ethical supematuialism, as a claim about the constitution rather than 
the identity of moral facts and properties. Moral facts and properties, so 
construed, are constituted, composed, or realised by organised combinations 
of natural and social scientific facts and properties. The foimer are, then, in a 
certain sense nothing over and above the latter" (Brinlc 1989:159).
3. Weak and Strong Supervenience
According to Brink, ethical natur alism involves tlie claim that moral properties
supervene upon natural properties. Brink constmes supervenience as
"a nomological or lawlike relation between, say, properties such that one
property F (the supervening property) supervenes on another property, or
configuration of properties G (the base property or properties), just in case it
is a law that if something is G, it is F" (ibid.: 160).
Blink makes a distinction between nomological relations that hold necessaiily and
nomological relations that hold contingently. He grounds a distinction between
strong and weak supeiwenience in this distinction. On his view, ethical naturalism
implies both strong and weak supei*venience (ibid.:).
To understand Brink's notion of supervenience, we need to understand the
notion of a law (or nomological relation) that is involved in his definition of
supervenience. Take the suggestion that it is a law that if something is G, then it is F.
If this suggestion is con ect, then it is not only the case that as a matter of fact,
everything G is F. Something stronger is the case: namely that it is impossible that
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something should be G and not F. A modal aspect is essentially involved in a law or 
nomological relation. We can therefore give the following definition of a (specific) 
law: it is a law that if something is G, then it is F, iff it is necessary that if something 
is G, then it is F.
What is special about str ong supervenience is that the base properties 
necessitate the supervening properties. What does this mean? Consider the claim that 
injustice (F) strongly supervenes on a set of social and economic properties (G^). G* 
necessitates F just in case it is tme in all possible worlds and for all objects that if  an 
object is G*, then it is F. Assuming that G*^  necessitates being F, it is the case that in 
the actual world, a social arxangement being G"^  is a sufficient condition for it being 
unjust. It is, however, also the case that in worlds that differ fi'om the actual world in 
terms of proper*ties causally connected to those in G*^ , being G*^  is still a sufficient 
condition for being F. What is involved in Br'ink's notion of strong supervenience can 
be put like this: «-properties (say, moral properties) strongly supervene upon 
jff-properties (say, social and economic proper'ties) iff:
(i) For every F in a there is a property G* in j3 such that it is necessary 
that if something is G*, then it is F.^ ^
To cast further light on Brink's idea that moral properties stiongly supervene upon 
natural properties, consider this passage: "Moral facts and properties strongly 
supervene upon natural facts and properties because some sets of natural properties 
necessitate certain sets of moral properties. Because he rejects a semantic test of 
properties, the ethical naturalist denies that this necessary relation represents either
^^Put formally: «-properties strongly supervene upon /^-properties iff: 
VFGa3G*e)S[D(Vx)(G*x Fx)]
In this formula, the modal operators range over all metaphysically possible worlds, and every 
individual property in a and jS is one that it is possible that an object should instantiate.
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logical or conceptual necessity; instead, it represents metaphysical necessity or 
necessity a posteriori" (ibid.: 175).
It is worth noticing that the idea that F strongly supervenes on G*, on Brink's 
construal of strong supervenience, is compatible with the idea that F is multiply 
realisable. The strong supeiwenience of F on G"^  leaves it possible that something 
should be F and not G*^ . Strong supervenience of F on G"^ ‘ only entails that being G* 
is a sufficient condition for being F in all possible worlds. It does not entail that 
being G*^  is necessary for being F (either in some possible world or in all possible 
worlds). I thinlc that this brings out an important difference between the ethical 
naturalist who is an identity theorist and the ethical naturalist who is a constitution 
theorist.
Consider what an identity theorist (outside ethics) should say about the 
relation between being H2O and being water. If asked to present his position in the 
stiongest possible way, he should not say that it is metaphysically necessaiy for all 
objects, that if an object is a sample of H2O, then it is a sample of water, because this 
would make his position consistent with it being metaphysical possible that 
something should be water and not H2O. He does not, however, believe that this is 
metaphysically possible. For the identity theorist, being H2O is not only a sufficient 
condition of being water: it is also a necessary condition. So, what the identity 
theorist should commit himself to, is the claim that it is metaphysically necessaiy for 
all objects that an object is a sample of water if and only if it is a sample of H2O.
The ethical naturalist who is a constitution theorist should not commit
himself to a universally quantified bi-conditional that holds with necessity. Where F
and G* stand for the previously mentioned properties, the constitution theorist should
not, that is, commit himself to the claim that it is metaphysically necessaiy for all
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objects that an object is F if only if it is G*. Such commitment namely entails a 
commitment to the claim that it is metaphysically necessaiy for all objects that if an 
object is F, then it is G*. This is a commitment to the effect that F can only be 
realised by being G*, and this runs counter to the idea that being F is realisable in 
multiple ways.
According to Brink, it is often difficult to identify a stiong supervenience 
base, because it is often difficult to be sure that a set of base properties includes all 
the properties required literally to necessitate a set of supervening properties. So, we 
often settle for identifying the weak supeiwenience base (ibid.:161). This is an 
epistemological, and not ontological point. The fact that it often difficult to find out 
what the strong supeiwenience base is of a given moral property, does not mean that 
it does not have one.
Weak supeiwenience states a nomological relation that is not necessary. It 
holds in the actual world and in nearby possible worlds. Brinlc's notion of wealc 
supervenience can formally be defined like this; «-properties wealdy supervene on 
;6-properties iff:
VFE«3G*6)9[0(Vx)(G*x Fx)]^ ^
Here is what Brink says in order to explicate the distinction between strong and weak 
supervenience:
"Similarly, certain social and economic conditions may be sufficient in our 
world (and nearby possible worlds) to cause social injustice, even if there are 
possible societies sufficiently different from our own in certain respects that 
these social and economic conditions would not constitute injustice. Injustice,
Importantly, in this formula, the modal operators do not range over tlie full set of metaphysically 
possible worlds. They only range over a subset of tliese worlds: namely the metaphysically possible 
worlds that aie relevantly similar to the actual world. Again, every individual property in a and P is 
one that it is possible that an object should instantiate.
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then, supervenes weakly, but not strongly, on these social and economic 
conditions" (ibid. : 161 ).
Just to comment on this example: assume that in the actual world, a social 
arrangement's instantiation of is sufficient to make it F. Just in case there is one, 
or more, metaphysically possible worlds in which a social arrangement's instantiation 
of G* is sufficient to make it F, and that there is a metaphysically possible world in 
which a social arrangement's instantiation of G*^  is not sufficient to malce it F, does F 
weakly supervene on G*. F's weak supeiwenience on G* is a nomological relation. It 
is not only the case that eveiything G'*^  in our world is also F. It is impossible that 
something should be G* and not F where this means that there is no world in a 
certain subset of metaphysically possible worlds in which something is G* and not F.
An important question that arises in connection with Brink's construal of 
strong and weak supervenience is the question of how we find out which moral 
properties strongly, or weakly, supervene upon which natural properties. Brink's 
answer is here that this is something that is determined by engaging in first order 
moral inquiry. Different moral theories will give different answers to the question of 
what set of natural properties, a given moral property, say, injustice, supervenes 
upon.
"Which moral properties strongly supeiwene upon which natural properties is 
determined differently by different moral theories, just as, say, which 
economic properties strongly supervene upon which social and psychological 
properties is determined differently by different economic theories"
(ibid: 175).
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4. Cornell Realism and Moral Supervenience
I have ai'gued, in chapters two and thr ee, that moral properties, at least weakly, 
superwene upon natural properties. I have, moreover, argued that any minimally 
convincing metaethical theory must be able to explain why this relation holds. What I 
mean by 'wealc supervenience' is not, it is important to note, what Brink means by the 
teiTn. In my use of the term, «-proper'ties weakly supervene on jg-properties just in 
case:
(ii) Necessarily, for any property F in « and for any object x, if x is F, then 
there exists a property G in ^  such that x is G, and if any y is G, it is
p 9 4
What any minimally convincing metaethical theory must be able to explain is, in 
other words, why it is impossible that two objects within the same world should 
differ in terms of moral properties without differing in tarns of natural properties. If 
Brink's view about the metaphysical status of moral properties is taken to represent 
the views of Cornell realism on the issue, then, by determining whether or not Brinlc 
can account for the supervenience relation, it can be determined whether or not 
Cornell realism can account for it. So, in order to determine whether or not Cor-nell 
realism is minimally convincing metaethical theory in the above mentioned respect, I 
now turn to consider whether or not Brink can account for the supervenience relation.
One important thing to focus on in connection with this issue is Brink's view 
that moral properties are constituted or realised by organised combinations of natural 
and social scientific properties. As Brink says, it is a consequence of the constitution
view that moral proper'ties ar e, in a certain sense, nothing over and above organised
'^’Put formally: «-properties weakly supervene on ^ -properties just in case:
□VFe«Vx[Fx 3 G g (Gx & Vy (Gy->Fy))]. This is Kim's definition of weak supervenience as 
discussed in chapter three.
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combinations of natural and social scientific properties (ibid.: 159). Now, if being F 
(where F is a particular moral property) is nothing over and above being constituted 
by a certain set of natural properties, then it is clear that two objects within a given 
world cannot differ in terms of being F without differing in terms of natur al 
properties. On the constitution picture, a difference in terms of being F between two 
objects just is a difference in terms of their natural properties. It is therefore 
impossible that two objects within the same world should differ in terms of being F 
without differing in terras of natural properties. This is Brink's own explanation as to 
how his theory can account for the supervenience of moral properties on natural 
properties:
"One explanation of why moral properties supervene on natural ones is that 
they are constituted by, but are not identical with, complex configurations of 
natur al properties. On this view, moral properties stand to natural properties 
much as a statue stands to the bronze out of which it is constituted. If so, 
there is one sense in which moral properties ar e nothing over and above the 
natural properties on which they supervene: the natural properties of a 
situation fix or determine its moral properties: the moral properties of a 
situation do not have to be added separately to the natural properties of the 
situation" (Brink 2001:157).^^
If nothing else follows from the constitution view of moral properties than that such 
properties are, in a certain sense, nothing over and above organised combinations of 
natural and social scientific properties, then Cornell realism, by advancing the above 
explanation, can give a convincing explanation of moral supervenience. However, it
^^This explanation of moral supervenience is also found in this passage: "Naturalists claim tliat moral 
properties supervene on natural properties because moral properties are constituted by natural 
properties" (Brink 1989:160).
179
is, arguably, not the case that the only thing that follows from the constitution view 
of moral properties is that such properties ai e, in a certain sense, nothing over and 
above natural properties. If this is right, then it cannot, as of yet, be concluded that 
Cornell realism can give a convincing explanation of moral supervenience. It might 
namely be the case that whatever it is that follows from the constitution view, in 
addition to moral properties being, in a certain sense, nothing over and above 
organised combinations of natural properties, is such that by accepting the 
constitution view, one incurs an explanatory burden that cannot be discharged by 
giving the above explanation. So, what needs to be addressed now is the question of 
what exactly follows fr om the constitution view, and whether or not this 
compromises the explanation of moral supervenience that Brink has offered.
5. The Real Explanatory Challenge
Brink's claim that the constitution view entails that, in a certain sense, moral 
properties are nothing over and above organised combinations of natural properties 
implies, though not strictly, that there is another sense in which moral properties are 
something over and above organised combinations of natural properties. That there is 
a sense in which this is the case is explicitly confirmed by Brinlc:
"In another sense, though, the moral properties ar e something over and above 
the natural properties on which they supervene. The same moral properties 
could have been realised by somewhat different configurations of natural 
properties; this modal difference implies that the properties are different 
properties, and grounds the constitution claim rather than the identity claim" 
(ibid.:157).
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As previously mentioned, Brink's view on the metaphysical status of moral properties 
is modelled on a functionalist account of mental properties. Brink explicitly cites 
Putnam as someone who formulates a view about mental properties that is similar in 
structur e to Brinlc's view about moral properties (Brink 1989:158). Here is what 
Putnam says, in the work referred to by Brink, about the mental property-type of 
being in pain:
"It would still be absurd to say, 'pain is stimulation of the copper fibers'. If we
said that, then we would have to say that pain is something different in the
case of machine I and in the case of machine II, if  machine I had copper pain
fibers and machine II had platinum pain fibers. Again, it seems clearer to say
what we said before: that 'pain' is a state of the machine normally occasioned
by damage to the machine's body and characterised by giving rise to
inclinations' to...etc., and to eschew the fonnulation, 'Pain is synthetically
identical with stimulation of the copper fibers.." (Putnam 1967:420).
What Putnam is emphasising here, is that on the version of functionalism that he
defends, the mental property-type of being in pain is identical to a certain internal
state that is characterised in terms of the causal relations it enters into. This state may
be realised in multiple ways, but it would be a mistake to thinlc that being in pain, at
the level of mental state-type, is identical to any first order property that realises this
second order property of being in pain. The 'is' in "that 'pain' is a state of the
machine.." is the 'is' of identity. So, Putnam is proposing the view that the mental
state-type of being in pain is something over and above the first order properties that
realise it on various occasions. This suggests that the version of functionalism that
Putnam defends involves an identity claim at one level, namely that the mental
property-type of, say, being in pain is identical to a certain type of internal state: a
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State that might be realised in multiple ways. On the issue of whether or not 
functionalism in the philosophy of mind involves an identity-claim, one commentator 
says:
"Notice that functionalism in the philosophy of mind does involve an identity 
between mental properties and functional properties, the latter, of course, 
being realisable by a variety of lower level, more naiTowly natural properties" 
(Timmons 1999:43).
Now, if  Brink models his view on moral properties on, among others, Putnam's 
functionalism about mental properties, then it seems to me that Brink is committed to 
something like this: assume Üiat empirical investigation has revealed that human uses 
of 'right' is causally regulated by the functional property of causing a maximisation of 
human well-being. This means that rightness is, where the 'is' is the 'is' of identity, 
this second order, functional property. An act is right if and only if it causes a 
maximisation of human well-being. An act's property of being right is realised by 
other, first order properties of the act, just as well as, on Putnam's view, a creature's 
property of being in pain is realised by certain other properties of the creature: e.g. 
C-fiber stimulation. Rightness is not identical to any first order, réaliser property, and 
an act's property of being right is therefore, in an important and straight forward 
sense, something over and above its other, first order properties that realise it.
This account of the status of moral properties fits well with the semantic 
account, discussed in the previous chapter, that Cornell realism gives of moral 
predicates. What 'right' rigidly designates is the second order, functional property of 
causing a maximisation of human well-being. 'Right' does not, it is important to note, 
rigidly designates first order, réaliser properties.
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"According to synthetic moral functionalism, as we will call this position, 
moral terms are construed as purporting to pick out certain functional 
properties whose essence is revealed by the generalisations of a synthetic 
moral theory" (Horgan & Timmons 1992a:242).
The fact that this account of the metaphysical status of moral properties entails that, 
in one sense, moral properties are something over and above the first order, natural 
properties that realise them, makes it the case that Brinlc's previous explanation of 
moral supervenience is not one that relieves him fiom problems in relation to moral 
supervenience. The previous explanation of moral supervenience only works on the 
assumption that moral properties are nothing over and above organised combinations 
of natural properties. It has now emerged that, in one important sense, this 
assumption is false. The explanatory challenge that Brink faces should initially be 
formulated like this: how is it possible for someone who thinlcs that moral properties 
are second order, fiinctional properties that are ontologically different fiom the first 
order, natural properties that realise them, to explain why it is impossible that two 
objects in the same world should differ in terms of moral properties without differing 
in terms of natural properties?
6. Brink's Response
One possible answer to this explanatory challenge is to say that (i) is true. The tmth 
of (i) entails the truth of (ii). Put differently, it is a consequence of str ong 
supervenience, in Brinlc' sense of strong supervenience, that there is no possible 
world in which two objects differ in their moral properties without differing in terms 
of their natural properties. Let me try to make this clear*:
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Assume that there is in the actual world an object that instantiates moral 
property F (say, injustice). Since moral properties on Brink's view are realised by first 
order, natural properties, the object in question also instantiates such a set of 
properties. Let us assume that F on this particular occasion is realised by property 
G*. Let us also assume that G* is a strong supervenience base for F. F may have 
more than one strong supervenience base. Intuitively, it may be the case that in all 
possible worlds, being G* is sufficient for being F. This does not, however, rule out 
that there is a different configuration of social and economic properties (G'^ *’') that is 
also sufficient, in all possible worlds, to cause F.
Now, if G*^  is a strong supervenience base for F, then there is no possible 
world in which something is G*^  and not F. This explains why moral supervenience, 
in my sense of moral supervenience, holds for the particular moral property F. If 
there is no possible world in which something is G* and not F, then of course there is 
no possible world in which something is G* and F, and something else is G* and not 
F. A similar argument can be given as to why moral supervenience holds for any 
other moral propeiiy.
Consider this definition of strong moral supeivenience: «-properties (moral 
properties) strongly supervene on j5-properties (natural properties) just in case:
(iii) Necessarily, for any property F in « and for any object x, if x is F, then 
there exists a property G i n f  such that x is G, and necessarily if any y 
is G ,itis  F."^
It is important to note that Brink is committed to the view that moral properties 
strongly supervene upon natural properties, in this sense of strong moral
Put fonnally: «-properties strongly supervene on /^-properties just in case:
□VFe«Vx[Fx -> 3Gg (Gx & DVy (Gy->Fy))]. This is Kim's definition of strong supervenience as 
discussed in chapter three.
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supervenience. On the assumption that there is something in the actual world that is F 
and whose stiong supervenience base is G*, Brink is committed to the view that 
there is no object in either the actual world or in any other world that is G^ and not F. 
But again, this is easily explained by the fact that there is no possible world in which 
something is G* and not F.
In this section, I have so far left open the question of what the force is of the 
modal operators involved in the various supervenience claims. It is now time to be 
more precise in this respect. As noted, Brink is of the opinion that (i) holds with 
metaphysical necessity. So Brink can explain why there is no metaphysically possible 
world in which two objects are identical in terms of first order, réaliser (natural) 
properties, and yet differ in teims of moral properties. This is not insignificant, but it 
is not enough to relinquish Brink fiom problems in relation to moral supeivenience. 
As I have tried to ai'gue in chapters two and three, moral supervenience holds with 
conceptual necessity. It is a conceptual constraint on any user of moral language, and 
no explanation of this conceptual constiaint flows natui ally fiom the claim that (i) 
holds with metaphysical necessity. Metaphysical necessity does not entail conceptual 
necessity, so the fact that Brink can explain why there is no metaphysically possible 
world in which two objects are identical in terms of first order, réaliser (natural) 
properties, and yet differ in teims of moral properties does not entail that he can 
explain why there is no conceptually possible world in which this state of affairs 
obtain.
If Brink took it to be the case that (i) holds with conceptual necessity, then he 
could explain moral supervenience. However, to think that (i) holds with conceptual 
necessity is equivalent to an abandonment of synthetic natur alism in favour of
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analytic naturalism. Brinlc cannot therefore explain moral supeivenience by changing 
his view about the modal forcé of (i).
Is it possible to construct an ai'gument that both allows Brink to explain moral 
supervenience as a conceptual constraint, and allows him to retain his claim that (i) 
holds with metaphysical necessity? Blackburn does not think so:
"This may indeed be the kind of thing that a certain kind of'realist' (Cornell 
realism) might say, except that they would want to avoid an identity of 
'conceptual' content. But then the idea that it is satisfactory comes from 
focusing exclusively on reference to properties. Generally speaking, identity 
of properties does not explain the conceptual requirement that supervenience 
imposes in the case of ethics. For example, people say that the property of 
being water is identical with the property of being H2O. But this does not 
make it a priori that being water supervenes on being H2O, or indeed on any 
chemical composition [...]. It is the analyticity of the supervenience 
requirement, in ethics, that is the awkward problem for realism. Reference to 
properties does not explain it. If the realist claims identity of conceptual 
content, between 'is good' and 'creates happiness' he escapes the problem, but 
the open question argument strikes" (Blackburn 1998:316).
In my opinion, Blackburn is too quick in his dismissal of Cornell realism.^^ Here is 
what Brink should do in order to fend of Blackburn's criticism. He should start by 
insisting on à sepai'ation of issues. He should then draw attention to the fact that at 
tlie level of metaphysical necessity, he can explain evei'ything that needs to be 
explained in relation to moral supervenience. The fact that moral supeivenience is a
my mind, he is also too quick in liis dismissal o f a theory (analytic ethical natur alism) that claims 
identity of content between moral and natuial predicates. Such a theory might be mistalcen, but as I 
tried to argue in chapter eight, there is no reason to think tliat the open question argument can be used 
to strike it out.
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conceptual constraint on any user of moral language is, however, a separate issue that 
needs an explanation that is separate from the one given as to why there is no 
metaphysically possible world in which two objects are identical in terms of first 
order, réaliser (natural) properties, and yet differ in terms of moral properties.
This separate explanation involves considerations about what semantic role is 
of moral language. Put shortly, there is no reason why Brink should not be allowed to 
explain the analyticity of moral supervenience by copying, to some extent, the 
explanation that Blackburn (and Hare) gives of the phenomenon. Brinlc gives a 
descriptivist account of moral discourse. On this account, moral language is primarily 
used to give a description of an aspect of reality. What lies at the heart of an 
advanced debate between proponents of a non-descriptive analysis of moral discourse 
and proponents of a descriptive analysis of moral discoui se is not an issue of whether 
or not moral discoui se is entirely non-descriptive or entirely descriptive. As 
Blackburn himself reminds us, an advanced non-descriptivist (expressivist) does not 
commit a ’speech act fallacy' tliat consists in thinking that moral predicates have an 
exclusively non-descriptive meaning (Blackburn 1984:170). At least since Hare, it 
has been part of non-descriptivist orthodoxy to allow that moral predicates have an 
element of descriptive meaning. To apply a moral predicate to an object is not only to 
prescribe or recommend it, or otherwise express something with non-propositional 
content: the defining claim of non-descriptivism is only that the primary meaning of 
moral predicates is non-descriptive.
Formulated as a negative thesis, descriptivism is the view that the
non-descriptivist view of moral language is mistaken. Formulated as a positive
thesis, descriptivism is the view that moral discourse is primarily descriptive. A
descriptivist is therefore not committed to the view that moral language does not
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posses an element of non-descriptive meaning. This means that Brink qua 
descriptivist is allowed to say that ftindamental moral terms such as 'good', 'right', 
'unjust' etc., have a partly non-descriptive meaning. In other words, there is nothing 
in descriptivism as such that debars Brinlc from saying that part of what we do when 
we apply moral predicates to objects is something else than giving a description of 
these objects. What might this 'something else' be? Here it seems natural to say that 
we express recommendations, teach standar ds, and try to guide practical 
decision-making. Non-descriptivist are, it seems to me, forced to allow the 
descriptivist this hybrid view of moral language. Otherwise, the idea that they can 
allow themselves a hybrid view, seems equivalent to be introducing double 
standards.
Now, if  Brink is entitled to say that we use moral language, at least partly, to 
teach standards and guide practical decision-making, then he can, it seems to me, 
explain moral super-venience as a conceptual constraint. He can do this by simply 
copying the expressivist's explanation of moral supervenience. He can argue that 
moral language, at least partly, seiwes the role of being a vehicle by which we teach 
standards and guide practical decision-making. Our use of moral predicates could not 
serwe this role if we did not respect superwenience in our* practice of applying these 
predicates. It is therefore not surprising that it is part of the content of moral concepts 
(and part of the meaning of the predicates that express these concepts) that they ar e to 
be applied uniformly across descriptive similarities.
Where the modal operator denotes conceptual necessity, Brink can therefore
accept and, importantly, explain the truth of the claim that «-properties (moral
properties) wealdy supervene on y^-properties (first order, réaliser properties) in the
sense that: □VFe«Vx[Fx 3Ge p  (Gx & Vy (Gy-^Fy))]
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7. Final Remaries
It seems to me that the considerations of the previous section support the conclusion 
that Brink (and therefore Cornell realism) does not have a problem on the issue of 
moral supervenience. The suggestion that Cornell realism fares badly on this issue 
arises from a failure to appreciate two things: firstly that the explanation that Cornell 
realism gives as to why it is metaphysically impossible that two objects within the 
same world should differ in terms of moral properties without differing in terms of 
first order, réaliser properties, is not the only explanation that Cornell realism can, 
and should, give on the general issue of moral supervenience.
Secondly, that the descriptivist analysis of moral discourse that Cornell 
realism favours, is compatible with the view that moral concepts has, as part of their 
meaning, a certain non-descriptive content. When these two things are fiilly 
appreciated, it should be clear that a mistake is made if one, as Blackburn, supposes 
that the analyticity of the supervenience requirement in ethics poses a problem for 
Cornell realism.
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Chapter 11 
Conclusion
1. Introductory
This is the final chapter of the thesis. Section two contains a short summary of the 
preceding chapters and their main conclusions. In section three, I outline and discuss 
various ways in which these conclusions might be resisted. The last section is 
concerned with the question of what the connection is between metaethics and 
normative ethics. I address this in order to place the issues discussed throughout this 
thesis in their broader philosophical context.
2. Summary and Main Conclusions
This thesis has been concerned with metaethics. In the introduction, a distinction was 
made between external and internal accommodation projects for moral discourse. It 
was then argued that the external accommodation project should be guided by 
acceptance of methodological naturalism. After having made clear what 
methodological naturalism is and given a rationale for accepting it, a prolonged 
discussion was undertalcen of two metaethical theories whose ontological and 
epistemological commitments are compatible with those of methodological 
naturalism: namely expressivism, as developed in the works of Simon Blackburn, 
and Cornell realism, as presented by Richar d Boyd and David Brink.
In the course of the thesis these two theories have been subjected to an 
extended comparative evaluation, and an answer has been sought to the question of
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which of the two should be favoured. My answer to this question is that Cornell 
realism is rationally preferable to expressivism. This is the main conclusion of the 
thesis. It was anived at by looking at how well the two theories, respectively, explain 
various deeply embedded features of moral discourse and practice. Explaining such 
features is what the internal accommodation project for moral discourse consists in.
The assertoric surface-form of moral discour se and the supervenience of 
moral predicates on natural predicates ar e two featur es of moral discour se that have 
been the object of special attention in the thesis. It has been ar gued that whereas 
expressivism has no problems on the issue of moral supervenience, it still has no 
convincing answer to the challenge posed by the Frege-Geach point. In the cunent 
state of philosophical development, therefore, expressivism is not a metaethical 
theory to which a methodological naturalist should subscribe.
After the examination and assessment of expressivism, attention was directed 
at realist alternatives to it. Analytical ethical naturalism was first discussed, and here 
there was a special focus on the question of whether or not 'the open question 
argument' can be used to refute this position. Arguments were presented for a 
negative reply to this question. Cornell realism then became the centre of attention. 
First, an inquiry was made into the semantic views commonly associated with this 
position. An influential and much discussed objection to these views was considered 
in detail, and it was concluded that this objection cannot be used to show the falsity 
of the semantic component of Cornell realism. It was argued that what makes this 
conclusion interesting is the fact that the considerations upon which it is based, show 
that if the semantic component of Cornell realism is false, then it is so for a reason 
different fiom the one most commonly cited in the literature.
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Some of the key metaphysical commitments of Cornell realism were then 
outlined, and a discussion was undertaken of the explanation that Cornell realism
igiVes of moral supervenience. An issue that received special attention in this 
discussion was that of whether the particular modal force with which moral 
supeiwenience holds, poses a problem for a naturalistic theory that denies the 
existence of an analytic entailment relation between an object's instantiation of 
certain natural properties and its instantiation of certain moral properties. The 
conclusion of the discussion was that Cornell realism has no problems on the issue of 
moral supervenience.
In a comparative evaluation involving the major issues I have chosen for 
discussion, Cornell realism therefore fares better than expressivism. Expressivism 
and Cornell realism do equally well on the issue of moral supervenience. But 
whereas expressivism is vulnerable to a particular* argument from the philosophy of 
language (the Frege-Geach point), Coi*nell realism can fend off the criticism that 
most persistently has been directed at it fr om this area of philosophy.
3. Resisting the Conclusions and a Short Glance Ahead
What ai*e the prospects for resisting the conclusions of the thesis? One line of thought
consists in saying that the judgement that Cornell realism should be prefeired over
expressivism, is of limited theoretical interest since it is false to assume that
methodological naturalism should guide the external accommodation project for
moral discourse. According to this objection, methodological naturalism imposes
unacceptably tight restrictions on what count as plausible epistemological and
ontological commitments. If one abandons the requirement that a metaethical theory
should be compatible with methodological naturalism, then a number of other
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metaethical theories emerge as alternatives to the two theories discussed in this 
thesis. It is therefore premature to suggest that Cornell realism should be favoured.
This line of argument features in the influential metaethical works of John 
McDowell.^^ It is also found in the work of writers such as Sabina Lovibond and 
Mafic Platts.^  ^This is not the occasion to engage in a discussion of the works of these 
writers. I mention them, however, in order to draw attention to the fact that if one 
goes against my recommendation and rejects methodological naturalism in favour of 
what might be labelled 'expansive naturalism', then there are writers on the 
contemporary metaethical scene in whose works one might find inspiration and 
intellectual affinity. Interesting as their work may be, however, it caiiies the 
significant burden of either having to reject naturalism in general or else of showing 
that its understanding of an expanded version of this meets the metaphysical and 
epistemological requirements of a credible metaethical theory. This remains the 
major challenge to non- or expansive naturalistic moral realism.
Another way in which one might try to resist the conclusions of the thesis is 
to say that whereas methodological natuialism should be accepted, the issues 1 have 
chosen for discussion for a comparative evaluation of expressivism and Cornell 
realism are not the important ones, or are ones that ought to be supplemented with 
various other issues. One might then go on to say that if the focus of attention is 
shifted fl'om the set of discussed issues to others, then it is not at all obvious that the 
conclusion of the discussion stays the same: i.e. it is not at all obvious that Cornell 
realism has the upper hand in a comparative evaluation with expressivism. A 
defender of expressivism could, for example, say that 1 have ignored the important
issue for moral psychology of what the connection is between having a moral
^ See, for example, (McDowell 1979; 1985; 1995).
See (Lovibond 1983) and (Platts 1979).
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conviction and being motivated to act in accordance with it. Moreover, expressivism, 
supposedly, fares well on this issue and Cornell realism may have problems in 
relation to it. So, were this issue to be brought into the overall equation, expressivism 
would, ai'guably, come out as a stronger position than it appears in my discussion of 
it.
Let me comment on this line of thought. The overall structure of the thesis is 
given by the following question: if we accept methodological naturalism, have a 
choice between expressivism and Cornell realism and restrict ourselves to a 
discussion of issues x, y and z, which of the two theories should then be favoured? 
Evidently, this stincture implies that if a change were made from a discussion of 
issues X, y and z, to an examination of a different set of issues, then it is possible that 
the overall conclusion would also change. However, the issues 1 have selected for 
discussion are not chosen arbitrarily or idiosyncratically. They connect to deeply 
embedded features of moral discourse that any minimally convincing metaethical 
theory must be able to account for. So, while the thesis does not constitute a fully 
comprehensive compar ative evaluation involving all conceivably relevant features of 
moral discourse, its selectivity is considered, and 1 believe warranted by the 
importance, complexity and difficulty of the issues chosen for analysis.
Considerations about the set of issues selected for discussion suggest how one
might proceed next in the general search for a sound metaethics. A natural
progr ession from the thesis would indeed consist in looking at other deeply
embedded features of moral discourse, and seeing how well the two theories,
respectively, can explain these. A different line of inquiry, however, would be to
direct attention at other metaethical theories that are compatible with methodological
naturalism, but which have not been discussed at any length in the present study. 1
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mentioned some of these theories in section two of chapter one. In light of what was 
concluded in chapter eight following the discussion of the 'open question ar gument', 
analytic naturalism is likely to be of particular interest. In a series of articles in the 
1950's and '60's, Philippa Foot defended a version of analytic naturalism. She 
argued that there was a conceptual linlc between an object's possession of certain 
natur al properties and its possession of certain moral properties. It would simply 
constitute a lack of competence with the involved predicates, if  one failed to see that 
acts with certain natural features were rude or kind. In quite recent times, analytic 
ethical naturalism has been the subject of renewed interest among philosophers 
dissatisfied with expressivism and non-reductive realism. A significant reason for 
this is no doubt that the limitations of the 'open question argument' has become more 
and more apparent. As mentioned in chapter eight, Michael Smith and Frank Jackson 
are examples of contemporary defenders of analytic natur alism. There are at leas two 
reasons as to why their theories are interesting. First, as versions of descriptivism, 
they ought to have no problems in accounting for the assertoric surface-fonn of 
moral discourse. Second, since the relation between being G (where G is some 
particular natural property) and being F (where F is some moral property) is held to 
be analytic, such theories seem well-placed to account for the special modal force 
with which moral supervenience holds. Whether or not these presumptions hold true, 
and whether or not Smith's and Jackson's theories can explain other deeply embedded 
features of moral discourse are, however, complicated questions that would need to 
be addressed in a separate and lengthy piece of work.
‘“ (Foot 1958a; 1958b; 1961)
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4. Metaethics and Normative Ethics
Let me end by saying something about the connection between metaethics and 
normative ethics (moral theory and applied ethics). A reader of this thesis may note 
that it only discusses issues of an abstr act theoretical natur e, and that no effort has 
been made to connect these issues to issues in normative ethics. In light of certain 
developments within philosophical ethics in recent years, this feature of the thesis 
might appear puzzling, perhaps even worTying. The developments I have in mind are 
well summarised in this passage from the introduction to a contemporary textbook in 
ethical theory:
"Present-day philosophers, unlike the ancients, still employ these categories 
[Metaethics; Normative Ethics; Practical Ethics] to roughly distinguish the 
types of inquiry in which they engage. But, unlike their mid-century 
predecessors, they reject the idea that philosophy simply concerns 
"theoretical statements.... about theoretical statements." They are therefore 
disinclined to think of these ethical categories as separate - as three wholly 
independent inquiries. For instance, Stephen Darwall rejects any clear 
separation between metaethics and normative ethics (1998:12), while Shelly 
Kagan not only eschews the distinction between metaethics and normative 
ethics (1998:7), he also renounces any firm distinction between normative 
and practical ethics" (Darwall 2000:2).
To the extent that this is a correct depiction of the present-day orthodoxy on the issue 
of what the connection is between metaethics and normative ethics, 1 am not part of 
this orthodoxy. In particular, 1 am not disinclined to think of these two ethical 
categories as separate: and 1 think that a relatively str ong case can be made for the
suggestion that metaethics is independent of normative ethics.
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To say that A is independent of B is vague. It immediately raises the question: 
'in what sense is A independent of B?'. So, if my suggestion that metaethics is 
independent of normative ethics is to be of interest, it needs to be qualified. Put more 
precisely, what I mean is that metaethics is independent of normative ethics in the 
sense that when one considers well-known and commonly held metaethical theories, 
then it is most often the case that their adoption has no implications for what 
normative views one can consistently hold. 1 am not claiming to be able to show that 
it is impossible that there should be metaethical theories that have normative 
implications. Candidates for such theories are, however, rar e and there are questions 
as to whether they do not so much bridge the metaethical and the ethical as reject (or 
overlook) metaethics conceived of in metaphysical or semantic terms.
There is only one way of testing the plausibility of my suggestion and that is 
to consider a number of well-known and commonly held metaethical theories and see 
whether they have normative implications. If it can be shown that a number of these 
theories are such that the adoption of them has no implications for what nonnative 
views one can consistently hold, then this strengthens the credibility of the 
suggestion that metaethics is independent of normative ethics.
Consider first Blackburn's quasi-realist position. This is a metaethical stance 
in so far as it involves certain semantic, ontological and epistemological assumptions 
about the nature of moral discourse. This position does not entail any first-order 
moral commitments. Neither does it entail any particular moral theory. Addressing 
the issue of that the connection is between projectivism and consequentialism, or any 
other moral theoiy, Blackburn says:
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"It should be noted from the outset that there is no essential connection 
between projectivism and a consequentialist view in ethics" (Blackburn 
1985b:164).
So, if one focuses solely on quasi-realism (or, alternatively, on Ayer's emotivism or
Haie's eaily formulation of prescriptivism), then it would, 1 believe, be coiTect to say
that metaethics is independent of nonnative ethics.
Consider next a divine command theoiy according to which moral goodness
is a property that an object instantiates in virtue of being commanded or otherwise
endorsed by a Divinity. A divine command theory is a metaethical theoiy because it
involves certain semantic, ontological and epistemological assumptions about the
nature of moral discourse. One might think that this metaethical theory sets
constraints on what normative views one can consistently hold. Assume that the
Divinity does not command actions that maximise the overall amount of experienced
pleasure. On this assumption, one cannot both be a divine coimnand theorist and, in
normative ethics, be a utilitarian who thinks that what is chai acteristic of right acts is
that they maximise the overall amount of experienced pleasure. So, perhaps one can
cast severe doubt on the plausibility of my suggestion about the independence of
metaethics by maldng reference to a divine command theory.
Such a doubt would, however, be premature. A distinction should be made
between a divine command theory as an account of the status of moral values and
presumptions, and claims about what the content is of what is deemed good or what
acts ai e commanded or prohibited. Claims of the latter kind belong to noimative
ethics, and not metaethics. A divine command theoiy does not in itself set constraints
on what normative views one can consistently hold. Here it is useful to keep in mind
the distinction between the question of'what it is to be good', and the question of
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'what is good'. A divine command theory is a theoiy that answers the former 
question, and not the latter. For any defender of a divine command theory there is a 
distinct philosophical task that consists in explaining and defending the vaiious 
semantic, ontological and epistemological assumptions upon which his theory rests. 
A task of this nature is something quite different from the task of finding out what 
the content is of the Divinity's commands.
Finally, consider an ideal ohseiwer theory according to which what it means 
to say that something is good, is that it is what an ideal observer would favour. This 
is a metaethical theory because it involves certain semantic, ontological and 
epistemological assumptions about the natui e of moral discourse. Consider, for 
example, the fact that such a theory involves a commitment to the idea that moral 
utterances are truth-apt. It also involves a commitment to a descriptivist analysis of 
moral utterances. So, on these two issues, an ideal observer theory involves 
commitments that are similar to those associated with, say, Moorean realism and 
Cornell realism. It differs, however, from the latter two theories when it comes to the 
question of what the tinth-maker is of moral utterances. On this issue, an ideal 
observer theoiy appeals to the prescriptions of an epistemologically privileged agent. 
This is an appeal that neither Moorean realism nor Cornell realism make.
Does an ideal observer theory in itself set constiaints on what normative
views one can consistently hold? 1 do not thinlc so. Consider again the distinction
between the question of'what it is to be good', and the question of'what is good'. An
ideal observer theory is a theory that answers the former question, and not the latter.
The view that what it is to be good is to be favouied by an ideal observer is
compatible with all kinds of views about what such an observer would actually
favour, and the task of finding out what such an observer would favour is different
199
from the one that consists in explaining and defending the semantic, ontological and 
epistemological assumptions upon which a ideal observer theoiy rests.
Having addressed the issue of whether or not metaethics is independent of 
normative ethics and having offered an argument as to why it is independent, it is 
possible to move on to the question of why it is worthwhile to do metaethics. Why is 
it valuable to engage in this kind of inquiiy? Imagine for a moment that one was 
convinced that metaethics is not independent of normative ethics. A particular 
answer to the question presently under consideration would then seem natuial. This 
would be the answer that it is worthwhile to do metaethics because the adoption of a 
metaethical theory very often has implications for what normative views one can 
hold. The assumption of this answer is that the question of what normative views to 
hold is of gieat importance to us, and it is therefore important and interesting to laiow 
about whatever has implications for us in this area of thought.
Since I have argued for the suggestion that metaethics is independent of 
normative ethics, the above answer is not available to me. Moreover, the question as 
to why it is worthwhile to do metaethics might be seen to exert a special kind of 
pressure on someone who holds the view that metaethics is independent of normative 
ethics. The underlying assumption here is that if one rejects the idea that it is often 
the case that the adoption of a metaethical theoiy has implications for what normative 
views one can holds, then it is difficult to see what the justification could be for an 
interest in metaethics.
My answer to the question of why it is worthwhile to do metaethics goes via
more general considerations. Consider first the nature of philosophical inquiry. One
of its chief aims is to produce a coherent and systematic explanation of phenomena
that we only paitially understand, and/or have problematic or conflicting
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explanations of. On this understanding, metaethical inquhy is a typical fonn of 
philosopliical inquiry. What we aim at when we do metaethics is to provide a 
coherent and systematic explanation of that phenomenon that can be labelled 'moral 
discourse'. It is difficult to give a clear and concise criterion by which one can decide 
whether or not some statement or thought falls within the boundaries of moral 
discourse. It would, however, be mistaken to thinlc that just because it is difficult to 
give such a criterion it follows that there is no intelligible distinction to be made 
between moral discourse and other aieas of discoui'se. Moral discourse, arguably, has 
features that demarcate it from other areas of discourse. As 1 have argued several 
times over the course of this thesis, moral predicates supeiwene on natural properties 
with conceptual necessity. In this sense, moral discourse is different fi*om, say, 
discourse about the mental. No conceptual mistake is made if one suggests that two 
persons within a world can differ in terms of some mental feature without differing in 
terms of some physical property.
Moral discoui’se is also different from, say, coloui* discourse. It is a well 
recognised fact that people aie, other things being equal, motivated to act in 
accordance with their moral judgements. Michael Smith brands this characteristic 
feature of moral judgements, the 'practicality of moral judgement', and summaiises it 
as follows:
"Moral judgements seem to be, or imply, opinions about the reasons we
have for behaving in certain ways, and, other things being equal, having
such opinions is a matter of finding ourselves with a coiTesponding
motivation to act" (Smith 1994:7).
The 'practicality of moral judgements' gives rise to vaiious views about what the
exact nature is of the relation between giving a favourable moral judgement of
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something and being motivated to do, or endorse it. Internalists in this area hold that 
the relation is necessaiy (See, for example, Blackburn 1984), whereas externalists 
hold that it is contingent (See, for example, Railton 1989).
A similar debate does not arise in connection with colour discourse. It is not a 
characteristic feature of colour discourse that people are, other things being equal, 
motivated to act in accordance with their colour judgements. For a philosopher 
engaged in a second-order inquiiy about colour discour se, there is no issue of the 
'practicality of colour judgements' that needs to be addressed.
If it is correct to suggest that there is such a thing as moral discoui se, and that 
metaethical inquiry aims at producing a coherent and systematic explanation of this 
phenomenon, then it is possible to provide an answer to the question of why it is 
worthwhile to engage in metaethical inquiry. The answer 1 favour rests on the 
assumption that just as it is philosophically desirable in itself to have a systematic 
and coherent account of what goes on when we engage in areas of discourse such as 
mental, modal and colour* discourse, so it is desirable in itself to have a similar 
account of what goes on when we engage in moral discourse. This assumption, 
together with the assumption that metaethical inquiiy aims at producing a coherent 
and systematic account of moral discoui se, implies that metaethical inquiiy is 
worthwhile in its own right. Such is also my conviction and such is what has 
motivated this inquiry into what account of the nature and status of moral discourse 
best commends itself as explaining centr al and important features of that discouise.
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